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Preface

T

HE INSPIRATION FOR THIS VOLUME is to be found in the
life and career of Thomas M. Izbicki. Tom has touched every one of
the authors whose work is found herein, whether as peers, collaborators,
or mentors. The appreciation by Jerry Christianson that appears in the
final section of the book conveys more than adequately Tom’s professional
contributions as a scholar who embodies the rare combined talents of onthe-ground rigor and visionary insight. Each of the chapters contained in
this volume reflect one or another dimension of his extraordinary capacity to synthesize vast amounts of literature—primary and secondary—
into a cohesive account of the transformations that occurred in Western
thought between the so-called “medieval” and “modern” periods. We suspect that Tom’s greatest academic joys emerged from working with colleagues (attested to by the bibliography with which this book ends), drawing together intellectual communities in various ways, and (unbelievably!)
preparing indices for books. Of course, Tom also has gathered a large group
of friends who deeply appreciate him and who value his love and support
(as well as his distinctive laugh and subtle sense of humor). Although he
may have formally retired from his appointment at Rutgers University, he
appears to be working harder and more productively than ever.
No collection of essays can be completed successfully by the sheer
will of its editors. Therefore, we wish to thank the contributors whose
scholarship is represented in this volume. Each and every one met deadlines (early!) and cooperated unselfishly in the publication process—a testament, we think, to their respect and true affection for Tom. The staff
of MIP was supportive and professional from beginning to end; in this
regard, we wish to thank Theresa Whitaker and Ilse Schweitzer, as well
as Simon Forde at Arc Humanities Press. Ben Peterson of Texas A&M
University made Herculean editorial contributions well beyond expectations (as well as enduring the not-always-pleasant to-and-fro between the
editors). The late Dennis Wm Moran of the University of Notre Dame

viii  Preface

took a keen interest in the project, suggested many names to approach
about contributing, and would have loved to add his own appreciation for
Tom. Alas, Dennis passed away only weeks before we completed the final
version of the manuscript. And, most importantly, we thank you, Tom, for
all you have done for us and for so many others.
Bettina Koch
Blacksburg, VA
Cary J. Nederman
College Station, TX
March 2018

Introduction
Inventing Modernity
Bettina Koch and Cary J. Nederman

A

VISITOR FROM A DISTANT LAND AND CULTURE travelling through Europe will most likely eventually find herself in the
historic center of a medieval city or town. The center’s most impressive
building is almost assuredly the city’s main church or cathedral, which
dominates its urban architecture. The cathedral or church may still serve
its initial religious purpose, though it might have been secularized to be
used as a café or community center. The visitor might be interested in
its contribution to art or architectural history. But she may also wonder
whether the cathedral is still part of a living culture or whether the building is nothing but a relic of a way of life that has long ceased to exist. The
artifact, then, would be little more than an assemblage of stones that had
meaning in the past but not in the present and that is simply too large to
be placed in a museum.
Thus, our visitor instantaneously, if unwittingly, encounters the
imposing remnants and continuing (in)significance of a religious value
system impressed upon this society. In broader terms, she is confronted
with the dilemma of what constitutes European or Western modernity
and the degree to which the premodern past is still present in the societies of today. Indeed, the current discourse related to the reemergence of
religious fundamentalism may return meaning to these buildings dating
to the so-called Middle Ages, or may add new layers of significance not
previously evident.
Here, it may be useful to invoke the German philosopher and intellectual historian Hans Blumenberg, according to whom we need to “free
ourselves of the assumption of a stable canon of ‘great questions’ that
throughout history occupy humans’ thirst for knowledge with constant
urgency and, thus, motivate the aspiration for world- and self-interpretation.”
Blumenberg suggests instead that a surplus of questions is a problem of
a threshold of epochs (Epochenschwellen).1 There is indeed a certain set
of questions that we raise presently, and have raised for the last several
decades, that may rise to the standard of such a “surplus.” Whether the
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current experience of change eventually turns into a new epoch is something future generations will have to judge. For the moment, however, it
seems safe to say that we are confronted with a transformation in narratives
that compelled Jürgen Habermas, for instance, to remark that “the split
within the West” caused by the political revitalization of religion(s) “is
rather perceived as if Europe were isolating itself from the rest of the world.
Seen in terms of world history, Max Weber’s ‘Occidental Rationalism’ now
appears to be the actual deviation.” For Habermas, this takes the form of a
“secular awareness that one is living in a post-secular society.”2
Whether one agrees with or disputes Habermas’s observation about
a “post secular” society or age, his suggestion hints that the perception
of secularity qualifies as one of the key features, if not the key feature, of
European Modernity, even though, more recently, sociologists of religion
seem to have abandoned the explanatory value of a theory of secularization. Scholars like José Casanova see this turn as a change of perception
rather than a change in reality.3 Yet, such a change of perception has not
affected other disciplines in a similar way. Among philosophers, it is still
common to associate Modernity with secularity and an unwavering commitment to reason. As Blumenberg notes, “[n]ot so much the totalitarian
claim of modern reason but rather the totalitarian obligation towards it
could be described as secularity.”4 This notion is echoed in Charles Taylor’s
A Secular Age.5
It is not, however, philosophy alone that emphasizes secularity,
together with (scientific) reason, as the key characteristics of European or
Western Modernity. A similar point, made to very different effect, centrally
grounds the post-colonial critique of Western or European cultural, political, and economic hegemony and hegemonic discourse. With reference
to the Arab Middle East today—with the exception of the early Muslim
community under the Prophet Muhammad—Gudrun Krämer notes that
“religion and state have never been fused in ‘Islamic’ societies and that the
link between religion and politics was not fundamentally different from
that found in contemporary ‘Christian’ Europe.” Yet, simultaneously in
post-colonial discourses “secularization is widely portrayed as the centerpiece of a modernizing project imposed from outside and/or above, by
colonial and post-colonial authoritarian regimes, one that jeopardizes the
identity of Muslims to the benefit of the enemies.”6 The assumptions that
to be modern means to be secular, and that whoever is not secular is not
fully modern, contribute to this perception.7 To some degree, the so-called
Thomas Theorem (“If men define situations as real, they are real in their
consequences”) seems predominant in discourse.8
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Yet, the emphasis on the secular, whether conceived as secularization, secularism, or secularity, is not without justification. As José
Casanova suggests, it needs to be emphasized that the secular, as secularization, initially emerged as a purely theological concept in Latin
Christendom “that has no equivalent in other religious traditions or even
in Eastern Christianity.” Thus, these categories might be completely inappropriate if applied to contexts outside the domains of Latin Christianity,
whether it is South Asia or the Arab world.9 In this sense, the visitor to
our fictional medieval town may perceive the cathedral not simply as a
symbol of a (past) belief system, but also as a symbol of its power to overcome itself. If one accepts secularity as a key characteristic of European
Modernity, how is one to read the “return” of fundamentalist or extremist
religious movements? Are these movements, whether they are some version of evangelical Christianity, fundamentalist Islam, or the South Asian
Hindutva movement,10 signs of the end of the modern European era, as
Habermas’s notion of postsecularism implies, or do they simply require
that the secularity narrative needs to be reconsidered? It is evident that
the emergence of fundamentalisms is dependent on the modern condition, however defined.11 At the same time, they are interpreted as signs of
the decline, if not the disintegration, of European Modernity.
Olivier Roy offers an intriguing alternative reading. First, he suggests that the “expulsion of religion from the public space [...] automatically places it in the hands of radicals and the self-taught.” 12 His position
goes hand in hand with more recent arguments favoring greater inclusion
of religion in the public sphere.13 Second, Roy argues that
[s]ecularization has not eradicated religion. As a result of our
separation of religion from our cultural environment, it appears on
the other hand as pure religion. In fact, secularization has worked:
what we are witnessing today is the militant reformulation of
religion in the secular space that has given religion its autonomy
and therefore the conditions for its expansion. Secularization and
globalization have forced religions to break away from culture, to
think of themselves as autonomous and to reconstruct themselves
in a space that is no longer territorial and is no longer subject
to politics.14

Furthermore, he advocates the need to draw a clear distinction between
“new” religions and “traditional” religions. For traditional religions,
reason and belief are not contradictory, but rather “faith and knowledge mutually reinforce each other.” The deculturation of new religions,
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by contrast, “destroys this dialectic[al] relation: the sacred texts must be
able to speak outside any cultural context.”15 In the eyes of the infidel, this
dichotomy leads to the perception of the born again believer as “incongruous, even fanatical.” By contrast, for the born again, “the lukewarm, the
cool or those who have not been born again belong to the secular—or
even pagan—world.”16
Yet, except for the “new” aspect of deculturation, no serious student
of medieval or (early) modern history, not to mention philosophers, theologians, or political theorists who focus on those historical epochs, would
regard such waves of “fanaticism” as surprising—let alone shocking—
“news.” In the past as in the present, the dissonant voices of fundamentalist or “born again” movements reflect a very small number of believers, who seek, occasionally forcefully, to reclaim the public sphere. Too
often today, headline hunting media attention blows their significance
out of proportion. Ironically, while contemporary discourses emphasize
the decline or even disintegration of what is usually termed Western or
European Modernity, the conditions for the emergence—indeed, invention—of what is commonly understood as Modernity remain understudied and, consequently, far from fully understood. The present volume
constitutes a contribution to the project of remedying this relative ignorance about the origins of European Modernity. Despite the current trend
toward trans- and inter-cultural research (which is in general terms laudatory), the express goal here is to bring into clear focus the intellectual and
institutional transitions in Europe that crystallized in the modern era. To
the extent that Modernity represents a palpable shift in perspective (“perception”) that has direct implications for current times, it becomes especially imperative to investigate the specific contexts out of which it arose.
Of course, there exist disagreements surrounding problems of
periodization. Over the last few decades, scholars engaged in studying
the “medieval/modern divide”—some of whose research is represented in
this volume17—have pushed questions about the roots of Modernity further backward in time. These developments challenge precisely the canonicity to which Blumenberg alluded, whether a single historical event
(e.g., 1492, the “discovery” of the “Americas”18) or a particular author
(Machiavelli or Hobbes are often the first choices). This habit might be
useful pedagogically, but not necessarily epistemologically. The point
of view broadly advocated in the chapters contained in this collection
directly rejects such neat historical platitudes. The contributing authors
also together acknowledge that the “invention” of European Modernity
was a long and multi-disciplinary intellectual process. As a glance at the
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table of contents reveals, the volume concentrates on the period from
ca.1100 to ca.1550. This chronological choice is not arbitrary. Rather,
placing the terminus a quo at roughly 1100 takes into consideration factors that are commonly regarded as typical of medieval Latin Christianity
at its peak: developing monasticism, ecclesiastical reform, literary and
philosophical revival—and, of course, the First Crusade, which was
just under way. Our point is that if we may begin to ask questions (in
Blumenberg’s sense) concerning certain emergent features of Modernity
identifiable already during the High and Later Western Middle Ages,
then we have extended the “threshold of epochs” that ultimately yielded
the full-scale invention of Modernity.
The second aim of the present volume suggested above is the refutation of the view that narrow disciplinarity (and especially theological
transformations) was the driving force behind the shift toward the modern
mindset. This is certainly a prime implication of the current emphasis on
(post)secularism and Latin Christendom. As the chapters contained here
testify, the invention of Modernity was a project that involved interaction
between the fields of metaphysics, theology, ecclesiology, canon and civil
law, and political philosophy, among other disciplines. Taken together,
the many intellectual transformations (and concomitant institutional
changes) that occurred from the twelfth century to the fifteenth were the
product of micro-level developments that came together in a multiplicity of ways. The contributions to this volume are intended to mirror the
multidisciplinary character of emergent Modernity. They are authored by
scholars representing diverse disciplines: historians to be sure, but also
philosophers, theologians, and political theorists, all engaged in a cooperative effort to identify and attempt to propose answers to the myriad
questions arising from the transition(s) to the modern world.
Yet, as many of the chapters contained in this volume attest, the
transition(s) to the modern world by no means reflect a linear process
that, once put into motion, followed through in a logical and straightforward manner. Rather, that an idea developed centuries ago gets picked
up and transformed or adjusted for contemporary needs most likely
happens by chance than intentionally. This reality only complicates the difficulties of conceptualizing the “true” meaning and content of European
Modernity. In a number of instances, there is still no common knowledge,
if any awareness at all, that certain ideas attributed to the modern age are
far from being “modern” in origin, at least in terms of their original “inventors.” While present discussions of Western Modernity, as indicated above,
focus almost exclusively on the secularization theorem, a focus that is partly
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stimulated by post-colonial discourses and particularly a critique of what is
perceived as Western, this volume takes a broader view that concentrates
on four main themes. These themes (“Heresy and Reform,” “Transforming
Ideas and Traditions,” “Cusa and Philosophy,” and “The Great Schism and
the Conciliar Option”) taken together aim to reveal some of the complexities associated with emergent Modernity. This picture cuts against the
grain of the predominant Renaissance narrative that emphasizes the return
to or rebirth of ancient Greece and Rome as the main stimulus in the process of “overcoming” the previous age. Thus, to uncover the invention of
Modernity, looking back to previously overlooked impacts is as relevant as
looking forward. One name that reappears rather frequently throughout
the volume is Nicholas Cusanus (aka Cusa). The emphasis on Cusanus is
not only a result of his central place in Thomas M. Izbicki’s scholarship; it
is also reflected in Blumenberg’s narrative that associates Cusanus with a
“systematic relation of the metaphysical triangle of human, god, and world”
that implies “the critical self-destruction of the Middle Ages.”19
Since the formation of Modernity is not the outcome of a linear process, as we have suggested, the chapters in this volume are grouped thematically rather than chronologically. The first part on “Heresy and Reform”
explores three manifestations of transformative discourse. First, Louis B.
Pascoe and Christopher M. Bellitto discuss Pierre d’Ailly’s insistence on the
need for internal reform of the institutionalized church as a means of personal reform. While d’Ailly remains in a theological discourse that, at a first
glance, seems to imply a discontent about developments in the institutional
Catholic Church, his interplay between institutional and personal reform
reveals a departure from the Catholic anthropology of human imperfection
caused by original sin. In d’Ailly’s theology one may observe a transition
from a theology that emphasizes human imperfection toward a theology
that renders human self-perfection possible and sees humans increasingly in the
context of imago Dei. While d’Ailly’s theology is certainly not secular in
the sense of a rejection of the religious, it emphasizes the study of salvational history that is in the world, in the saeculum. Rejecting the ahistoricity
of theology applies a strategy for renewal and reform similar to, for instance,
that of twentieth-century liberation theologian Ignacio Ellacuría.20
The stress on historicity and the explicit use of history as a means to
critique the status quo also yields a new method to undermine and question papal authority. As Thomas Turley notes in his chapter, “In the early
thirteenth century, a new generation of canon lawyers—the Decretalists—
began to alter the interpretation of the status ecclesiae, ascribing broad
discretionary powers to the pope that allowed them to circumvent the
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normal rights and privileges of prelates and others in cases of necessity.”
“Secular champions” challenged their reading by explicitly turning to the
Scriptures, blended in their argument with history. While the turn to history as a means of antipapal polemics is well known in the works of Marsilius
of Padua, Turley traces earlier examples of this technique back to John of
Paris and John of Pouilly, among others. Despite heresy charges like those
leveled against John of Pouilly, the technique of emphasizing the secularity
of historicity resulted in an erosion of authority through a multiplicity of
interpretations that jeopardized papal claims to nearly absolute power.
Taking on the theme of heresy, Thomas A. Fudge explores the tensions
in the perception of the Bohemian priest Jan Hus, who “went to the stake
as a condemned heretic” at Constance. As Fudge shows, the conviction of
Hus has a prehistory that goes back as far as the Council of Tours of 1163.
In Lateran IV’s (1215) perspective on heresy, the earlier caritas approach
is replaced by potestas that relates heresy to treason as a crime against the
church and against the community. Thus, Hus was not only charged as a sinner, but also as a criminal. Consequently, “extra-ecclesiastical authorities are
seconded into the prosecution of the offensive activity.” By invoking Dante,
Fudge identifies common themes in Dante and Hus: “Patriotism, devotion
to their culture, lonely deaths far from home, and the experience of exile.”
While Hus illustrates the merging of ecclesiastical and political crime that
secularized sinful actions, Fudge also traces the perception of Hus until the
nineteenth century, echoing Dante’s themes of patriotism and (national)
culture. As exemplified by Hus’s legacy, Fudge’s contribution demonstrates
the emergence of nationalist thinking in the context of the secularization of
heresy as a deed against the church and against the state.
In Part 2, “Transforming Ideas and Traditions,” illuminates the impact
of the Roman tradition on republican thought that later became a marker of
the modern rather than of the medieval period, the transformation of ideas
from the twelfth to the fifteenth century, as well as the temporal abolition of
medieval republican thought in the Reformation age. Thus, the section shows
how the invention of Modernity can be seen as a dialectical “development”
that first abolishes more progressive ideas to allow for their more forceful
reemergence centuries later. For this purpose, Cary J. Nederman traces the
origins of medieval “republican” theory in the writings of Ptolemy of Lucca
and Marsilius of Padua to the grossly overlooked impact of “the role played
by classical Latinate culture and Roman civilization in the development of
political thought during the Middle Ages.” Focusing first on Ptolemy, who
“praised republican institutions as ‘more suitable for producing a certain
civility’,” Nederman shows that his reasons for limited terms for officials
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and emphasis on the rule of law, as well as the idea that the republic “must
struggle to gain and retain earthly security and welfare,” rest on Valerius
Maximus, Sallust, and Cicero rather than on Aristotle. In a similar vein,
Nederman traces how Roman, and especially Ciceronian, concepts and practices impacted the Paduan’s discourse about justice. Marsilius concludes that
“society itself is impossible without the acknowledgment of [the] obligation
arising from the Ciceronian principle of justice.” Following partially along
the lines of Turley’s argument, Nederman also shows that it was primarily
Roman “political doctrines and languages” that helped Marsilius to attain
“his overarching purpose of challenging and undermining the papal agenda.”
Nancy Struever’s inquiry into Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla on “the
centrality of imaginative powers in discovery” shows an alternative humanist tradition that moves away from Ciceronian elegance through advocating
Quintilian rhetorical elegance. Thus, she uncovers a story of classic Roman
reception that is often overlooked. By emphasizing both intellectuals’ interest in language, Struever points to Valla’s loquendi libertas, the freedom of
speaking, as “a felt obligation to intrude. Valla proposes and performs an
interconnected range of genres with topical reverberations; yet he offers serious critique of a particular historical—but unhistorical, inaccurate—clerical
misuse of the language of secular power.” While this is an indirect critique
of Cusanus’s “creative reinterpretation,” it also demonstrates Humanism’s
“function to enable inquiry to be strenuously, even meticulously revisionist,
and, perhaps, to be engaged in generating the possibilities of reform.”
Challenging and undermining the papal agenda remains, certainly,
one of the key issues in the Reformation era, particularly in the reception
of Marsilius. In her discussion of a 1545 partial German translation of
Marsilius’s Defensor pacis, Bettina Koch shows how and for what purposes
Marsilian ideas were adapted during the Reformation. Here, it is ironic
that, in this period, all of Marsilius’s republican leanings were eliminated
in preference to the view that he advocated a territorial ruler possessed
of almost absolute power over temporal and ecclesiastical affairs. Thus,
the move toward modern democratic ideas, numerous of which are visible and foreshadowed in Marsilius’s original work, takes a detour by first
abolishing them. While, at a first glance, the sixteenth-century reception
of Marsilius appears to be rather a step back from emerging Modernity, in
an odd way the use of Marsilius, as well as the historical reality in which
it emerges, helps to chart a path toward secularity. By fulfilling Marsilius’s
demand of keeping the Church’s activities under political control and
eventually placing it under the emerging regional powers’ governance, the
religious sphere bows to secular authority.
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In Part 3, “Cusa and Philosophy,” Donald F. Duclow stresses the
importance of Cusanus’s Constantinople experience. By focusing on one
of Cusanus’s lesser studied works, De venatione sapientiae (The Hunt for
Wisdom), Duclow concentrates on a philosophical-theological theme that
Pierre d’Ailly had tackled from a purely theological perspective: the question of self-perfection discussed in the Aristotelian language of potentiality and possibility. Duclow highlights Cusanus’s emphasis on the difference between celestial beings and other beings, the other “creatures—like
ourselves—are not all that they can become: these ‘are never constant,
and perish ... They imitate perpetual things but will never attain them ...
They are temporal, and are called earthly and perceptible things’.” Duclow’s
chapter demonstrates how, though moving increasingly toward a worldly
understanding, philosophy remains within the parameters of Christian
theology; at the same time, he illustrates Cusanus’s creative use of the
sources he hunted down in libraries and archives. One of the core questions
Duclow seeks to answer is whether Cusanus ought to be characterized as
medieval or (already) modern. Although Cusanus is clearly not modern in
the sense of Descartes, Duclow suggests that he might been seen as “modern” in a Gadamerian hermeneutical sense because, as Gadamer notes,
“[t]he horizon of the past, out of which all human life lives and which exists
in the form of tradition, is always in motion. The surrounding horizon is
not set in motion by historical consciousness. But it is in this motion [that
it] becomes aware of itself.”21 In this fashion, Cusanus remains in the tradition but, at the same time, “he pays little attention to the tensions between
the texts he reads and his own perspective on them,” which allows him to
read his sources “in a new and idiosyncratic direction.”
Precisely this feature of Cusanus’s thought is illustrated in Constant
Mews’s essay. Mews uncovers a less well-known and maybe even hidden
reception history that also challenges the Renaissance master narrative
defined “in terms of the rediscovery of classical authors” by stressing that
“the intellectual renaissance of the fifteenth century was shaped (particularly in northern Europe) by recovery of less well-known authors of the
twelfth and thirteenth century, whose writings did not gain authority
within a standard scholastic curriculum.” Mews traces some of these influences through Nicholas Cusanus’s library by emphasizing the writings
of Peter Abelard and Anselm of Havelberg. Here the primary focus is on
Abelard’s Theologia ‘Scholarium’, a work that Bernard of Clairvaux condemned because of its allegedly heretical content. Only five manuscripts of
Abelard’s work survived. As a transmissional figure, Mews identifies Anselm
of Havelberg, “whose fascination with accepting religious diversity” in some
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ways resemble Cusanus’s position. Both Anselm and Abelard were rediscovered in the fifteenth century. As Mews notes, “[i]n his Antikeimenon Anselm
of Havelberg anticipates the concerns of Nicholas of Cusa about overcoming diversity, but in the twelfth century, this was understood only through
the divergences between different forms of Christian life.” In both cases, the
interest in and the discovery of religious diversity was stimulated through
their journeys to Constantinople. Mews concludes that, although Cusanus
had been influenced by other medieval figures like Roman Lull and Meister
Eckhart, the “originality of Nicholas is such that his ideas cannot be traced
back to any single literary source.”
James Muldoon, by contrast, shifts attention away from the realm
of philosophical speculation toward Cusanus’s vision of World Order and
International Relations, “a topic that was of growing importance in the fifteenth century, culminating in the creation of the great European overseas
empires.” Cusanus stresses a harmony that results from the “active participation of human beings, wise men working with the consent of their fellows, to work out the specific details of the harmony.” This harmony, based
on consent, is precisely what most readers today would identify as a “modern” feature, though it was precisely this train of thought that was put, at
least partially, off the track in sixteenth-century thinking. Yet, because of
the emerging significance of integrating peoples from distant lands into
Cusanus’s speculative World Order, he faced the problem of how to fit the
“other” into a harmonious system. Theoretically, for Cusanus, this assimilation does not pose a significant problem, because “all men are by nature
social and organized societies ‘to preserve unity and harmony’ and ‘establish guardians of all these laws with the power necessary to provide for the
public good,’ just as European Christian rulers did.” Nonetheless, Cusanus
invents a hierarchy among nations that rests on their relative proximity
to Christian religion. According to his logic, Muslims would rank higher
than Tatars because Muslims “venerate the laws of the Old Testament
and certain of those of the New Testament.” As Muldoon notes, Cusanus
did not concern himself much with the practicality of his suggestion and
certainly could not anticipate the fact that “Islam was advancing in the
east, seizing Constantinople in 1453 and advancing through the Balkans,
reaching Vienna in 1683. A harmonious relationship did not appear
likely.” Yet, as Muldoon stresses, even for Cusanus the harmonious World
Order may not be realized “without the use of force in some cases.”
In Part 4, “The Great Schism and the Conciliar Option,” Joëlle
Rollo-Koster opens the discussion with a case of a political situation in
which harmony has little place by analyzing the circumstances that might
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justify the act of tyrannicide. She places her narrative in the context of
the murder of Louis of Orléans in 1407. As Rollo-Koster shows, this case
is of particular relevance because it plays out in the context of the Great
Schism, which raises the question of whether, if tyrannicide is permissible,
papacide would be acceptable on similar grounds. The problem refers to a
pressing political question during the Schism that concerns religious and
secular authorities alike, namely, “the means of responding to illegitimacy:
they could use violence, break away from all popes, or call a council to
solve the issue.” Her case illustrates that the struggle toward the legalization of responses to unjust or tyrannical rule requires in part a redefinition
of usurper, opponent, and heretic. Even though the Council of Constance
did not arrive at an univocal solution to the problem of a proper procedure, it nonetheless, with reference to the condemnation of John Wyclif
in 1377, declared that “the council as a whole is greater than the pope and
the pope is a part of the council.” Even after the election of a pope, that is,
the council still maintains its supreme power, which perhaps also reflects
an embryonic version of checks and balances.
The idea of the pope’s limited authority that shines through
the discussion at the Council of Constance is similarly relevant in Ian
Christopher Levy’s analysis of John Wyclif ’s opposition to canon lawyers
who claim that whatever the pope ordains is just since his letters may even
“possess greater authority than Holy Scripture.” Thus, the “heretic” Wyclif
is essentially concerned with a project similar to that of the conciliar
movement: limiting papal power. The means of attempting to achieve this
goal for Wyclif is through a discussion of a hierarchy in the authority of
sources. Wyclif particularly criticizes the canonist’s “assumption that Holy
Scripture and canon law might be placed on equal footing, as though the
growth of the former justifies that of the latter.” One of the key issues in
this conflict is the idea of papal dispensations that, at least in some cases,
might undermine the accountability and authority of the priestly office,
because, for Wyclif, “when a priest commits an act of fornication he must
be deposed from the state of the priesthood. The only question is whether
he can be reinstated following a suitable penance.”
In the case of Wyclif ’s idea of the accountability of officials of the
church, it took at least until the Reformation for the general principle to
be embraced and become part of political and judicial practice. For some
ideas, it took far longer than just a couple of centuries for their relevance
to be realized. As Francis Oakley shows in his chapter on the nineteenthcentury churchman Henri Louis Charles Maret, the ideas of Pierre d’Ailly,
with whom our journey through medieval discourses began, gained
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ultimate currency in the context of Vatican I, which aimed to address the
challenges posed by rationalism, liberalism, and materialism. For Maret,
“the government of the Church [...] had become ‘too exclusive, too absolute, too Italian’.” Maret’s opposition, however, reached not merely to
the too-absolute and too-Italian church, but also to his discontent with
the ancienne régime’s “political Gallicanism” that was “alien to the liberal
sympathies and (increasingly) democratic sensibilities that eventually
led Maret to embrace a species of separation between church and state.”
Yet, his distaste for the political Gallicanism of the time also brought
Maret closer to traditional conciliar thinking. As Oakley notes, in the
“combination of the strict conciliar theory with the (older) reforming
strand in conciliar thinking, Maret stood somewhat closer in spirit to the
great conciliarists of the fifteenth century than he did to his immediate
Gallican forbearers.”
After our traveler from a distant land and culture who was introduced at the beginning of this chapter has journeyed with us to the different places and engaged with different ideas discussed in the present
volume, she might come to the conclusion that, while the meanings of
representations of medieval Christianity still visible throughout Europe
might have changed throughout the centuries, they also shaped and made
possible what is presently perceived as Modernity. She might even conclude that some ideas she has associated with Modernity itself were as present in medieval thought as they are today.
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Part 1
Heresy and Reform

Pierre d’Ailly
The Trinitarian Dynamics of
Personal Reform and Renewal
Louis B. Pascoe, SJ† with Christopher M. Bellitto1

T

HERE IS A TENDENCY TO VIEW CHURCH REFORM in any
historical period through a prism of attempts to reform and renew
either the institution’s administrative head (pope, cardinals, bishops) or
her local members (priests, monks and nuns, mendicant men and women,
city or rural folk). This is a false dichotomy, however, since the operative
phrase in the history of church reform is reformatio in capite et in membris:
reform in head and members, not head or members. While historians and
theologians may logically focus on efforts in one or the other, the reality is
that most reformers—particularly represented by late medieval and early
modern Catholic and Protestant voices—saw reform in terms of both
head and members and not a binary either/or.2
This chapter offers a balancing look at one such reformer, Pierre
d’Ailly (1351–1420), who is primarily known for his considerable achievements in high-level church statesmanship, which entailed the institutional aspects of his writings and actions on church politics and theology.
Our attempt is to expand the standard portrait of d’Ailly by means of an
examination of the more contemplative aspect of his considerable body of
writings on reform: the spiritual dimensions that must underlie all other
attempts at structural reform, especially episcopal and papal reform, if
they are to demonstrate authenticity, integrity, credibility, and, ultimately,
long-term impact and success on the personal level. The present study will
draw on d’Ailly’s generally overlooked writings on spirituality and will
explore especially the personal initiatives necessary for inner renewal.
Personal reform and renewal—and therefore lasting institutional
structural reforms—were simply impossible without the three preconditions of grace (what d’Ailly referred to as the heart’s opening to the adventus Christi) self-knowledge, and a loving response to God’s invitation. We
find this triad of preconditions explicated in a series of writings from the
first part of d’Ailly’s career (1372–1395), dating to his own arts studies at
the Collège de Navarre, and then moving to his time as a theology professor
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and university official, first as rector of his Collège (1384–1389) and then
as University of Paris chancellor (1389–1395).3 He was named diocesan
bishop in Le Puy (1395–1397), although he did not spend much time
there; he was then transferred to the more prestigious diocese of Cambrai
(1397–1411), where he took his episcopal duties more seriously.4 We will
examine especially his Speculum considerationis, dating probably from
the latter years of the Cambrai period, along with a few comments from
other writings and sermons.5 It is likely that Speculum considerationis was
directed toward his clergy in Cambrai and may be a more formal version
of three long sermons delivered in the three synods that d’Ailly held as
bishop there. In them, he encouraged his priests to live a life of virtue,
especially charity in pastoral service, instead of vice—rhetorically to be
apostles rather than apostates.6
The key to understanding d’Ailly’s notion of personal reform is to
ground it, as he did, in Christian anthropology.7 D’Ailly’s perspective on
personal reform was based on an optimistic and respectful stance toward
the status and potential of the human person. Made in the image and likeness of God, each human being enjoyed the dignity and nobility of the created state. All human creatures may be said to be vestigia Dei et Trinitatis.
Only rational creatures can be created in God’s image and likeness; therein
sits human dignity, nobility, and honor. In fact, the imago Dei is placed
at the border of the two worlds of heaven and earth. This threshold status meant that all humans had the potential in mind, intellect, and will
to manifest truth, goodness, wisdom, love, mercy, and loftiness or magnificentia (big-heartedness) that were close to but never quite reaching
the divine levels of these attributes. Nevertheless, these virtues could be
achieved via self-knowledge, good habit, reason, and a cultivated conscience guided by the principle of synderesis to act in a morally responsible
way for the good of others. D’Ailly envisioned a unified hierarchical view
of the created universe not unlike that of his successor as University of
Paris chancellor, Jean Gerson (1363–1429), who closely followed pseudoDionysian models. D’Ailly’s theology was also in line with late medieval
scholastic adoption and adaptation of Augustinian thought, especially on
the Trinity, and owed a large debt to Aristotelian logic.8
This optimistic potential had been harmed by Adam’s fall, though
Adam as a human creature was above all other corporeal creations while
containing and surpassing their measure of perfection. Humanity’s four
original virtues—mercy, truth, justice, and peace—had been obscured
by vice because of the human inability to realize the original dignity.
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This blindness occurred through disobedience and rebelliousness. As a
result, humans lost their full imago et similitudo (image and likeness) to
God and Trinity, although never the potential to recover them. Humans
began to act sinfully, which in turn dulled the spiritual senses. Hence,
d’Ailly described the state of humanity in the church on Earth as that of
vestigia et similitudo creatorum.9 Affinity with the Trinity was replaced in
exile from the heavenly home by a new unworthy trinity of impotentia,
ignorantia et concupiscentia. Some of d’Ailly’s images for the now-pilgrim
human being were a region of shadows, a besieged castle or tower, and
the man beaten by thieves on the journey to Jericho from the parable of
the Good Samaritan. That pilgrim path back to the spotless imago Dei et
Trinitatis entailed the dynamics of personal reform and renewal.10
The human person is a microcosm of God, who is infused in all creation. As God creates, moves, and rules all creatures, so too the human soul
freely moves the body and directs its physical and spiritual actions. God’s
grace was necessary because of human fragility, which cannot achieve
virtue without divine aid. Turning to God in meditation with a humble
awareness of this need for grace strengthens the soul; penance leads to
spiritual progress and a conversion away from carnal vices and sins. Love
God sweetly, prudently, and boldly, d’Ailly advises, so that you may endure
hardship.11 In tones that occasionally ring with exhortation but at other
times clang like a tedious scholastic lecture, d’Ailly leads his reader (or
more likely his priestly listener in synod at Cambrai) in Speculum considerationis through a reflection on his vices and then, in contrast, a meditation on his heavenly home with an emphasis on how he might progress
from mortal reason to angelic participation. The arduous path of a virtuous life includes a pragmatic recognition of humanity’s natural dignity
sullied by sinful actions; however, that dignity can be revived by divine
grace and hard human work that progresses toward God. Such progress is
informed by philosophy that offers excellences (he is adopting Aristotle’s
word here, which we usually take as “virtues”), but we are impeded by our
carnal desires. The antidote is reliance on and hope of God’s goodness,
truth, power, and love.12
In trinitarian fashion, d’Ailly delineated that redemption comes by
divine potentia (power), sapientia (wisdom), and bonitas (goodness), all
of which are fueled by grace and mercy that produce personal reformation and right action. Christ’s passion is seen as reflecting this triad. Grace
reforms the soul, but only if the soul recognizes its dignity and is open to
correction. For Christ’s part, patience is the order of the day: Christ offers
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grace as a standing gift to be accepted in due time. What is required of the
individual person seeking reform is an openness to the gift in prayer before
the Trinity: the Father provides strength so the penitent might not weary,
the Son will rule by wisdom so the penitent will not be seduced into error,
and the Spirit would console with mercy.13
D’Ailly added self-knowledge, one of the Holy Spirit’s seven gifts,
as another precondition for personal reform to grace and a heart open to
the adventus Christi. We should not be surprised to find this theme in an
Advent sermon where d’Ailly listed a four-fold opening to Christ. We first
are open to the incarnated Christ who made his home among humanity
when the Word became flesh. Next Christ takes root in the mind through
spiritual influence, related again in trinitarian terms: the Father forms
us with his power, the Son illuminates with wisdom, the Spirit inflames
hearts with grace. Third, Christ comes to accompany us in our suffering
as he carried us on his own cross. Fourth and finally, Christ leads us to our
judgment at the end of time.14
It is necessary to turn within: only in self-recognition of sinfulness
and defects as well as of impending divine judgment can the soul move
from an inferior to a superior knowledge of God. In meditating on death,
the mind contemplates eternal life with God and the angels in heaven: a
life that surpasses the rational and mortal aspects of earthly life. The lack
of such self-knowledge has a terrible price: the soul that does not know
itself does not know the dignity of its nature as made in the imago Dei
and therefore cannot know nor conform itself to God. The antidote is to
seek to understand and desire as God understands and desires. In this way,
the will deformed by sin may be reformed according to God’s love, power,
wisdom, and mercy. The purgative path of humble meditation leads away
from sin and to conversion that progresses toward heavenly life. The
soul will thus be freed from both Original and lived sin through God’s
patience and kindness as demonstrated by Christ’s suffering and crucifixion. Led to the knowledge and love of God, the soul’s only response is
an intense love (dulciter, prudenter, fortiter) for the God who provided
redemption and salvation.15
Despite the ultimate reliance on divine grace, d’Ailly placed a great
deal of emphasis on personal initiatives toward reform, beginning with an
intentional and self-conscious effort to root out vices and cleanse oneself
of sins, in particular of falling prey to the devil’s lures—the chains of concupiscence of the flesh and eyes as well as arrogance and avarice—to be
replaced by the cultivation of virtues, especially humility and obedience.16
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We arrive at these virtues through hard work in our tasks and contemplation of the divine majesty and heavenly light, which purge the heart of
vice and begin the path toward wisdom. One must be intentionally aware
of God’s gifts in this purgative path through an ascetical lifestyle and contemplation. We again see the pseudo-Dionysian influence, in this case the
reform path shared by Gerson’s notions of personal renewal: from purgation through illumination to perfection.17
D’Ailly discussed the combined total of seven theological and cardinal virtues in his Speculum considerationis, which, as we’ve noted, was
likely connected to three instructional and pastorally-oriented synods
for his priests in Cambrai. He also addressed the topic in a sermon for
Trinity Sunday on June 14, 1405. In common trinitarian terms—and we
note that d’Ailly saw trinitarian reform applying to both personal and
institutional reform—he described the theological virtues of faith, hope,
and charity as the created Trinity, which are made in the image of the
uncreated Trinity. These virtues he sees as interrelated in spiritual people
who act in obedience to God’s potentia, veritas, et bonitas. He stressed
that these virtues are themselves reformative within the individual soul:
as they curb vice and convert the soul to act in faith, they cause that soul
to rise upward to God. Thus reason is transformed into faith in the gospel, anger into hope, and lust into charity. It is through the created Trinity
of the theological virtues that fallen humanity reforms and returns to the
uncreated Trinity from which it fell and was exiled. Through faith (rules
and sacraments), we are guided toward the Trinity; through hope (forgiveness by grace and glory), we are lifted up to the Trinity; and especially through charity (a pure heart and a good conscience), we are united
with the Trinity.18
The cardinal virtues—prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia—are intertwined with God’s potentia, veritas, et bonitas. We hear the
former university professor’s precise methodology at work as diocesan
bishop. In good scholastic fashion, d’Ailly began by defining his terms
for the four cardinal virtues. Prudence is presented as a rubric for other
functions: discretion, memory, understanding , circumspection (perhaps perspective is a better word), and caution. Temperance entails constancy, modesty, abstinence, and chastity. He broadly defined fortitude
as including magnanimity, trust, security, and patience. He also dwelled
a bit here on magnificentia (which we have anachronistically translated
as “big-heartedness”), indicating that it dispels three defects: rashness,
weakness, and being faint-hearted, like plants tossed easily by the wind.
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The final cardinal virtue, justice, is accorded a greater level of
inquiry. D’Ailly identified four theories of justice. First, justice can be seen
as both severity and freedom, which in turn can produce a sense of piety,
innocence, friendship, reverence, concord, and mercy. Second, justice fosters obedience, discipline, equity, truth, and faithfulness. A third theory
of justice is more basic to natural law: justice helps all and harms none.
Fourth, justice must ensure that everyone is rendered what is naturally his,
namely faith, hope, and love. He noted that justice may translate to intimate connections such as the piety or honor due to parents, relatives, and
even country.
We come now to the reformative role that d’Ailly assigned to these
cardinal virtues, starting with their fundamental task in working against
the defectus of Original Sin. To begin this fight against sin, d’Ailly prescribed the petitionary aspects of the Pater Noster as a path to restore
theological and cardinal virtues. He grandly described those virtues as
precious stones like shining stars in the crown of Christ’s spouse, the
ecclesia militans, and then assigned the virtues to parts of that crown.
Prudence is the front part where understanding battles ignorance with
good counsel by guarding against future evils. Temperance sits on the
crown’s right side where it moderates against concupiscence and the
dangers of prosperity, while fortitude pairs temperance on the left side
where it provides support against succumbing to adversity or infirmity.
D’Ailly placed a greater emphasis on fortitude a bit later in this section of the Speculum considerationis, perhaps because he felt the need
to support a diocesan clergy embattled and demoralized by the Schism
and the French civil wars, both by then in their third decades. He commended fortitude for expelling the soul’s weakness or sense of being
enfeebled and replacing it with greatness. Fortitude specifically counters three debilities: fear with patience, timidity with knowledge, and
instability with steadiness. Finally, justice is the crown’s back, correcting
spite or an ill nature with uprightness. 19 Earlier, in his academic career
at Paris before taking on the pastoral role of a diocesan bishop, d’Ailly
had already laid out in his Epilogus de quadruplici exercitio spirituali the
reformative role of Christ’s power, wisdom, and goodness or mercy (he
used both bonitas and clementia). Christ’s passion demonstrated that
these divine attributes are offered to help humans transform themselves
and to be reformed by divine aid. Christ has great patience in waiting
for us to embrace self-reformation via penance for our sins and to allow
Christ to lead our soul back to him.20

PIERRE D’AILLY  23

Having weeded out vice and cultivated virtue, the reforming soul
is next in a position to taste the fruits of its good work in the next life,
although some may enjoy their sweetness partially on earth. This enjoyment
brings us to d’Ailly’s consideration of contemplation, which, he noted to his
priests in pastoral service in Cambrai, is easier to pursue in a monastic setting
rather than in their active parish context. He recommended that his busy
priests locate a place of quiet solitude for their reading, prayer, and meditation so they may ascend in contemplation. They must not engage in fruitless
work or be distracted. These thoughts on the stages of contemplation that
d’Ailly recommended to his diocesan clergy in Speculum considerationis drew
on another text with the affiliated thematic title, De quatuor gradibus scale
spiritualis, dating back to his Parisian period, as well as on his sermons in
Cambrai. He now adapted his earlier formal classroom treatment with an
inspirational tone directed to the busy apostolic service of working priests.
In the Parisian text he described in conventional terms the four stages of contemplation: lectio, meditatio, oratio, et contemplatio. The first three combine
to produce the fourth. Reading and meditation inform prayer, which then
ascends to contemplation and returns in a renewed commitment to apostolic service and virtuous deeds that would present a credible example to
parishioners.21 As always, d’Ailly identified the combination of divine grace
and human industry as indispensable to personal reform and renewal.22
Here we see d’Ailly presenting a dialectic among the spiritual progress of contemplation, the personal progress in the cardinal and theological virtues, and the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. He relates four of these
gifts to intellectus (sapientia, intellectus, consilium et scientia) and three to
affectus (fortitudo, pietas et timor Dei). Although he had stated that it is easier to achieve this personal progress in a monastic setting, d’Ailly reminded
his working priests that the apostolic-oriented beatitudes were the natural effect of exercising the Holy Spirit’s gifts and fruits. While sapientia et
intellectus pertained particularly to the contemplative life, the three gifts
of timor Dei, pietas, et fortitudo would serve the clergy well in their parish life. In this they will conform themselves to the image and likeness of
God while they led their charges to do so too. They must, however, guard
themselves from a sense of smugness: as they climb, they can easily fall off
the ladder of contemplation. Self-knowledge demands that the spiritual
pilgrim accuse himself of negligence and sin, vanity, and lust. Progress in
the virtues does not preclude backsliding into vice. In particular, the gifts
of sapientia and consilium (judgment) guide the soul to discern what helps
and what hinders via contemplation.23
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The best way for the soul to make progress was not by following
human doctrine but by seeking divine inspiration that is encountered
especially through scripture, which d’Ailly offered as the way home to
heaven. This is the reformative dimension—more precisely: function—of
theology.24 Earthly knowledge and wisdom would not lead back to the
Garden: fallen, sinful, poor, and expelled mankind would not be corrected by philosophers, doctors, politicians, or lawyers. The ancient law
of Moses must be pushed aside for the new law personified by Christ the
doctor and master. Studying salvation history was the same as revealing
Truth on Earth that had been lost by Adam’s disobedience. Scripture calls
humanity’s originally pure but now sullied imago back to God and Trinity.
Scripture study leads to an appreciation of God’s perfect precepts, increasing belief and meritorious actions, and therefore heavenly reward, by grace
and justice. Schooled in salvation history, the seeking soul that had been
hampered by human defect is now mildly and helpfully corrected by God.
The soul reforms by conforming itself to Christ’s law and divine will.
Using medical imagery, d’Ailly comments that Christ’s new doctrine is the
healing remedy that by grace restores human wholeness and health from
its infirmity. Specifically, the sacraments are perfect medicine for all of the
consequences of Original and later sins.25
For those who have persisted through d’Ailly’s many divisions and
distinctions of contemplation, study, and meditation, there is great reward.
Nearing the end of Speculum considerationis, d’Ailly turns lyrical, abandoning his professor’s mantle for his shepherd’s crook. When inflamed by
the fire of celestial desire that exceeds human modes, d’Ailly promises his
clergy, the soul will melt like wax. When illumined by divine light and
then suspended in admiration of the highest beauty, it will be as if the
soul is struck by lightning. When the soul is drunk with an abundance
of heavenly and eternal sweetness, it will forget what it once was and will
be elevated to a state of wonderful happiness that will be transformative
in its ecstasy. The heart is now purified and can contemplate the depth
and fervor of God’s love, which far surpasses human love. The more that
contemplation becomes sublime, the greater the humility will be in the
human soul. And then d’Ailly issued a caveat: once these heights have been
achieved, the soul must still guard against excess, wandering thoughts, and
losing the insights gained through introspection and discretion. The perfecting soul—which, being human, can de facto never be perfect—must at
every hour of its pilgrimage continue to desire and to heed the full vision
of the Godhead.26

PIERRE D’AILLY  25

Although d’Ailly preached on personal reform during his time as a
diocesan bishop in Cambrai, his thoughts never confined reform to individuals. He always had in mind the wider church, especially during the
troubles of the Great Western Schism, thereby connecting individual to
institutional reform, the latter of which has been the focus of prior scholarship on d’Ailly’s reform thought.27 As incentive and model of true personal reform, d’Ailly offered those who had achieved the beatific vision in
his November 1, 1416 sermon on the Feast of All Saints, those who had
eclipsed their errors by their faith. It is notable that he offered the saints
as exemplars of how to seek truth and justice at the very moment that
many members of the Council of Constance, working toward institutional
reform, were locked in complex political battles deciding how best to
depose Avignon’s Benedict XIII.28 Elsewhere he also returned Constance
to the first principles of the church as a community. In a Pentecost sermon
preached at Constance on May 30, 1417 (right in the midst of the tense
resolution of the Schism), d’Ailly portrayed the ecclesia primitiva as having
been endowed at first with the virtues of poverty, chastity, and humility,
which were then driven out and replaced by the vices of avarice, luxury,
vanity, and arrogance. The original community described in Acts of the
Apostles as holding peace and unity in the normative phrase cor unum et
anima una (Acts 4:32) had shattered. Like the individual soul fallen from
original virtue to present-day vice, the current state of the church bore testimony to the need for both personal and institutional reform. Without a
cor unum, the contending factions at Constance bore testimony to the fact
that the entire church herself suffered because she lacked peace. 29 Given
the readings for that Pentecost Sunday, d’Ailly predictably used the New
Testament’s descending fire as an image for purgation and illumination.
He was likely continuing the idea that the Holy Spirit itself ratified the
council’s actions, which dated back two years to Jean Gerson’s Ambulate
dum lucem habetis sermon of March 23 1415 and the subsequent decree of
April 6 1415, Haec sancta synodus.30 In his sermon on the Trinity a decade
before, d’Ailly had made clear just how the Holy Spirit would spare the
church: Extirpa igitur vitia, planta virtutes, reforma in ecclesia iustitiam et
scitate si vis in ea procurare concordiam unitatem et pacem.31
The reforming path to unity and peace may have been clear to the
Holy Spirit, but it was not to those living through the longstanding Schism.
No one knew how best to achieve unity and peace, though all agreed they
were certainly the goals to be pursued. In practical terms and being fair to
the historical players, we note that d’Ailly, like the others of his era, walked
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a difficult line among three papacies. For French theologians and prelates
the trouble was especially fraught because the most obstinate claimant,
the Avignon line’s Benedict XIII, never accepted deposition. D’Ailly’s
cautious personality had earned him enmity from his Parisian colleagues.
They thought he was too soft toward Benedict XIII, who favored d’Ailly
with a number of positions and endowed d’Ailly’s relatives with offices
on the chancellor’s request. The issue came to a head when most Parisian
scholars voted in February 1395 to force Benedict to abdicate through a
withdrawal of spiritual obedience and financial support, a strategy that
d’Ailly opposed. Benedict named d’Ailly bishop of Puy in April 1395; later
that year, the University of Paris Arts faculty voted to censure their chancellor. D’Ailly resigned that position in favor of Jean Gerson as successor
when he was ordained bishop. The French church did withdraw obedience
from Benedict for the period 1398–1403, but the move accomplished
nothing except to solidify Benedict’s resolve not to step down.32
In his Trinity sermon from 1405, d’Ailly moved away from Benedict:
he indicated the need for papal leadership in resolving the Schism, which
d’Ailly said was caused by vice crowding out virtue. By the Council of Pisa
in 1409, d’Ailly abandoned his former patron, who persistently resisted
peace and union by refusing to step down. In a letter to Benedict XIII
dated January 26 1408, d’Ailly wrote with a sense of dismay, sadness, and
even exasperation that the Avignon pope was guilty of breaking Christ’s
mystical body into fragments and dividing the church into two divisions,
a state that was against divine and natural law. How, d’Ailly asked, could
Benedict grant peace to the church if he did not have it—nor even wish to
seek it?33 Of course, little could anyone have known that Pisa would move
the church from two papacies to three. The supposedly unifying Pisan
pope, Alexander V, died not long afterwards; his successor, John XXIII,
named d’Ailly a cardinal in June 1411.
How could unity occur, according to Pierre d’Ailly? The three theological virtues, once restored and flowing freely, would surely reform
and renew the church from three papal obediences into its true single and
unified corpus mysticum Christi. Church unity and personal virtue were
combined in the mystical body of Christ, d’Ailly had preached in one
of his sermons to the Cambrai clergy.34 His prize student Jean Gerson
also embraced the imagery and ecclesiology of Christ’s mystical body. In
his own writings on reform, Gerson noted that institutional reform led
by the hierarchy, with theologians playing a central role, would result
in personal reform in membris. As Louis B. Pascoe SJ concluded about
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Gerson: “In brief, then, personal reform in Gerson is not simply the
result of individual endeavor but takes place within the context of the
church’s hierarchical structure. The result is not only personal reform
and renewal but also the edification of the Church as Christ’s mystical body.” 35 We may conclude that d’Ailly—despite his reputation as a
church statesman of the highest order operating at dizzying levels in
the church’s most dangerous moments of the Great Western Schism—
similarly saw personal reform as the key to all church renewal. For Gerson
and d’Ailly, personal and institutional reform could not be separated.
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model, Pascoe, Jean Gerson, 176–86, 223–24.
14
D’Ailly, Sermo de quadruplice adventu Domini, TS, 230–31.
15
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21
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another voice on the personal reform of the parish clergy, see Pascoe, Jean Gerson,
169–74.
22
On divine–human partnership as foundational, see, for example, d’Ailly,
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History, Heresy, and Hell
Lateran IV and Dante in the Battle for Jan Hus
Thomas A. Fudge

O

N JULY 6, 1415, THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE released
Jan Hus to the secular authorities for execution of sentence following
a protracted legal process predicated upon charges of heresy.1 A few days
prior, the defendant wrote to members of Charles University in Prague,
“Master Jan Hus in chains and in prison, now standing on the shore of the
present life, awaiting a horrible death on the morrow.”2 With these words,
Hus indicated his own awareness of standing at the intersection of time
and eternity.
The battle for his memory and identity began immediately and
yielded two contrasting images. An early sixteenth-century parody of the
Te Deum by the Danish Carmelite Poul Helgesen (ca. 1485–ca. 1534)
is representative: “In the beginning was an error and the error was with
Luther and Luther was the error and the same was in the beginning with
Luther … There was a man sent by the Devil whose name was Jan Hus. He
came to bear witness, to testify concerning the darkness.”3 In distinction
to that negative point of view we have the testimony of Charles University,
Hus’s alma mater, written on May 23, 1416: “O incomparable man shining greater than all by the example of magnificent holiness. O humble man
gleaming with the light of great piety ... he followed the footsteps of the
apostles ... he surpassed all others, demonstrating in every way the works
of love, pure faith, and consistent truth ... in everything he became the
incomparable master of life.”4
The Hus of history is both heretical and holy. Two hundred years
before Hus, Lateran IV marked a turning point in the definition and prosecution of heresy. One hundred years later, Dante Alighieri placed heretics into the sixth circle of hell while betrayers were consigned to the ninth
circle. Jan Hus qualified for both. The final chapter in the Hus trial during
the Council of Constance settled nothing around these entrenched convictions, but those dramatic events in Germany established a foundation
for his memory. What emerged from the ashes of the heretics’ stake in
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1415 has been a sustained 600-year-long battle for the memory of a man
who was controversial before he died. Should he be regarded as an icon or
noted as a pariah? There have been powerful voices advocating one or the
other. I want to examine the historical and historiographical debate over
one of medieval history’s most misunderstood and politicized personalities, a battle that began in the fifteenth century and persists to the present.
Who is Jan Hus? The answer must be nuanced, as it is a complicated matter that must take into account a varied landscape both medieval
and modern. He is the hero of a dozen faces: Communist, rebel, Roman
Catholic, nationalist, reformer, social revolutionary, Wyclifite, Protestant,
heretic, saint, evangelical Christian, national hero, and a myriad of other
alternatives.5 One must be wary of constructing an act of homage, inventing a portrait in our own image, rather than discovering the historical figure. There is a dangerous myopia associated with focusing on the life of
an individual that can obscure the historical context in which that person
lived. In the quest for the historical Hus, it is important to reveal aspects
of the medieval man while simultaneously opening up a wider view of his
place during the time he lived. There is, further, the danger of emotional
identification, which may cloud the scholar’s objectivity or limit his or
her perspective.
It is true that a text without a context is a pretext for a prooftext.
To ground this consideration of Hus in the context of history and in the
context of the Middle Ages, let us remind ourselves of three seemingly
disparate events. Six hundred years ago the Bohemian priest Jan Hus went
to the stake as a condemned heretic. Seven hundred years ago, the Italian
poet Dante Alighieri was working on his masterpiece. Eight hundred years
ago, delegates were gathering in Rome for a major conference convened in
the basilica of the Lateran Palace. These three chapters of European history, separated by two centuries, have more in common than meets the
eye. They bring together considerations of history and heresy and their
relation to time and eternity.

Killing Hus Lawfully: The Role of Lateran IV
The fourth Lateran Council was announced by the bull Vineam Domini
Sabaoth in April 1213 and was scheduled to commence on November 1,
1215. There were three sessions, and the council was concluded within
the month. More than 400 bishops and more than 800 abbots and priors attended. As many as eighteen bishops from Bohemia, Poland, and
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Hungary attended Lateran IV. 6 One of the prelates, the elderly Matteo
Capuano, archbishop of Amalfi, was suffocated in the crush of the crowd
pressing to hear the pope’s opening sermon.7 The synod convened with
two main goals: church reform and crusade. On the first point the purpose of the council was explicit in its desire to “eradicate vices, plant virtues, correct faults, reform morals, remove heresies, and strengthen faith.”8
The convocation bull opened with a compelling image: “Many
kinds of beasts have tried to destroy the vineyard of the Lord of Hosts.
Their efforts have been successful to the extent that in a not insubstantial
area, thorns have sprung up rather than vines. With regret, we report that
the vines are to greater and lesser degrees infected and diseased. Instead of
grapes, they produce wild grapes.”9 The harvest of wrath and the hatred
of heresy manifested at Constance had antecedents. For example, canon 7
of the Council of Tours (1163) drew attention to a damnable heresy, virulent like cancer, creeping stealthily like a serpent, which had infected many
people and caused damage to the Lord’s vineyard.10 The wild grapes noted
at Lateran IV in consequence might be regarded as poisonous.
The fourth Lateran Council issued seventy-one canons. One of
them is especially relevant here. Canon 3 is devoted to the concern around
heresy and it is essential to point out that heresy was not simply a topos
in the European Middle Ages. 11 Excommunicamus (canon 3) provides a
succinct summary of the Church’s perspective on heresy. This led to extensive discussions among canon lawyers leading to a discernible shift in the
perception of heretics. Two things emerge. Heresy becomes a well-defined
crime and juridical aspects like contumacy become more prominent, and
procedures leading to condemnation are ever more carefully defined and
articulated. Prior to Lateran IV, it cannot be said that law was manageable,
succinct, or even consistent. Then came Gratian. Following Lateran IV,
the earlier caritas principle began to yield to a potestas approach. Coercion
replaced persuasion. We might argue that this shift had both papal and
canonical (legal) stimulation. Canon 3 led to a more streamlined consistent policy on heresy. In addition, canon 3 sanctioned the procedural
rule per inquisitionem as normative and this had the commensurate result
in a general condemnation (codified in canon 3) that legalized sweeping
canonical measures against heretics and their defenders.12 Without the
canonical development, the prosecution of heresy would have remained
less systematic, prone to arbitrariness, and selectively applied.
Canon 3, of course, was not entirely new in content. It is evident
that the statute integrated parts of earlier legislation. For example, we
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find synergies with Ad abolendam and Vergentis in senium wherein heresy is equated with treason.13 The latter was a landmark in the Church’s
campaign against heresy and it governed the law on heresy for centuries
thereafter. The language characterizing heresy is unambiguous. Examples
include haeretica foeditate (filth of heresy) and haereticae pravitatis fermento (yeast of heretical depravity). Both ideas would later emerge in the
case against Jan Hus.
The introduction to canon 3 excommunicates and anathematises
omnen haeresim ... quibuscumque nominibus censeantur, terminology taken
from Ad abolendam, along with facies quidem habentes diversas, sed caudas adinvicem colligatas, quia de vanitate conveniunt in idipsum which has
been derived from Vergentis.14 The canonical literature links these ideas
to notions of incorrigibility and its nomenclature including the broad
thrust of language such as contumacia, contempserit, obstinatione, crescente,
pertinaciter, persistant, and so on. The textual dependence of canon 3 on
these earlier anti-heresy statutes is easily established. We find the language
of crime, criminal behaviour and heresy interwoven.15 An emerging and
evolving concern with contumacy and incorrigibility as determining and
defining elements of heresy, which will become central and critical in the
Hus trial, is evident in canon 3.
In consequence, the defining elements in heresy cases from the thirteenth century onwards became contumax and incorrigibilis, which appear
to have been applied to all, and not just to circumscribed groups. What
becomes manifestly clear is that heresy is both criminal and sin. It is not
just one (peccatum) or the other (crimen) but both. Jan Hus is found to be
a sinner and a criminal and the two offenses are codified in the later medieval understanding of heresy.
Canon 3 does not spell out procedural technicalities but it yielded
a result wherein the use of force was increasingly recognized by canon
lawyers and the harvest of Lateran IV includes a shift from a defensive
posture to one more overtly aggressive. Heresy was also secularized by
Lateran IV, meaning it involved society and therefore required secular
aid in combatting it. The prosecution of heresy became politicized. 16 It
is important to note that lawyers in the Middle Ages held two assumptions about law. First, that it had to be just and, second, that it had to
be reasonable. 17 By the time of the Council of Constance, there is little
evidence to suggest that there were serious reservations among lawyers
and prelates involved in the Hus case around considerations of justice and
reasonableness with respect to anti-heresy legislation and its prosecution
and implementation. The decision of the English Parliament in 1401, in
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response to the Lollards, to define heresy as a crime punishable by the state
(2Hen.IV c.15), combined with the supplementary parliamentary ordinance of 1406 that enabled ecclesiastical and secular authorities to pursue
and arrest Lollards everywhere, indicates the domestication of the church
by the state at the end of the Middle Ages.18
Using Lateran IV doctrine, especially as codified in canon 3, we
discover a specific focus on heresy as a phenomenon, but not on specific
manifestations. To wit, every heresy (omnem haeresim) and all heretics
(universos haereticos) are condemned. Earlier legislation, Ad abolendam
for example, provided a list of offenders. Canon 3 leaves heresy as an undefined category as it relates to elaborating a dossier of suspects. What is
manifestly evident in an examination of canon 3, related decretals, legal
commentary and glosses illustrates that the undefined category widened.
As noted above, Vergentis (1199) characterized heresy as treason. A
related and evolving body of authority, the Ordinary Gloss, between the
1230s and 1266, tended to develop a notional concept of heresy as a public crime. The jurists clearly understood heresy as an offense against the
church but heresy is also a transgression against the community. From this
point of view, a public sinner was guilty not merely of an offence against
God, to whom the offender owed repentance, but also of an injury to the
Christian community, to which the offender owed compensation. With
this amalgamation we see a move from peccatum to crimen. The former
requires penance, the latter demands punishment and judicial procedure.
Heresy emerges as an exceptional crime.19 Hus is only one of those who
found themselves sideways with the Latin Church in the post-Lateran era.
While heresy was an offense against both church and community, it
was often viewed as one of the three principal crimes against the church.
In addition to heresy, this included simony and the murder of a religious.20
It is noteworthy that Hus stridently denounced simony as a heresy.21 In
contrast, Jean Gerson, who would later be numbered among Hus’s legal
prosecutors, affirmed that, while simony was indeed an offense and hardly
salutary, it was definitely not heretical and Gerson preferred to minimize
it by referring to it as the “simonian slip,” giving it the sense of being an
error of omission or an inadvertent mistake perpetrated by otherwise
decent and conscientious churchmen.22
In specific terms, canon 3 identifies heresy as contempt of church
and church authority. The outcome of this offense was spelled out judicially as animadversione debita puniendi. Within fifteen years of Lateran
IV, the term had become established as a synonym for the death penalty. A
close examination of the medieval doctrine of excommunication implied
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that the convict was expelled from the church and delivered to Satan.23 We
may also find within the text of canon 3 an elaboration of the problem,
the procedure, the prevention, and the punishment of heresy. Canon law
nominated the bishop as the authority to assess “juxta considerationem suspicionis qualitatemque personae” along with the “suspicion and character”
of the person, with the outcome that the greater the fault, the greater the
punishment, enumerated as “maior est culpa, gravior exerceatur vindicta.”24
Looking at the Excommunicamus of Gregory IX (1231), it is clear that the
legal ramifications of canon 3 may be delineated thus: heresy is a crime,
procedural steps are in place to deal with it, and the matter is public, therefore extra-ecclesiastical authorities are seconded into the prosecution of the
offensive activity. This papal bull eventually found its way into canon law.25
All of this indicates evidence of a clear line of development which
includes, but is not restricted to, Ad abolendam, Vergentis in senium, canon
3, decretals such as X 5.20.7, X 2.1.10, X 2.1.4, glosses and the Ordinary
Gloss that, taken together, reveals and reflects the Church’s official and
legal position on heresy. The Liber extra places heresy between Jews and
Saracens on one hand and schismatics on the other.26 This makes it quite
clear that heretics are on the list of the Church’s most serious enemies.27
Modern and medieval thinkers and writers alike have always disagreed
on the question of heresy in Hus. However, it might be worth bearing
in mind, as a third-century jurist observed, that not everything that is
permitted, or legal, is honest or right (“Non omne quod licet honestum
est”).28 The law is not always concerned with morality or ethics.
Eight hundred years after Lateran IV, the synod continues to stand
as the high-water mark of the medieval papacy. Its political and ecclesiastical decisions endured until the sixteenth century when another significant
convocation occurred (Council of Trent). Modern historiography broadly
recognizes Lateran IV as among the most significant assemblies of the
Middle Ages.29 Its decisions on the matter of heresy, combined with other
trends and developments, allowed the Latin Church to try Jan Hus, convict him of heresy, and, in consequence, to legally ask the secular authorities to carry out the sentence. This was the result of dogmatic theology on
one hand and silent assent on the other.

Heresy and Betrayal in Dante
Law and legal procedure established, the eternal fate of the damned may
also be considered. Virtually every person in the Western world knows
the name Dante Alighieri; comparatively few know anything substantial
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about Jan Hus. Though a national hero, few Czechs today share or encourage Hus’s religious faith. This is especially true of the ruling powers
(including the Communist ancien régime) but they could not and cannot
abandon Hus.
Dante (1265–1321) belongs to the Middle Ages. The theology of
the Divine Comedy is medieval. Hus belongs to that medieval world. This
is the time of the “Babylonian captivity” of the church. It is the time of
Wyclif, the time of corruption, confusion, and creativity, an age of heresy and reform. Dante was acutely interested in church renewal and one
should not read De monarchia only as a treatise on secular politics. 30
Dante worked on the Comedy for a number of years in the period between
1308 and 1320. It is firmly fixed among the great literary monuments of
European history.31 There are more than 600 extant fourteenth-century
copies of the Comedy alone and we know of at least a dozen commentaries prepared by the year 1400. A famous depiction of Dante holding up
his magnum opus by Domenico di Michelino in 1465 shows the Comedy
opened to its first lines which read: “Halfway through life, I awoke to find
myself in a dark wood. The right road completely lost and gone.”32 There
has been a persistent willingness to read and consider the first part of this
great work, which has a clear focus on hell, singly or in isolation from the
rest of Dante’s great oeuvre. In August 1944, Dorothy Sayers wrote to
Charles Williams noting that she had inherited a three-volume edition of
the Comedy and had made a trenchant observation. “I observed a sinister
thing about it: the Inferno is slightly loose at the joints; the Purgatorio
in excellent condition; the Paradiso practically ‘as new’.” 33 Though I am
sobered by the sage observation which Sayers made and keenly aware of
its meaning, I am, nevertheless, interested only in Part One, “The Inferno,”
which was completed in 1314.
Taking into account the situation in the Inferno, the reader discovers
that the damned in Dante’s hell are consigned there because of the disorder
of their souls, which is reflected in the Inferno as a comprehensive condition affecting body, mind, language, landscape, and weather. But it is essential to observe that Dante’s heretics are not the same as those of Lateran
IV. There are, famously, nine circles in Dante’s vision of hell: limbo, lust,
gluttony, greed, anger, heresy, violence, fraud, treachery. The ninth circle
of hell is reserved for the worst sinners: the betrayers. Hus betrayed God,
the Church, and the faith. The ninth circle is frozen. Surprisingly, there is
not a lot of fire in Dante’s hell. The only sinners who are wrapped in flames
are the heretics in the sixth circle and the false councillors in the eighth
circle.34 Canto 9 reveals the “great heresiarchs” lying in grim tombs of iron
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that have grown white-hot from the fierce flames. The heretics, like all the
other transgressors, remain in hell, fixed within their particular evil, outside of time for all eternity. There are no accidental heretics in hell. They
were all hereticated by choice. In Dante, heresy is contumacy and intellectual stubbornness. Here we see connections between canon 3 of Lateran
IV and the received assumptions of the conciliar fathers at Constance.
Dante also reflects an Augustinian perspective (though Augustine is virtually absent or cleverly concealed in the Comedy) wherein sin interferes
with divine grace and human conversion to salvation. Heretics are sinners
sent to hell and now beyond the possibility of grace and salvation. It is in
Canto 3 of the Inferno where we encounter the oft-mentioned hopelessness of the Comedy: “Abandon hope, all who enter.”35 In hell, where there
is no redemption, the body of the heretic becomes a corpse in which the
image of God is destroyed and the soul is deformed. While Augustine is
not prominent in the Comedy, he is referenced in the Paradiso (10.120)
and is included among the Comedy’s glorified saints (32.35).
Where in hell might Dante have placed Jan Hus? Notably, heretics
in Dante’s hell are fairly high and there can be little doubt that his betrayers (Sigismund and some of the prelates) would be placed well below Hus.
If the heretics occupy circle six, betrayers are consigned to circle nine. Hus
would certainly appear among the sarcophagi of the damned in the sixth
circle but he might also have the necessary qualifications for inclusion in
the ninth circle. Cantos 9–11 of the Inferno leave little room for doubt
that heresy was abhorrent, and offenders were sentenced to eternal punishment. At the end of the Comedy, which is an eschatological adventure
through Hell (Inferno), Purgatory (Purgatorio), and Heaven (Paradiso), the
pilgrim meets God. There is therefore the important distinction between
“hell” and a “vision of hell.” The former is permanent with no redemptive
value while the latter is temporary and potential. Unlike Lateran IV and
its third canon, Dante is poetry.
What is common between Hus and Dante? It is possible to identify
patriotism, devotion to their culture, lonely deaths far from home, and the
experience of exile. Both were pioneers of the vernacular, both were keenly
interested in religion, both appear deeply concerned with issues of morality, both were opposed to abuses within the church, both gave their lives
for their work (one literally, the other metaphorically), and both remained
committed to notional concepts of truth. We have no way of knowing if
Hus had any awareness of Dante. At Constance, Robert Hallam (bishop
of Salisbury) and Nicholas Bubwith (bishop of Bath and Wells) had an
Italian bishop (Giovanni da Serravalle) provide them with a paraphrase
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of Dante’s Commedia.36 The appearance of Dante at Constance raises a
query that has been fiercely debated. Did Dante veer into heresy himself ? The query is controversial. Dante displays tendencies that some have
suggested bring him close to heresy. He condemns some absolved by the
church and absolves others condemned by the church. He consigns to the
pit a pope canonized by the church (Celestine V). There are contradictory
judgements, and a variety of viewpoints have existed among scholars for a
long time. But was he deficient on the scale of orthodoxy? Some interpreters have issued a resounding no.37 Others have argued for merit in determining that perhaps the poet who so vividly sketched a vision of hell and
heresy could be numbered among those of the damned whom the church
determined were deviant.38 These are not simply disagreements amongst
modern thinkers, and it should be pointed out that there were debates
along these lines in the fourteenth century. Is the fact that a debate existed
important? The question is worth pondering. I shall not essay a judgment
on Dante on this point, but on Hus there can be no doubt.

Battle for the Memory of Jan Hus
Almost every relevant Czech thinker has participated to some extent in
the battle for Hus or has had to deal with the Hus phenomenon. This
includes František Palacký, the father of modern Czech historiography. It
includes the founder of independent Czechoslovakia, Tomáš G. Masaryk,
whose interpretation of the Hussite Movement laid the foundation of the
First Czechoslovak Republic’s official ideology after 1918. Jan Patočka
(1907–1977), the philosopher and main spokesmen for Charter 77, a
1977 human rights movement in the former Czechoslovakia, also opined
on the topic. Hus’s importance has also been confirmed in current politics,
with President Miloš Zeman calling Hus the cornerstone of Czech history. The powers that be in the historic Czech lands over the past seventyfive years, German, Russian, and Czech, do not share nor do they desire to
encourage the religious faith and ideas of Hus, but they cannot afford to
simply abandon him. There continues to be a strange relationship between
the memory of Hus and his actual influence. For more than fifty years
Czech scholars have endeavored to produce a critical edition of his works
but the Czech government has never regarded Hus as sufficiently important to fund the production of that critical edition. Almost 450 years ago
we find an indictment: “The Czechs should be ashamed of having slackened in this matter so horribly.”39 This was written in 1571 in reference to
the production of a Czech Bible.
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If we return to the time of Hus we find, even within his lifetime, evidence of a battle for Hus which may be examined briefly. This can be best
achieved by selecting contemporary individuals who disagreed about Hus.
Michael de Causis and Jan Chlum were men on the ground, participants
in, and eye witnesses to, the trial. Michael de Causis was a lawyer attached
to the papal curia. He developed clear antagonism towards Hus and characterized him as “a son of iniquity,” “a heretic,” and “that devil Jan Hus.” 40
As for the imperial knight Jan Chlum, it is not what he said, but what he
did. A chronicler records an extraordinary encounter during the public
hearings in June 1415 at Constance. “The bishop of Riga took charge of
Master Hus and escorted him to the prison. As they passed near Lord Jan
Chlum, he greeted him and reached out his hand to comfort him. Hus
was extremely glad that Lord Jan was not ashamed and was not reluctant to greet him, though he was essentially rejected, ridiculed, and considered a heretic by practically everyone.” 41 Petr Mladoňovic and Ulrich
Richental were chroniclers who not only were present at the later stages
of the Hus trial but who left behind valuable accounts of the proceedings.
Mladoňovic concluded his Relatio with the assertion that he had provided
testimony to the events at Constance in order that the memory of Jan Hus,
the “most steadfast champion of truth,” would remain green in the future
and throughout time.42 In contrast, Richental portrayed Hus as wicked,
cowardly, and deceitful.43 These opinions, developed and defended, served
as foundations for evolving traditions in the lives of the posthumous Hus.
By the sixteenth century the myth-makers were hard at work, and
Hus emerges as a central figure in the European Reformations. 44 Luther
championed Hus, and in many respects he was lionized across the spectrum of the Protestant landscape.45 He was not regarded in the same manner by defenders of the official church. The battlefield for the memory of
Hus is illuminated in the works of John Foxe and Johannes Cochlaeus.
The English-Protestant martyrologist John Foxe regarded Hus as a “most
holy man and excellent doctor of the evangelical truth ... the godly servant and martyr of Christ.”46 The German-Catholic theologian Johannes
Cochlaeus said the “wicked Jan Hus” deserved eternal punishment, for he
was worse than an infidel, even worse than the men of Sodom, still worse
than frightful murderers from the annals of history, ultimately worse than
cannibals. With Lateran doctrine in mind, Cochlaeus declared that heresy “was a monstrous crime” worse than all other offenses and exceeded
every other crime for its unspeakable enormity, impiety, shamefulness and
impurity, surpassing all evil before God.47 These polar views were repeated
over and over throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the
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texts replaced history. What happened at Constance was forgotten, and
the past yielded to the words that were written down. These words and
characterizations, rather than the events, were remembered, and the narratives formed the memory of the events that faded in the onslaught of
history. By the nineteenth century, when scientific-based research began
to excavate the Hus of history, these narratives and characterizations were
rediscovered, interrogated, and subjected to broader analyses, and the battle for Jan Hus was renewed.
In the intellectually bellicose nineteenth-century Prague world,
nationalism intruded into considerations of Hus. Konstantin von Höfler’s
work declared that the Hussite movement was really more about an
embedded anti-German sentiment than a concern for ecclesiastical and
social reform, and that Jan Hus was a racial bigot who allowed his hatred
of Germans to grow until it destroyed the university in Prague.48 Höfler
believed Hussitism was a destructive period in history. Hus was not only
a heretic but a criminal who deserved the stake.49 The polar view was
advanced by František Palacký who suggested that a new religious epoch
began with Hus whose followers were the first Protestants. 50 Hus and the
Hussites were, for Palacký, the bedrock of national identity. Proper Czech
scholarship on Hus began with Palacký after the strictures were lifted in
1848. Palacký’s ten-volume History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and
Moravia laid down a paradigm followed by so many ever since. While
his ethnicism inspired many Czechs, it also crippled subsequent generations of historians who were either unwilling or unable to find alternative interpretations of the process by which a Czech nation appeared in
Europe. Palacký sought to minimize if not eliminate Hus’s theological
issues and thus presented Hus as a Czech struggling within a national
context against Germans and the Church. Thus began in earnest a positivist taxonomy that continues to prevail. This perspective was succinctly
expressed from a Czech point of view in English by Albert Wratislaw: “It
will always remain the greatest distinction of the Bohemian nation that
it was the first in the national development of European culture—as a
whole people—to rise against Rome, and such a national movement cannot be explained as the effect of learned Latin tracts.” 51 Some of these
considerations continued to influence the manner in which Hus was
represented well into the twentieth century.
Perhaps the most important debate amongst the scholars was undertaken by Johann Loserth who was answered by Matthew Spinka. Loserth
concluded that “Hus’ writings [are] the exclusive property of Wiclif,
and there is no ground for speaking of a Hussite system of doctrine.”52

44   Thomas A. Fudge

Loserth did not alter his basic view between his published review in 1884
and a second edition in 1925. More than twenty-five years later Spinka
assailed the Loserth thesis arguing that Hus was a man of probity, a beacon of integrity, and a towering figure in the later medieval world with
influence to the present. He argued that Hus was not a mere disciple of
Wyclif and that he held ideas unique from those of the Oxford scholar,
derived independently from a preceding native Czech reform tradition.53
Though implacably opposed to the Loserth school of thought, which was
adopted by able scholars like Robert Kalivoda and Howard Kaminsky,
Spinka was, at the same time, never able to rid himself entirely of bias
against Marxist and Catholic scholars. Thus he held Václav Flajšhans, Jan
Sedlák, and Paul de Vooght at arm’s length while bluntly declaring that the
Marxist-dominated work of Kalivoda, Josef Macek, and Milan Machovec
did not “qualify as genuine and unbiased research.”54
The battle for Jan Hus is now reflected more acutely in the scholarly and historiographical differences between modern Czech approaches
and so-called Anglo-Saxon methods. The former has been described as
descriptive while the latter is more intentionally evaluative.55 Scholarship
and methodology is rather like the stock market, fluctuating with the
stimulation of buyer enthusiasm or consumer angst. What will the next
skirmish in the battle for Jan Hus look like?56

Perverse Readings
Eschewing the constraints of Lateran doctrine on heresy, the visions of
Dante Alighieri, and the limits of historical categories, it seems salutary
to engage in perverse readings of Jan Hus. This means to ignore shamelessly the established orthodoxies set down by De Causis, Richental,
Cochlaeus, Höfler, and Loserth on one hand and those developed by
Chlum, Mladoňovic, Foxe, Palacký, and Spinka on the other. It also solicits a refusal to conform to the well-worn historiographical paths. And it
suggests that thinkers in the twenty-first century should not be arguing
towards pre-determined conclusions. Instead, perverse readings of Hus
should be encouraged. The word perversus means to turn aside wrongly
or inappropriately or to be askew. In The Confessions, Augustine spoke of
sin as defined in terms of the soul’s motion relative to God and went on
to elaborate three possibilities. Here we encounter perversus wherein the
soul has deviated or is wrongly positioned, aversus which indicates that
the soul has turned from God, and adversus with the implication that the
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soul has turned away from divine truth and goodness.57 From a soteriological point of view all three postures are serious impediments for the pilgrim. But, with respect to historiography, the idea of perverse readings is
useful, indeed salutary. Assumptions around ideas of deviant or erroneous
interpretations are often unnecessary shackles limiting more imaginative
research and curtailing our understanding of an altogether compelling
chapter in Europe’s past. With this in mind, Hus needs to be removed
from the pantheon of the sacred cow collection, but too often we do not
have the courage to confront our own icons; the scholar must ask why.

Conclusion
Lateran IV was a magnificent assembly, a veritable display of ecclesiastical
power and authority. On matters taken up by canon 3, the delegates determined that the many beasts of heresy had to be removed. The Divine Comedy
of Dante Alighieri is a textual feast of imagination, a medieval vision of the
universe, reflecting past, present, and future, drawing on Aristotelian cosmology, Thomist philosophy, classical culture, and Christian religious doctrine. We must keep in mind that above all else, Hus was a priest, and his
life and work were dominated by theology. Importantly, that theology was
developed and understood in and through medieval categories. Adopting
Protestant doctrines as a means of understanding Hus tends to obfuscate
rather than illuminate and runs the risk of anachronism. The same should
be said for nationalism and craven subservience to particular schools of
thought and political considerations that often reveal a deeper interest in
ideas about history than in history itself.
Recognizing that Hus’s intellectual world was dominated by theology,
broadly conceived and understood, it is necessary to try and penetrate that
world as the first order of significance in the battle for his memory. In
seeking to comprehend the synergies between time and eternity we can
turn to one of Hus’s earliest academic endeavors, his commentary on
the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In Hus’s thought, the world is a spectaculum, a theatre in which the unity of God as trinity and God as creator
is revealed. 58 There is a distinction between time and eternity in Hus.
There are two main categories. First, eternity is used in speaking about
God who transcends time. Second, there are also fragments of eternity that
have their origin in time. Goodness, holiness, and virtues are eternal
though the lives of those who exemplify these attributes are finite. 59
In this way, eternity is not entirely divorced from time. Thus, Hus holds that
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humankind is truly great and noble because God created humanity with
immortality forever (eternity).60
At the same time, for others, he is the perpetual pariah who cannot be liberated from his opprobrium, fixed as he is in a fiery tomb of
iron in the sixth circle of hell and frozen steadfast in the ninth circle of
hell as imagined by Dante Alighieri, mandated by canon 3 at the Fourth
Lateran Council, and subsequently ratified by Latin Christendom. As we
have seen, by the time the conciliar fathers gathered at Constance, heresy was well-defined and understood as treason, deviance, and crime. In
the aftermath, Hus became frozen at the intersection of time and eternity,
suspended between heaven and hell while the battle for his meaning, identity, and memory rages on.
In considerations of time and eternity, history, heresy, and hell, an
important query remains: Who will guard the guards?61 This was a question occupying the mind of Hus. To some extent, Hus believed that he was
qualified to do just that. Others disagreed. In preaching the sermo generalis
against Hus on July 6, 1415, the Bishop of Lodi asserted that no greater
fornication than that practiced by Hus had ever been perpetrated against
the Church. This constituted a betrayal of God and faith.62 History is temporal, but hell is eternal. In reply, the Council declared it had the authority to commit Hus’s soul to eternal damnation. This presented Hus with a
serious dilemma, one that was juxtaposed between obedience and authority and situated between notions of truth and loyalty to institutions.
There are limits to human knowledge.63 Lateran IV, Dante Alighieri, and
Jan Hus recognized this, but all three behaved as though it did not apply
to them. Each acted as though they were exceptions to the rule.
As noted earlier, Petr Mladoňovic concluded his Relatio with the
assertion that he had provided testimony to the events at Constance in
order that the memory of Jan Hus, the immoveable defender of truth,
would be preserved forever. Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II)
said the “perfidious lunacy” of the Hussites began with Hus who was a
heresiarch and would, in consequence, perish eternally in hell.64 We are
back with the contested image of a man destroyed by the Church for
the blasphemy of the “unforgiveable sin,” the crime of heresy. We appear
to be left with a contested figure on the boundaries of intersecting and
diverse cultural, political, and religious worlds. The battle for Jan Hus
has been waged and won between time and eternity, fought and lost on
the killing fields of heresy within visions of heaven and hell both medieval
and modern.65
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History and Legitimacy in the Dominican
Responses to John of Pouilly
Thomas Turley

M

ARSILIUS OF PADUA’S ATTACK ON THE HIERARCHICAL
CHURCH in Dictio II of his Defensor pacis was a stunning use of
history to attack legitimacy. His deft manipulation of traditional texts and
doctrinal emblems and his deployment of historical and contextual arguments to create novel and disruptive readings of the Scriptures and canons allowed him to create a new narrative for the church that threw into
question almost every papal claim to ecclesial authority.1 The result was a
coherent and plausible revision of church history that suppressed or discredited inconvenient sources, coopted others, and abandoned traditional
scriptural exegesis.2 The novelty of Marsilius’s method has led to considerable speculation as to his inspiration. Much has focused on other opponents of the papacy in the years preceding the composition of the Defensor
pacis, notably the dissident Franciscans of the late 1310s and early 1320s.
But these may not have been his only influence.3 It is evident that some
papalists were familiar with historical argument before they encountered
Marsilius’s work. In 1327, as Pope John XXII prepared to condemn the
Defensor pacis, several prominent theologians, who had been sent a very
brief list of the Paduan’s errors, were able to compose deft and relatively
elaborate responses around historical sources.4 Their quick recognition of
the nature of the arguments that underlay Marsilius’s conclusions—they
were given no details on these and never saw the Defensor—as well as their
comfort in responding, point to earlier encounters with similar material.
It is of course possible that these encounters were with the assertions of the
dissident Franciscans, but there is an alternative. Almost a decade before
the Defensor pacis was reviewed by the Roman curia, three prominent
members of the Dominican order, Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, and
William Peter Godin, engaged the theologian John of Pouilly and other
secular masters on the origins of episcopal rights in substantial tracts that
explored the extent of papal authority. Each had to deal with the kind of
historical sources Marsilius later employed in constructing his narrative
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of legitimacy. Examination of these works reveals the important position
the church’s past occupied in the papalist discourse of this era, the influence episcopalist assertions had in drawing some papalists to attend seriously to ecclesial history, the gradual mooting of traditional authorities
during these debates, and the similarity of some of the methods employed
by these papalists to those used by Marsilius a decade later.

Episcopal Rights and History
One of the great achievements of the canon lawyers of the twelfth century
was the construction of a working ecclesiology from the jumble of seemingly contradictory canons they found in Gratian’s Decretum. Within this
vast collection of documents, the record of more than a millennium of
church history, these Decretists derived a complex web of precedents that
they considered the foundation of ecclesial order. This delicately balanced
set of rights and privileges, the status ecclesiae, its authority based on an
assumption of the continuity of church order throughout the church’s history, mapped the powers and limits of all the prelates within the church,
including the pope.
In the early thirteenth century a new generation of canon lawyers—
the Decretalists—began to alter the Decretists’ interpretation of the status ecclesiae. They ascribed broad discretionary powers to the popes that
allowed them to circumvent the normal rights and privileges of prelates
and others in cases of necessity. This new interpretation of papal authority suggested that historical precedent was no certain gauge of ecclesial
right. It provoked serious conflict in the middle of the thirteenth century
when popes applied it broadly, granting mendicant friars special privileges
to preach and hear confessions without the permission of the bishops in
whose dioceses they were operating. Secular masters at the University of
Paris, seeing this as a preemption of one of the ancient rights of bishops,
produced a series of works protesting the papal action. They argued that
Christ had given authority to Peter and the apostles—the first pope and
bishops—together and directly, and that consequently bishops had their
rights and privileges from Christ, not the pope.5 No pope could abrogate
or alter what Christ himself had granted. In addition to scriptural passages
demonstrating Christ’s conferral of authority on all the apostles, these
episcopalists cited canons that seemed to document the existence of rights
and privileges that bishops and the curates who served their dioceses had
enjoyed from the beginning of the church—clear proof, it seemed, that
these prelates alone were the indispensable and permanent ministers of
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the church.6 The episcopalists’ argument blended Scripture and history.
They saw the canons they cited much as the Decretists had, as markers
witnessing a continuous observance of episcopal rights throughout the
church’s existence. For them, history confirmed legitimacy.
Mendicants responded immediately, but chose to shift the basis
of the debate away from the canons and history toward a few scriptural
texts—notably Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17—that they insisted were
proof that Christ had granted all jurisdictional power in the church to
Peter alone. Peter, they claimed, had then distributed jurisdiction to the
other apostles, retaining the authority to reapportion it any way he saw
fit as the church developed. His successors had the same authority. The
jurisdiction of bishops and curates was therefore held at the pleasure of
the pope; it could be expanded, curtailed, or shifted to new ecclesiastical
authorities at any time. All ensuing developments in the church had to be
understood in light of this central fact.
The mendicant argument, developed primarily by Franciscan theologians, turned the debate away from law and history toward theology,
effectively pushing historical precedent to the sidelines. Mendicants continued to defend and elaborate this “derivational” theory of jurisdiction
in debates with episcopalists into the fourteenth century—although some
Dominicans followed Thomas Aquinas in adopting a more moderate position soon after the conflict began in the 1250s.7 Episcopalists, for their
part, continued to rely on historical precedents.8 Each side had created a
substantial literature by the turn of the fourteenth century.

The Conflict Between Boniface VIII and
the French Monarchy
When the struggle between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair of
France erupted in 1301, the mendicant theologians Giles of Rome and
James of Viterbo, both Augustinians, constructed defenses of the pope’s
supreme position in Christian society—the first tracts De potestate
papae—that approached the problem much as earlier mendicants had
approached the issue of papal jurisdiction. Earlier discussions of church–
state relations had relied on complex precedents found in Scripture,
the canons, and history to establish legitimacy; Giles and James based
their works in philosophical analyses of government that effectively preceded and contextualized the scriptural, patristic, and canonistic sources
they eventually discussed.9 Much as earlier mendicant theologians had
directed focus from the complex history of rights and privileges found in
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the canons to the seeming simplicity of Christ’s conferral of jurisdiction
in the Gospels, Giles and James directed focus from the equally complex
history of church–state relations to the apparent certainty of philosophical reasoning. 10 James rooted his argument in a blend of Aristotelian
and Augustinian notions regarding government and community; Giles
relied on these and hierarchical metaphysical concepts found in PseudoDionysius. 11 Like earlier champions of the derivational theory of jurisdiction, both authors kept the canons and history at the periphery of
their arguments.12
The novelty of Giles and James’s methods did not divert their opponents from reliance on traditional ecclesiological evidence. Though most
of the Augustinians’ respondents did gesture at discussions of the nature of
government in their works, their arguments rested primarily on Scripture,
the fathers, and the canons, the sources long employed in church–state
debates. So, for example, the anonymous author of the Rex pacificus, a
brief tract asserting the independence of the French monarch, relied
almost exclusively on the canons.13 He arranged them within the context
of a somatic analogy—the church as head, the state as heart, working in
tandem for the good of the body.14 The author of the Quaestio in utramque
partem, another brief royalist tract, used a similar approach, fitting his historical references into a dualist framework that presented state and church
as different genera exercising distinct powers. 15 Both writers treated the
canons and Scripture they cited as evidence of an enduring ecclesial order
very much like that presented in traditional canonistic exegesis—though
their assumptions about continuity led them to pluck their evidence topically from a history without much dimension or context.
The Dominican John of Paris, the most original opponent of
extreme papalism in this exchange, used the testimony of the past with
much greater sophistication. His De regia potestate et papali defended both
the independence of the secular power and the rights of prelates, applying history differently in each case to limit papal authority. John began
his work much as Giles and James had, with a sophisticated philosophical
examination of the nature of government. His early chapters made only
casual use of the past, presenting analyses of the origin of natural government based in Aristotle and Aquinas and of the priesthood and church
hierarchy based mainly in Scripture. 16 John’s purpose here seems to have
been to establish ecclesiological constants. He made no reference to ecclesial evolution, but instead proclaimed the consistent agreement of philosophers, Scripture, and the fathers on the dualistic relationship of church
and state.17
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Once John began discussion of prelates’ temporal lordship and jurisdiction, he turned to the past in earnest. He drew heavily on Scripture, the
fathers, and whatever canons he could count as witnesses to history.18 Like
most of the theologians engaged in ecclesiological polemics in his era, he
had no training in canon law, but this did not deter him from interpreting
the texts to his advantage.19 He read them without the elaborate context
professional canonists saw, and so was able to make a straightforward and
compelling argument for episcopal rights that stepped beyond the circumspect opinions of the lawyers.20
In the later chapters of his work, which dealt with papal claims to
authority over the secular monarchies, John continued to mine the canons for their historical content. History was a major issue here; some
papalists relied heavily on historical precedents such as the Donation
of Constantine and the coronations of Pepin and Constantine to verify
their claims to papal authority over temporal monarchs.21 John rewrote
these narratives, simplifying readings, emphasizing or suppressing texts
to serve his polemical purposes, and blending the canons with other historical materials. He treated the histories he used—standard works such
as Vincent of Beauvais’s Speculum historiale and Martin of Troppau’s
Chronicon pontificum et imperatorum—much as he did the canons, editing
and reinterpreting as required.22
While John of Paris bent problematic canons and extra-scriptural
histories to his purpose, Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo avoided
them. Giles skillfully employed scriptural and patristic exegesis and biblical history to build his argument, but took only passing notice of postbiblical church history.23 Many of the canons he introduced were the basis
of objections to his argument that he could not ignore. Giles dealt with
the majority in the last part of his work, where he adroitly and sometimes
ingeniously reconciled them to his positions.24 James of Viterbo included
very few direct references to the canons: the Decretum twice—D.79 c.7
and D.96 c.10—and a cluster of decretals on papal authority that he
apparently borrowed from Giles of Rome.25
By the end of the Franco–papal debates in 1303, a clear pattern had
emerged among the disputants in their approaches to ecclesial and secular history. The extreme papalists avoided discussion as much as possible,
while their opponents embraced historical evidence with varying degrees
of sophistication. And both groups found it necessary to manipulate
whatever texts from the Scriptures, canons, and fathers they used—selecting,
suppressing, and reinterpreting—to draw them into full agreement with
their arguments.

58   Thomas Turley

John of Pouilly and the Dominican Response
As the royal–papal controversy subsided, episcopalists continued to
assert their traditional rights, pushing ecclesiastical history back toward
the center of ecclesiological discourse. When Pope Clement V triggered
another open debate between episcopalists and mendicants in 1312 by
restricting a very favorable privilege that had been granted to the mendicants just a few years before, the theologian John of Pouilly emerged
as the new champion of episcopal rights. 26 John pressed his case aggressively over the next several years—so aggressively that he eventually
blundered into statements that were called heretical. In 1318 he was
summoned to the curia to answer those charges. 27 Around the time
Pouilly was called to Avignon—perhaps just before—three well-known
Dominican theologians composed works De potestate papae in reply
to the episcopalist assertions: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter of Palude, and
William Peter Godin. Each was obliged to engage the arguments from
history posed by Pouilly and the other defenders of episcopal rights, and
each dealt with them differently.
Hervaeus’s De potestate papae was his second response to secular
claims. The first, a tract De iurisdictione published in 1312, was a rather
blunt assertion of the derivational theory of jurisdiction that clearly illustrates the Dominican’s preferred approach to the problem.28 In this brief
work Hervaeus avoids historical argument completely, relying instead on
a philosophical analysis of government to inform his exegesis of Christ’s
conferral of jurisdiction in Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17. He poses
an Aristotelian argument to demonstrate the natural need for a single
head and a single source of jurisdictional authority in government, then
argues that this arrangement is in fact the governmental structure Christ
intended for his church when he conferred power on Peter. His other
conclusions rest primarily on logical deduction. As Christ gave jurisdiction only to Peter, all the apostles and all the bishops who succeeded them
must derive their jurisdiction entirely from the pope. There are therefore
no limits to papal authority over them. Bishops are like a secular king’s
bailiffs, appointed servants who owe absolute obedience and have no
right to their positions. 29 For this reason, the episcopate cannot be considered an essential part of the church’s order. In fact, popes are not even
required to give local ecclesial jurisdictions to bishops; they can, if they
choose, bestow those powers on whomever they think suitable.30 In demonstrating this radical reduction of traditional ecclesiology, Hervaeus
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cites no scriptural texts other than Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17. He
does include a brief refutation of the scriptural arguments of the seculars,
but makes no reference to the canons or ecclesial history.31
Hervaeus was forced to alter his approach in the De potestate papae.
By the time he composed it, his opponents had marshalled a significant
body of proof texts, primarily from the canons, that had to be answered.32
His response was to structure his work along the lines of Giles of Rome’s
De ecclesiastica potestate, presenting a philosophical framework first, then
addressing scriptural and legal evidence within that context. He begins
with analyses of the kinds of justice, the type and extent of papal power,
the way that ecclesial power was instituted, the church as a republic, and
so on. Scriptural texts are inserted where necessary, but not frequently,
with Matthew 16:18 and John 21:17 cited most. In proving the pope’s
divine authority, he limits himself to relatively few sources: Matthew
16:18, John 21:17, and Luke 22:32; Hilarius, Origen, and Chrysostom
on Peter as the foundation of the church; and D.21 c.3, Quamvis universae, and D.22 c.1, Omnes sive patriarchae, on the origin of the Roman
Church’s authority.33 He devotes the latter portion of his work to refuting secular interpretations of Scripture, canons, and fathers, but does so
primarily with arguments from causality that allow him to ignore almost
completely the historical difficulties these texts introduced.34 Obliged to
acknowledge the arguments of his opponents, Hervaeus refused to debate
on the same plane.35 As in his De iurisdictione, he excluded the church’s
history from the argument. The words of Christ were sufficient; all later
evidence was extraneous.
Peter of Palude responded to the secular arguments very differently. Trained as a lawyer as well as a theologian, he was very aware of the
canonistic doctrine of precedent and the network of rights and privileges
that canonists believed prelates possessed. He was also aware of the canonistic teaching that some of these had evolved later, to accommodate the
church’s growth. He would use this notion to considerable effect against
the episcopalists.36 Like Hervaeus, Palude addressed episcopalist arguments in the years before he composed his De potestate papae, and his distinctive approach to ecclesiological discussion is as evident in that earlier
work, a quodlibetal question delivered in the fall of 1314, as Hervaeus’s is
in the De iurisdictione. The issue addressed in the quodlibetal question was
whether a person’s “own priest” had to hear his confession, as the Fourth
Lateran Council had apparently decreed (X 5.38.12, Omnis utriusque
sexus). A much-discussed aspect of mendicant privileges, the council’s
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decree was read literally by episcopalists as a simple affirmation of curates’
(and bishops’) rights. They cited it to condemn any interference by mendicants in the relationship between priest and penitent and contended that
this arrangement had existed since the time of the primitive church.
Palude begins his response by reminding his audience that church
history is as important as the model of the primitive church in understanding the structure of the ecclesial order, and that the development of the
church over the thirteen hundred years since its founding demonstrates
that God intended ecclesial evolution. He lists deacons, hermits, monks,
secular canons, and theological masters as examples of new ecclesial offices
created since the time of the primitive church; all were willed by God and
of great value to the church. Practices have also been altered by God’s will,
including the relationship of penitent and priest. The council’s decree recognizes this, though the narrow reading of the episcopalists obscures its
proper meaning. Citing the authority of the great canonist Hostiensis,
Palude asserts that the decree actually permits any superior of a parish
priest—that is, the pope or the priest’s bishop—to hear the confessions
of the priest’s flock himself or to delegate someone else to hear them for
him.37 He supports this interpretation with several examples from history
and current practice. No one, he says, questions the propriety of papal
penitentiaries—clerics authorized by popes to hear the confessions of persons only popes can absolve. The mendicants authorized by the popes are
similar. That the mendicants received a general dispensation from the control of bishops is analogous to existing practice regarding other religious
orders and secular colleges. The only difference in the case under consideration is that the decision to go to a mendicant for confession is left up to
the parishioner—a right that Palude defends as consonant with Christian
liberty and Roman law.38
This is only the first of several arguments Palude put forward in the
quodlibetal question, but it illustrates clearly his preferences in ecclesiological debate. He relied on evidence from ecclesiastical history and the
evolving circumstances of the church’s practice rather than theory. He
avoided entirely the reductive methods of many other mendicants. His
approach was very much that of a canonist, reconciling contradictions in
law and history to find order. This gave him a powerful edge in debating the episcopalists; he was addressing their arguments symmetrically,
employing the same sources and the methods to establish legitimacy.
Palude used a similar approach in his De potestate papae. He divided
this much larger work into two parts, one on the nature of papal authority
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and its origin, the other on the power of the papacy over temporal goods.39
This permitted him to discuss a wide range of recent issues, from Christ’s
direct conferral of ecclesiastical jurisdiction on Peter to papal authority over the French monarchy. As in the quodlibetal question, Palude
ignores philosophical analysis in the De potestate papae, turning instead
to Scripture, the canons, the fathers, and, occasionally, to Aristotle and
Roman law. 40 He develops his discussions at considerable length, as a
canonist would, reviewing many alternatives and sometimes avoiding a
conclusion. Although he agrees with Hervaeus on several key issues, particularly the error of John of Pouilly’s assertion that popes are bound by
conciliar decrees (other than the doctrinal truths these might affirm), he
moderates many others. So, for example, he allows, with Huguccio and
common canonistic opinion, that councils can depose heretical popes
once they are revealed—an issue Hervaeus ignored.41 He also temporizes
on Christ’s direct conferral of all ecclesial jurisdiction on the popes alone,
stating somewhat ambiguously that the jurisdiction of popes, bishops, and
priests all derive from Christ—in apparent agreement with the Decretists
and Thomas Aquinas rather than mendicant extremists.42
Palude’s reliance on canonistic sources, current ecclesial practice, and church history is particularly evident in his discussion of papal
authority over temporal kingdoms. Again, he approaches this question
much like a canonist, surveying the many historical negotiations between
the church and state as he edges toward a complex conclusion. Like John
of Paris, Palude dedicates the last portion of his work to this problem,
focusing particularly on the temporal power of the pope in the kingdom
of France. His conclusions are quite similar to John’s: the pope holds
only enough temporal power over France and most other secular states to
maintain his spiritual authority, but he does hold temporal and spiritual
power over the Holy Roman Empire, which in its turn holds no authority
over France. And, like John, Palude deftly manipulates Scripture, canons
and history to create a narrative that becomes part of his evidence, concluding that most papal temporal authority is the product of historical
circumstance rather than intrinsic to the pope’s office. While Palude’s
analysis is not as tightly constructed as that of John of Paris, it deploys
history just as powerfully. Notable is his complex review of the evidence,
which usually probes numerous possible answers before arriving at a solution.43 This predilection for thoroughness had its merits; Palude’s seemingly exhaustive examination of the sources and alternative interpretations
could be quite persuasive.
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Not long after the appearance of Palude’s De potestate papae,
William Peter Godin produced his De causa immediata ecclesiastice potestatis.44 In composing it, William made an interesting choice: he defended
the same extreme position on papal jurisdiction asserted by Hervaeus
Natalis, but employed the mode of argument adopted by Peter of Palude.
To accomplish this, he borrowed sizeable portions of Peter’s work, reinterpreting them to support his position. The result is surprisingly effective.
William limits his discussion to the key issues surrounding Christ’s gift of
jurisdiction to Peter: the nature of the power Peter received from Christ;
the moment when it was granted; the power Christ gave to the apostles,
the disciples, and their successors; and the consequences of Christ’s action
for the papal office. His reorganization of the rich materials drawn from
Palude’s work allows him to attach new conclusions to Palude’s digressive
discussions, alter interpretations of texts, and clothe his interpretation in
the authority of complex analyses of the fathers and canons. Gone, however, are Palude’s examination of papal authority over temporals and his
constant reliance on historical evolution to demonstrate legitimacy. 45
William keeps his focus on the first years of the church, intent on meeting the episcopalists on their own ground and proving that the exegesis
from which they derive their image of the primitive church’s order is false.
This approach allows William to suggest that the moment of the church’s
formation is the only point in history relevant to the question of papal
power. If Christ bestowed all jurisdiction on Peter at that moment, consideration of other aspects of the church’s history is irrelevant to ecclesiological debate. Apparently impressed with the force of Palude’s method, Godin
modified its conclusions to provide adherents of the derivational theory
of ecclesial jurisdiction with a symmetrical response to the episcopalists’
appeal to tradition.46

Conclusion
The works De potestate papae of Hervaeus, Palude, and Godin illustrate
the division among contemporary papalists on the value of historical evidence in ecclesiological discussion. Hervaeus, with most extreme papalists, preferred to ignore it, and when forced to confront it by Pouilly and
other seculars, insisted on subordinating its interpretation to a philosophical or theological framework that suppressed any potential ambiguity or
contradiction in the sources. Peter of Palude, a trained lawyer and moderate papalist, embraced historical evidence enthusiastically and used it
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very effectively. William Peter Godin, another extreme papalist, chose to
temporize, exploiting the power of Palude’s appeal to history but limiting the scope of the discussion to avoid dealing with ecclesial evolution.
His work coopted Palude’s reliance on historical materials while reading a
much more extreme version of papal authority into its texts.
These works also make clear that papalists were debating ecclesiology in historical terms before the 1320s. Not every disputant had the
training of Peter of Palude, but a number demonstrated significant skills.
Most of these were moderate papalists. During the struggle between
Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII, we can count John of Paris among those
moderates. Although he leveled his arguments against what he considered the overreach of Pope Boniface, the ecclesiology John outlined was
rooted in the thought of the Decretists, and perhaps the episcopalists. He
viewed the order of the church to be the product of evolution, and the
church’s relation with the state to have been historically constructed. Peter
of Palude held similar views, though he allowed for more radical change
in the church than John did. And the two theologians who responded so
effectively to Marsilius’s errors in 1327—the Carmelite theologians Guido
Terreni and Sibert of Beek—also held moderate views on papal power. 47
William Peter Godin was no moderate, but seems to have understood
the polemical potential in a work like Palude’s and the value of history in
establishing legitimacy. He adapted it skillfully for his own purpose.
Finally, these three works point to a danger lurking in all the ecclesiological debates of this era. Despite the advantages perceived by Palude
and Godin, reliance on history to prove legitimacy also had a serious
weakness—one that had led mendicant theologians to turn away from it
when the debate over jurisdiction began in the 1250s. The sources were
many and difficult to reconcile, and the interpretative tradition surrounding them was complex and sometimes contradictory. As the controversialists of the early fourteenth century struggled to bring them into agreement with their positions, selecting, excluding, and reinterpreting for
their polemical ends, the variety of ecclesiological possibilities they proposed, often based on the same evidence, had an unintended consequence.
The multiplicity of interpretations they produced eroded the authority
and stability of the sources, and, with it, the certainty of the history they
reflected. The works of Hervaeus, Palude, and Godin are excellent examples. The conflicting readings they generated could have suggested to a
contemporary that every interpretation of the church’s past was moot. A
sympathetic but critical reader might have recommended a constructive
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remedy: correction and revision of the current fonts of tradition, along
with their commentaries. A reader hostile to papal claims might well have
perceived a weakness ripe for exploitation. Marsilius’s casual manipulation
of the ecclesiological sources to delegitimize the papacy comes to mind.
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Part 2
Transforming Ideas and Traditions

Putting on the Toga
Classical Roman Roots of Two Medieval Italian
“Aristotelian” Political Theorists (Ptolemy of
Lucca and Marsilius of Padua)
Cary J. Nederman

C

OMPARED WITH DISCUSSIONS OF GREEK (ESPECIALLY
ARISTOTELIAN) AND ARABIC SOURCES, the study of the
role played by ancient Roman texts and ideas in the transformation of
medieval European political thought has been relatively muted. Yet medieval political theorists wrote their treatises primarily in Latin, looked to
Roman authors (Christian as well as pagan) for many of their precedents,
and acquired their familiarity with Greek and Arabic thinkers through
Latin translations. Thus, very compelling reasons exist to take seriously
classical Latinate culture and Roman civilization in the development of
political thought during the Middle Ages. The present chapter contributes to redressing this lacuna by investigating the use of Latin sources
and doctrines from antiquity in the teachings of two of the most prominent scholastic political authors of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries: Ptolemy of Lucca and Marsilius of Padua. In light of the
Italian heritage of both thinkers, there seem to be especially compelling
reasons to redirect our attention to the ways in which they appropriated
and adapted ancient Roman sources (both republican and imperial) in
order to articulate their theoretical frameworks. This does not mean that
either Ptolemy or Marsilius may be regarded as an unabashed and unalloyed adherent to Romanitas, but rather that we do a disservice to the
unique characteristics of their theories if we refrain from acknowledging
the significant ways in which their thought was shaped by features of the
classical Roman traditions that they inherited.

Ptolemy of Lucca
Written circa 1300, Ptolemy of Lucca’s De regimine principum has generally been treated as one of the most powerful medieval defenses of republicanism, and of republican Rome in particular.1 Originally attributed in
toto to Thomas Aquinas, who may be the author of Book 1 and the opening
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chapters of Book 2 (known as De regno),2 the section of the treatise now
known to be written by Ptolemy praised republican institutions as “more
suitable for producing a certain civility”3 and argued that God rewarded
the ancient Romans for their civic virtue and just system of laws.4 In spite
of this veneration for Rome, scholars have generally asserted that the fundamental principles undergirding Ptolemy’s political theory stem from
his devotion to Aristotelian scholasticism. Charles T. Davis proposes that
the repeated references to Aristotle in De regimine principum signal that
“Ptolemy was ... attracted (and this is reflected in his political theory) by
the positive analysis of popular government in Aristotle’s Politics.”5 This
basic view of the text’s dependence on Aristotle has been magnified by
James Blythe, the leading contemporary scholar of Ptolemy:
For his general approach to politics, his criteria for judging the
worth of government, and his basic political principles, Ptolemy is
greatly and increasingly indebted to Aristotle’s Politics … In these
areas Ptolemy usually understands Aristotle correctly, and the
“twisting” of Aristotelian texts that does occur results from flawed
understanding, not conscious deception. Moreover, in De regimine
principum Ptolemy cites Aristotle, not merely to make a point, but
for close analysis, constantly using Aristotelian terminology and
concepts even when not discussing Aristotle directly.6

In sum, Ptolemy’s political theory, while “novel,” may still “reasonably be
called Aristotelian,” according to Blythe. 7 On the whole, scholars seem
satisfied to embrace the conclusion that Ptolemy’s Aristotelianism forms
the theoretical core of his republicanism, and that his gestures toward the
Roman Republic are mere window dressing, lacking in intellectual value
or substance.8
Yet, when we examine De regimine principum closely, we find that
Ptolemy’s arguments rest very heavily indeed on his impressive (for its
time) knowledge of Roman political institutions, leading figures, and
history.9 Indeed, it would not be too great a stretch to assert that, in comparison with other prominent political thinkers of the late thirteenth
and early fourteenth centuries, the level of knowledge on display in De
regimine principum about Rome in the republican period is virtually
without parallel. In addition to standard Latin sources for the history
of the Republic, such as Cicero, Sallust, Vegetius, and Valerius Maximus,
Ptolemy mined authorities less commonly cited in his day, such as Livy
and Eutropius. Moreover, he found ways to transform sacred texts into
key witnesses to secular history. Thus, as Davis has pointed out, Ptolemy
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provides an ingenious rereading of Augustine’s City of God 5.18, which
strips out the Saint’s moral condemnation of republican rapaciousness
and vice, replacing it with a positive valuation of the motives behind and
accomplishments of Roman patriots.10 Likewise, the books of Maccabees
are looted as a treasure trove of historical information about the political, social, and physical characteristics of Rome, often employed side-byside with pagan sources as a confirmation or supplement. 11 Judged from
the preponderance of the citations in Ptolemy’s portion of De regimine
principum, one might conclude that the Latin accounts of the organization of the Republic and the conduct of its leaders, instead of Aristotle’s
analysis of politeia (that is, the mixed constitution), formed the central
reference point for his argument. The superiority of the Roman Republic
posited by Ptolemy provided the salient frame through which he filtered
the reading of ancient texts—sacred as well as profane, philosophical as
well as historical.
In particular, Rome is regarded by Ptolemy as constituting the quintessential example of what he calls “political lordship” (his terminology
for republican government)—in contradistinction to “regal lordship”—
and which is his preferred system of governance, on account of the “mildness” of its organization. In support of this view, Ptolemy gives reasons
such as the limited terms of officials, the system of payment, the nature
of the subjects, and the constraints placed on the ruler’s judgment by
the laws. Ptolemy relies on Roman sources, including Valerius Maximus,
Sallust, and Cicero, rather than on Aristotle, to uphold such claims. In
almost every instance where a positive example is provided, it is from the
ancient Roman Republic.12 For example, Ptolemy’s initial definition of
political rule is followed immediately by a reference to Roman governance:
“Political rule exists when a region, province, city or town is governed by
one or many according to its own statutes, as happens in regions of Italy
and especially in Rome, which for the most part has been governed by
senators and consuls ever since the city was founded.”13 Ptolemy’s defense
of republicanism is essentially a defense of its Roman form. Likewise,
Ptolemy’s discussion of political rulers concentrates on the Romans as
providing the supreme examples: “Ancient Roman leaders, such as Marcus
Curius, Fabricius, and many others, as Valerius Maximus writes, took care
of the Republic with their own riches, which made them more bold and
more solicitous for the care of the polity, as if their whole intention and
inner disposition were directed to that. This verifies Cato’s opinion, which
Sallust relates in The War with Catiline: ‘The Republic, which had once
been small, was made great because they displayed industry at home, just
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command abroad, a free spirit in counseling, and were addicted neither
to lust nor to transgressions’.”14 Thus, Ptolemy relies primarily on Roman
sources and argues in favor of a specifically Roman notion of political rule.
Ptolemy’s interpretation of Roman development coincides with and
reinforces his Christian providential account of history, dependent on his
interpretation of Augustine. According to this view, the path of Roman
governance, like that of all earthly regimes, was directed by the hand of
God toward a definite end. One cannot escape this linear and teleological
notion of history in Ptolemy’s thought: “We can conclude ... that something participates in divine action to the degree that it is ordained to an
excellent end. This describes a kingdom or any community or an association, whether it is regal, a polity, or of some other condition.”15 Ptolemy
elsewhere makes it clear that all rulers serve at the discretion of the divine
will, stating that “it is clear that the kingdom does not exist on account
of the king but rather the king on account of the kingdom, because it is
for this that God provided for kings to govern and to exercise governance over their kingdoms and to preserve everyone according to their
own right, and this is the end of government.” 16 Throughout Ptolemy’s
account of the rise and spread of republican/imperial Rome, divine intervention (or at least divine acquiescence) plays a prominent role. Ptolemy
even cites Augustine as supporting the idea that God rewarded Roman
virtue with an empire: “Because the kings and rulers of the Roman world
were more solicitous than any others for these things, God inspired them
to govern well, and for this they deserved an empire.”17 The success of the
Romans was not caused directly by their political/military skills and their
civic self-sacrifice, but rather by the will of God, who was pleased by the
Romans’ method of governing.
Nevertheless, Ptolemy also admits that not all those who come to
great power are just or benevolent rulers. Ptolemy allows that God may
make use of tyrants as well in his divine plan:
They [Cain, Nimrod, Belus, etc.] had lordship because tyrants are
instruments of divine justice for punishing human transgression, as
was the king of the Assyrians over the Israelite people, and Totila,
king of the Goths, over Italy, as the histories relate ... And the
prophet Isaiah showed how the king of the Assyrians was destined
to punish the transgressions of God’s own people … We can
conclude, therefore, that tyrants are instruments of God ... whose
power the Sacred Doctors hold to be just, even though their will is
always iniquitous.18
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Thus, the success or failure of any regime depends ultimately on the will
of God; both good and bad constitutions may be utilized as part of the
divine plan. With regard to Rome, Ptolemy sees the progress from kingship to republic to empire as part of providential history, commencing
with the birth of Israel and culminating in the life of Jesus and the spread
of Christianity.19 The development is strictly linear and serves the purpose
of preparing the way for Christ’s kingdom. Rome’s role in the proliferation of Christianity is highlighted in Ptolemy’s discussion of Constantine
and the conversion of the Roman Empire: “When the appropriate time
came for the kingdom of Christ ... to manifest itself in the world, the force
of our ruler Jesus Christ caused distress to Constantine, the ruler of the
world, by striking him with leprosy and then curing him … When he had
proof of this, Constantine yielded his lordship to the blessed Sylvester,
the vicar of Christ, to whom the lordship belonged by right.”20 The temporal supremacy of the Roman Empire allowed for the dissemination of
the Christian religion. Therefore, the whole history of Rome up to that
point could be seen as instrumental to God’s plan for the redemption of
humanity. This, for Ptolemy, does not entail denying that the excellence of
the Roman constitution and the virtue of the Romans themselves played
key roles in Rome’s success; rather, divine inspiration caused the invention
of the republican institutions that permitted the conquest of the world.21
There is also a naturalistic component to the defense of the Roman
Republic in De regimine principum. Ptolemy proposes that government
arises primarily from the material needs of mankind and the relative vulnerability of human beings in nature. Though citing Aristotle on the political nature of man, Ptolemy places far more emphasis on biological and
material necessity than the Philosopher ever would:
The necessity of establishing a city comes first from a consideration
of human need, which compels a person to live in society ... Nature
provides hereditary ornaments and defenses for other animals.
They avoid harmful things and love suitable ones by using their
natural virtue of estimating, without having to resort to any
previous direction … This is not true for human beings, who, on
the contrary, lack an instructor for choosing what is proportionate
to their nature.22

Ptolemy goes on to illustrate how plants and animals have no need of
clothing or of fortifications, while humans are quite vulnerable without
them. Likewise, when struck by disease, humans require the aid of those
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educated in the medical arts. 23 Ptolemy ends this discussion with the
remark that “for all these reasons I conclude that the city is a necessity for
human beings, and that it is constituted on behalf of the community of
the multitude, without which humans cannot live decently. To the extent
that a city is greater than a town or village, there will be more arts and
artisans present there to ensure the sufficiency of human life.”24 He thereby
sets a clear naturalistic standard for the evaluation of various regimes.
In turn, the Roman Republic was for Ptolemy distinctively suited to
redress the failings of the human condition in its natural state, namely, that
human beings are a frail and always endangered species, lacking the natural resources to survive enjoyed by other creatures, so that they must struggle to gain and retain earthly security and welfare.25 Ptolemy articulates
the foundation of all systems of government succinctly: “The reason is at
hand to show what one could demand for the good of the republic, for the
defense of the kingdom, or for any other cause that rationally pertains to
the common good of one’s lordship. Since we have supposed that human
society is natural ... all things necessary for the preservation of human
society are done by natural right.”26 This is, of course, a Ciceronian doctrine (perhaps most famously stated in De officiis, which Ptolemy knew).
Indeed, in the following paragraph, Cicero is cited directly in connection
with the “art” of politics necessary to provide for human welfare. The primary “natural” duty of government is to assure that those whose preservation is threatened are served and hence that the bonds of human society
are maintained and strengthened.27 The Romans excelled in this regard,
according to Ptolemy. Thus, they particularly merited their lordship. He
identifies three elements of the superlative virtue of Romans: “One reason
comes from love of their fatherland, another from their zeal for justice,
and a third from the virtue of [civil] benevolence.”28 He illustrates these
three principles copiously, citing Cicero, Sallust, Valerius Maximus, and
Vergil, as well as his unique interpretation of Augustine. 29 Ptolemy aims
to demonstrate a convergence between the qualities of Roman character
nourished in the Republic and the requirements of righteous governance. As he concludes, “Considering the merits of the virtues among the
Romans, divine goodness itself seems to concur in their rule.” 30 God and
Rome converge.
The latter remark reveals how Ptolemy’s characterization of the
naturalness of human community relates to his defense of the special
divine “calling” of the Roman Republic. In his view, the three main virtues
embraced by the Republic naturally and in the absence of Revelation were

PUTTING ON THE TOGA   79

identical to the end for which “the rule of Christ” was initiated: to promote sacrifice for the good of all and love of one’s fellows rather than the
pursuit of personal self-glorification or private advantage. Ptolemy states
this quite openly: Christ “founded his lordship in humility and poverty.
Sallust and Valerius Maximus relate the opinion of Cato that proves the
same thing—that the Roman Republic increased not through haughtiness or public displays of pride, but in adversities, labors, and hardships.”31
Before the birth of Jesus, the Roman Republic was performing God’s work
by fostering precisely those virtues of patriotism, civil benevolence, and
justice that prefigure the rule of Christ. And such virtues were important
precisely because humanity’s natural circumstances are so precarious and
difficult. Of course, Christ’s rule adds the ultimate good of salvation to the
republican virtues, but it does not disparage or deny the value of the latter.
Intriguingly, this twin-pronged naturalistic and providential defense
of republican Rome directly reinforces Ptolemy’s papalist proclivities by
providing an account of the continuing legitimacy of Roman imperium
that places the authority for the appointment of the latter-day emperor in
the hands of the vicar of Christ. Thus, Ptolemy introduces a version of the
translatio imperii historiography that was widespread in the Middle Ages
as a means of justifying the right of the German emperor to claim dominium over all the world and/or the right of the pope to select and crown
that ruler. The body of literature on this topic is sizeable enough that there
is no need to recapitulate the outlines of the translation imperii theme at
the moment.32 In current circumstances, two observations seem germane.
First, Ptolemy’s republicanism is of a sufficiently flexible character that he
does not reject out of hand the need at times for kingship as a valid form
of lordship, nor does he equate all royal dominium with tyranny as would
later republicans.33 The Roman Empire and other forms of monarchy can
be considered worthy of obedience so long as they do not devolve into the
despotism to which one-man rule is always inclined.34 Second, however,
Ptolemy derives an interesting republican lesson from the historical confluence of the transformation of the Roman Republic into the Empire and
the emergence of the rule of Christ. As long as the Republic and its leaders persisted in the pursuit of the three main virtues Ptolemy ascribed to
Rome, government served the purposes of God, inasmuch as it placed the
common good above private ends. But once the Republic became corrupt,
and especially in the time of Julius Caesar (whom Ptolemy expressly identifies as a “usurper of imperium”) and his nephew, Octavian, a new rule
became necessary—signified foremost by the birth and life of Jesus, and,
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to a lesser degree, by the institution of the Empire.35 Ptolemy connects
the decline in the virtue of the Roman Republic with the need for a new
system of lordship—one ordained directly by God through his Son, rather
than circumspectly through republican values. The former is obviously
greater and more divine than the latter (hence, the pope as Christ’s vicar
stands immeasurably above any earthly ruler), but God’s intervention in a
sense became necessary precisely because the ancient Roman Republic had
abdicated its responsibility to serve humanity.
Ptolemy’s admiration for the Roman Republic is thus intimately tied
to his Christian understanding of human history. In Ptolemy’s view, the
character of the Romans and of the Roman Republic was such that they
could spread righteous rule across the globe in preparation for Christ’s
coming. In addition to the practical advantages of the pax Romana for
the spread of the Christian religion, Roman civic virtue and love of justice promoted a benevolent and self-sacrificing spirit that prefigured the
kingdom of Christ. The historical success of Roman government was, for
Ptolemy, in no way a matter of blind natural forces or chance, but instead
reflected a providential plan directing the course of human events toward
a preordained goal.

Marsilius of Padua
Ironically, the other figure I investigate in this chapter, Marsilius (also
known as Marsiglio) of Padua, stood entirely opposed to Ptolemy’s
Roman-inflected providentialism and the support it leant to papal pretensions to earthly power. 36 His major work, the Defensor pacis, completed in 1324, is indeed one of the main statements of medieval antipapalism in its most extreme form. Composed of two major sections—a
first discourse on the foundations of temporal government and a much
longer Dictio II on ecclesiology—the Defensor pacis has, like Ptolemy’s
De regimine principum, been generally viewed as a quintessential work
of scholastic Aristotelianism. Already, in the sixteenth century, Albertus
Pighius had quipped that Marsilius was “homo magis aristotelicus quam
christianus,” 37 and most recent scholars have looked upon the texts of
Aristotle as central to understanding the foundations of the Paduan’s
political ideas.38 Certainly, the Defensor pacis is replete with numerous
quotations from and references to the Aristotelian corpus: the Politics and
Nicomachean Ethics most obviously, but also the Rhetoric and (pseudoAristotelian) Economics, as well as the Metaphysics and various works on
natural philosophy.

PUTTING ON THE TOGA   81

Yet the plethora of his citations of Aristotle ought not to blind us to
the fact that Marsilius is, in addition, deeply indebted to the Roman tradition (Christian as well as pagan). 39 He evinces awareness of the work of
Cicero and Sallust, as well as of several major Fathers of the Latin church,
such as Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine. This Latin impact upon Marsilius
has been acknowledged in varying degrees, although it still tends to be
overlooked in scholarship on the Defensor pacis. While Marsilius does not
depend as heavily upon classical Roman philosophers, theologians, and
historians as does Ptolemy, it would be an error to overlook entirely his
debts to Latin authorities, especially Cicero and Augustine. Rather, attention to Marsilius’s reliance upon Roman sources—the texts that he cites as
well as some possible influences of a less overt nature—helps us to identify
and comprehend some of the leading features of his political theory.
Among pagan Roman writers, Cicero looms the largest in
the Defensor pacis. Cicero was the only major political thinker of
pre-Christian antiquity whose ideas continued to be accessible to the West
following the collapse of the Empire. While Cicero’s two major political
treatises, De re publica and De legibus, were only known through secondary sources in partial and fragmentary form, his work on political ethics,
De officiis, circulated widely throughout the Middle Ages. Moreover, his
rhetorical writings, which contain substantial discussions of key topics of
social and political theory, in particular De inventione, were broadly studied and adapted in medieval Europe. Evidence of Marsilius’s knowledge of
Cicero’s teachings may be found in both main discourses of the Defensor
pacis; De officiis is quoted, by my count, on eight separate and discrete
occasions—five times in Dictio I and three times in Dictio II—making
Cicero the pagan author cited most often by Marsilius, save only Aristotle.
Marsilius seems especially drawn to Cicero’s teaching that membership in
human society necessarily entails duties toward other men, inasmuch as
no community whatsoever is possible where a regard for one’s fellows is
lacking. Social cohesion specifically requires a natural duty to be just in
one’s conduct toward others: the very precondition for a communal existence is the recognition of a fixed principle of justice.
These assertions play a central role in Marsilius’s political theory,
elucidating the basis on which he seeks to rally opposition to the temporal intrusions by papal monarchy and simultaneously revealing much of
the framework within which he constructs his normative proposals for the
arrangement of the secular political community. In particular, in order to
defend a universal duty to reject papal infringement upon earthly jurisdiction, Marsilius invokes a Ciceronian account of society. In the introductory
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remarks to the first discourse, the Defensor pacis posits that “individual
brethren, and in even greater degree groups and communities, are obliged
to help one another ... from the bond or law of human society.”40 In support of this view, Marsilius quotes at length from De officiis to the effect
that human beings exist, according to their natures, in order to serve their
fellows rather than merely to satisfy themselves. Nature instills in man
the duty to act for the public benefit above all else: “Whoever desires to
and is capable of discerning the common utility is obliged to give … his
vigilant care and diligent efforts” to whatever threatens earthly communities.41 Human sociability forms a universal bond, not confined to one’s
own community but extending beyond fixed political units to all civilized
peoples. Thus, Marsilius attributes to Cicero his basic account of the naturalistic foundations of a generalized human responsibility to discover and
to stamp out anti-social beliefs and practices wherever they occur.
This doctrine of natural duty is developed to a far greater degree in
the conclusion to Dictio I. Marsilius again employs Cicero to authorize a
broadly based, purely temporal obligation on the part of men to oppose
interference with human “peace and happiness.” The resistance advocated
in the Defensor pacis is of two sorts. First, one must repel enemies of earthly
tranquility by revealing their identities to all who will listen. Instruction can
be a powerful tool in the war against those who seek to disturb the social
order. Second, one must move beyond education to direct action: whoever
takes up the banner of discord and temporal misery must be halted by any
means available to informed antagonists. Marsilius insists that “every man
is obligated to do this for another by a certain quasi-natural law, the duty
of friendship and human society.”42 Man is subject to the natural requirement to seek the good of his fellows without regard for his personal welfare. Marsilius indicates that any other mode of conduct would be unjust, a
position for which he cites explicitly Ciceronian grounds:
To these [namely, the tasks of identifying and fighting the enemies
of human happiness] all are obligated who have the knowledge
and ability to take action; and those who neglect or omit them on
whatever grounds are unjust, as Tully testified in De officiis, Book I,
Chapter V, when he said, “There are two kinds of injustice: one, of
those men who inflict it; the other, of those who do not drive away
the injury from those upon whom it is inflicted, if they can.” See,
then, according to this notable statement of Tully, that not only
those are unjust who inflict injury on others, but also those who
have the knowledge and ability to prevent injury being inflicted on
others, yet do not prevent it.43
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Marsilius’s argument suggests that a necessary corollary of the natural
bond of human association is a duty to perform justice in both its aspects:
not only to refrain from doing injury, but also to protect others from harm
when it is imminent. The clear implication is that society itself is impossible without the acknowledgement of this obligation arising from the
Ciceronian principle of justice.
Beyond this broad conception of universal human duties, Marsilius also
finds warrant in Cicero for the formation of specific political communities.
Unlike Aristotle, who emphasizes that the primary purpose of the polis is “living well,” by which he understands the life of virtuous citizenship, Marsilius
focuses almost exclusively on material and biological existence (what he calls
a “sufficient life”) as the aim of communal order. Human beings in their natural condition are described as physically weak and vulnerable to the elements,
and thus require mutual assistance in order to survive.44 Sociopolitical organization and institutions hence provide to mankind the protection and succor
necessary for the continued existence of the species, so that “the purpose for
the sake of which the state was established, and which necessitates all the
things which exist in the state and are done by the association of men in it,”
stems from “a principle naturally held, believed and freely granted by all: that
all men not deformed or otherwise impeded naturally desire a sufficient life
and avoid and flee what is harmful thereto.”45 Marsilius then quotes from De
officiis I.3, which employs almost identical language, in support of this fundamental desire for self-preservation as the basis for community.
The principle of the sufficient life is recurrently associated with
Cicero’s teachings throughout in the Defensor pacis. In Dictio II, for
instance, the natural disposition to associate communally is explained as
an implicit feature of human nature, realized only when men have been
exposed to reasoned persuasion about the advantages that accrue from
gathering into civil, legal and political order.
When men originally came together to establish the civil community
and civil law, the weightier part of them agreeing on matters pertaining
to sufficiency of life, they were summoned not by the coercive
authority of one or many persons, but rather by the persuasion
and exhortation of prudent and able men. The latter, exceptionally
endowed by nature with an inclination for this task, later through
their own efforts made progress in their various pursuits and guided
others either successively or simultaneously to the formation of a
perfected community, to which men are naturally inclined so that
they readily complied with this persuasion, as we have shown ... from
the Politics [of Aristotle].46
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The reference to Aristotle is a feint. In fact, this passage reproduces almost
verbatim Cicero’s recounting of the emergence of human communities in
De inventione I.2, according to which the realization of man’s natural but
implicit social sentiments depended on the guidance of a wise and eloquent
person, by whose instruction others discovered and improved their own
rational and discursive capabilities. Through the persuasion of this wise
orator, his fellow men exchanged their solitary existence for a social one.
At his behest, says Cicero, they learned useful and honorable occupations,
assembled into cities, obeyed voluntarily the commands of duly authorized
rulers, and observed laws, in sum, all of the features of human association
necessary for the attainment of the Marsilian goal of the sufficient life.
In turn, Marsilius insists that the attempt to sever members of the
political community from their duties to leaders and to one another, such
as occurs when the pope seeks to absolve citizens from obedience to political superiors, violates the very natural purpose for which communal order
exists. Should an external authority succeed in separating a ruler from his
people, the result would be
to allow the root of all governments to be cut up, and the bond and
nexus of every city and state to be destroyed. For I hold such root
and nexus to be nothing other than the mutual allegiance and faith
of subjects and rulers. For this faith, as Cicero says in his treatise
On Duties, Book I [23], “is the foundation of justice,” and he who
strives to destroy it between rulers and subjects harbors no other
design than to acquire for himself the ability to overthrow at his
own pleasure the power of all governments, and hence to cast them
into slavery to himself. And this also means that such a person
disturbs the peace or tranquility of all men who lead a civil life and
hence deprives them of the sufficient life in the present world.47

In proposing this argument, Marsilius brings together the broad Ciceronian
view that all forms of human association and cooperation naturally rest on
justice with the more specific claim that political and legal authority rests
upon the application of just principles to regulate interactions among members of the community in order to achieve a sufficient life for all. Anyone
who attempts to undermine the “nexus” of social and political relationships
governed by justice is an enemy of communal order and indeed of nature
itself. Marsilius thus invokes fundamental elements of Cicero’s thought
in order to pursue his primary polemical and philosophical agenda in the
Defensor pacis of demonstrating the dangerous and disruptive effects of the
papacy’s efforts to impose its power over purely temporal affairs.
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Ancient Roman sources beyond Cicero also play significant parts in
shaping the main contours of Marsilius’s framework. Sallust, for example, is
cited only twice, both times in Dictio I. In the first instance, he is quoted
to illustrate the damage caused by public discord to “the Italian natives …
deprived of the sufficient life, undergoing the gravest hardships instead
of the quiet they seek, and the harsh yoke of tyrants instead of liberty.”48
In the second case, Sallust’s report of the suppression of the conspiracy of
Catiline and his accomplices is mentioned in order to praise Cicero’s conduct, while Consul, as a “prudent” statesman who elected to punish the
plotters by extra-legal execution rather than to risk the likelihood that “civil
wars destructive of the polity” would have arisen “because of the sedition
which these conspirators incited among the people against the consul and
the other rulers.” 49 By contrast, the Latin Fathers are much more commonly referred to, albeit nearly always in Dictio II. Ambrose and Jerome
are central sources of information about the governance of the church and
commentary on scripture; others, such as Origen, Gregory the Great, and
Hilary, are mentioned, although less frequently. The extent of Marsilius’s
direct familiarity with their writings is difficult to ascertain. The vast majority of his quotations from and references to them derive from intermediate
sources, including the Glossa ordinaria, Peter Lombard’s Collectanea, and
Thomas Aquinas’s Catena aurea, although, at least in the case of Ambrose,
Marsilius seems at times to be drawing directly from letters and sermons.
Although Augustine, too, is often cited only indirectly, there is
greater evidence to suggest Marsilius’s direct knowledge of his treatises
and other writings, including the City of God, On the Trinity, and the
Retractations. Indeed, Augustine is the only Father who merits even a single reference in Dictio I. Augustine’s importance for the development of
Marsilian ideas has in fact been the subject of significant previous scholarly
discussion. In his germinal 1951 study, Marsilius of Padua and Medieval
Political Philosophy, Alan Gewirth contended that central elements of the
argument of the Defensor pacis depend on Augustinian premises.50 Gewirth
pointed to Marsilius’s view that the chief purpose of political community,
and thus the goal of government, is peace, a position that coincides directly
with Augustine’s in The City of God. For Marsilius, as for Augustine, the
maintenance of public peace or tranquility requires a government able to
enforce civil order upon a fallen mankind that is always threatened with
self-destruction as the result of conflicting interests and selfish desires.
The Augustinianism ascribed to Marsilius by Gewirth is said to support two important features of Dictio I. First, Augustine is imputed to be
the source for Marsilius’s “biological” conception of the ends of earthly
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communal life, in the sense that the physical well-being of citizens, rather
than their moral and spiritual improvement, constitutes the main reason
that temporal society and government come into existence. Unable to
fend for themselves in the wake of the Fall, human beings must rely upon
one another in order to survive individually and as a species. This desire
for corporeal subsistence compels them to form communities and share
with each other the various “arts and sciences” necessary for existence.
Unlike Aristotle and most medieval Aristotelians, temporal rulership
for Marsilius has little purchase on the souls of human beings, either in
matters of earthly virtue or eternal salvation. Second, on Gewirth’s interpretation, Marsilius’s Augustinian proclivities lead him to endorse a form
of legal positivism, in the sense that he supposedly evinces no interest in
whether human laws accord with some “higher order” (natural or divine)
principle of justice. Rather, Marsilius advocates the view that the promulgation of law by the appropriate temporal authority (whom he calls the
legislator humanus, or human legislator) is sufficient unto itself to render
a statute binding and enforceable. Since law is necessary for the maintenance of the civil peace, and the members of the community naturally
desire to achieve and maintain that peace above all else, the establishment
of enforceable statute is of greater importance than whether its dictates
accord with a rational or supernatural conception of justice.
Gewirth’s understanding of Marsilius’s Augustinian proclivities
has not gone unchallenged. Daniel G. Mulcahy argued that Marsilius in
fact deploys Augustinian sources in a far different way from that claimed
by Gewirth. 51 Pointing out that Augustine is barely ever cited in the
first discourse of the Defensor pacis (which is the section of the text on
which Gewirth concentrates), Mulcahy insists instead that Marsilius’s
Augustinianism, to the extent it exists at all, arises from the two authors’
theological/ecclesiological convergence on issues about the power and
status of priests, the fallibility of human writings, and the justification
of religious poverty. In Mulcahy’s view, however, even these references to
Augustine’s views are relatively trivial and tangential, such that no genuine Augustinian influence may properly be identified in the Defensor pacis.
In a similar vein, Conal Condren has claimed that Augustine should be
treated not even as a potential “source,” but simply as an “authority,” for
Marsilius, such that the entire question of “influence” itself must be dismissed.52 Another scholar, Joanna V. Scott, defended some of the merits
of Gewirth’s assertion of an Augustinian strain in the Defensor pacis. 53
While she argued that there are certainly important divergences between
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the Augustinian and Marsilian conceptions of the earthly community, she
also demonstrated that Marsilius’s position by no means stands in conflict
with that of Augustine, illustrated especially by their common concern to
advance the legitimacy of earthly political power in relation to divine ordination. The influence of Augustine upon his late medieval successor is less
an issue than their shared commitment to an idea of the proper role and
sphere of secular civic life in the overall Christian conception of human
ends and goods.
What are we to make of these competing interpretations of the role
played by Augustine in the argument of the Defensor pacis? Each position
has certain merits. Mulcahy is correct to point out that the vast preponderance of references to Augustine is contained in the second discourse
and concerns matters of ecclesiology and scriptural hermeneutics; and
Condren is right that these citations (as in the case of Marsilius’s use of
other Latin Fathers) tend to constitute appeals to authority rather than
developed theoretical arguments. Moreover, Gewirth seems to stretch credulity by claiming that Augustine afforded the inspiration for Marsilius’s
alleged legal positivism: as scholars have argued, it is far from clear that
the Defensor pacis endorses such a doctrine. 54 Marsilius’s reliance on
Cicero’s conception of justice, discussed above, supports this conclusion.
Yet Scott’s chastened defense of Gewirth also finds support in the text of
the Defensor pacis. The City of God is cited by Marsilius in the context of
his discussion of the “causes” of government, that is, how temporal rule
is authorized. He distinguishes between “demonstrable” and “indemonstrable” modes of causation. The latter denotes the claim that the “divine
will” or another supernatural force was the immediate source of an office
or institution, while the former connotes a “method of establishing governments which proceeds immediately from the human mind, although
perhaps remotely from God as remote cause, who grants all earthly rulership.”55 It is at this juncture that Marsilius refers to City of God 5.21 as
the basis for the view that all temporal power may be traced back to God,
however distantly and indirectly. While he wishes to concentrate on forms
of government that arise from the human mind and will and thus are
susceptible to certain demonstration, he also declines to adopt a strictly
naturalistic position (such as that associated with pagan philosophers like
Aristotle and Cicero) that would deny any measure of divine ordination
to political institutions and authority. The Augustinian position permits
him to adopt a middle ground between extreme naturalism and a more
theocentric view: Although all political dominion derives from God in
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the final analysis, many (probably most) earthly governments directly
and immediately result from human intellect and volition, and thus their
causes may be demonstrated by reason and experience.
Perhaps the more difficult question concerning Marsilius’s relation
to Augustine is why he did not explicitly invoke the famous doctrine of
the City of God that the purpose of earthly government is to establish and
maintain the peace, given the apparent agreement between the two thinkers concerning this central claim. While ultimately one can only speculate, the answer may have much to do with the very different character
of their respective conceptions of what constitutes peace itself. Temporal
peace for Augustine is a modus vivendi in which government imposes
order upon the potentially conflicting inhabitants of the two cities, those
who live according to libido dominandi (the City of Man) and those who
have been accorded divine grace (the City of God). Thus, peace is crucially connected to Augustine’s overarching providential scheme of history. By contrast, Marsilian peace represents a wholly naturalistic goal
resulting from the emergence of the diverse functions necessary for the
“perfected” human community. In order for the members of this community to live together in relative harmony and order, it became necessary
for a separate and distinct system of justice to be introduced in the course
of social development. Marsilius explains that “because between men so
congregated there occur contentions and quarrels which, not regulated
by the norm of justice, would cause fights and the separation of men and
so at length the decay of the city, it is required in this relationship that
a standard of justice be established and custodians or makers [of it].”56
Indeed, the embodiment of this standard of justice in the law constitutes
the salient achievement of the “perfected community.” No community
is complete without “standards of civil justice and benefit established by
human authority, such as customs, statutes, plebiscites, decretals and similar rules.”57 The Defensor pacis insists that the existence of peace in a fully
developed human community is necessarily and inescapably coextensive
with submission to the conditions imposed by justice. Such a position
stands at considerable remove from Augustine, for whom true justice is
possible only in heaven among God’s chosen and therefore is different in
kind from earthly peace and order.
Despite Marsilius’s evident debts to ancient Roman writers,
especially Cicero and Augustine, it should be clear from the foregoing
that his political thought is no more fully assimilable to one or more
Latin traditions than to Aristotelianism or any other school of thought.
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The Defensor pacis is too sui generis to be reduced to rigid categorization.
On the other hand, Latin ideas did quite demonstrably exercise some
intellectual impact upon Marsilius, a fact that we ignore at our own peril.
In particular, attentiveness to the classical Roman background helps us
to understand how Marsilius adapted and blended a variety of political
doctrines and languages in order to pursue his overarching purpose of
challenging and undermining the papalist agenda. Seen in this light, the
original and innovative features of the Defensor pacis may be identified and
analyzed with greater precision.

Conclusion
At first glance, there may not appear to be many features shared in common by the appropriations of ancient Roman civilization found in Ptolemy
of Lucca’s De regimine principum and Marsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis.
Ptolemy focuses on the history of Rome, with special attention to the
republican phase, in order both to support a normative claim about the
superiority of republics and to bolster his providentialist account of
human events. Marsilius, although he has sometimes been characterized as
a theorist of republicanism,58 tends to concentrate on philosophical arguments and principles derived from Roman sources in order to articulate
his “generic” naturalistic conception of human community.59 But a couple
more general observations about the role that classical Latin sources play
in their respective works seem in order to me by way of conclusion.
First, despite the close association of their authors with the Arts
Faculty at the University of Paris, not to mention the sizeable number of
references to and quotations from Aristotle’s corpus, the appeals in both
De regimine principum and the Defensor pacis to Roman antiquity challenge decisively the easy assumption that Ptolemy and Marsilius were
fundamentally devoted to and dependent upon Aristotelian premises.
Their ideas are far too eclectic and their sources were far too diverse to
warrant reduction to the simple label of “Aristotelianism.” Indeed, when
Aristotle’s thought conflicted with relevant Roman ideas, it was often the
former that was forced to conform to the latter, either overtly or by implication. Second, however attractive the authority of Aristotle might have
been to Ptolemy and Marsilius, neither of them seems entirely comfortable with the world of the Greek polis, whereas the Latin culture of the
Roman Republic and Empire clearly falls (and feels) closer to their experiences and intellectual sensibilities. Some of this affinity may be attributed
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to personal factors. When Marsilius described himself at the beginning
of the Defensor pacis as a “son of Antenor”—the legendary founder of
Padua—he self-identifies with traditional Roman myth.60 Likewise, as we
have seen, Ptolemy clearly equates the Italian self-governing urban communes of his own day with the Roman republican past rather than with,
say, Athenian democracy or even Spartan oligarchy.
Yet I am inclined to think that more is at stake here than simple
proto-nationalist pride that these ethnic Italians might have harbored for
the Roman heritage. For a plethora of civilizational reasons—including
but not limited to continuities of language, legal system, recognizable
political institutions (empire and republic), and literature—I postulate
that Rome and its culture struck a chord with Ptolemy and Marsilius (and
I daresay many other medieval scholastic political authors) in a way that
Aristotle’s Greek polis and its constitutional orders did not resonate. Nor
did the situation necessarily change with the Renaissance and its superior
command of the Attic Greek language and access to a far larger body of
Greek (especially Athenian) philosophical, literary, political, and historical writings. One need only recall Machiavelli’s deep devotion to the classical Romans, and his relative lack of interest in the ancient Greek poleis,
to realize that Romanitas carried great intellectual power and historical
weight well into early modern times, no less than during the Middle Ages.
Having put on the toga, numerous European political thinkers were loathe
to exchange it for other garb.61
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Nicholas Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla as
Virtual Colleagues
Humanism as Defining
Nancy Struever

“The humane disciplines are history and criticism.”1

Intellectual history is reflective, reflexive: devoted to the history of
inquiry. That is, to a commitment, not so much to a history of religion
in the seventeenth century, as to a history of seventeenth-century investigations of religion. Here a radical philosophical revisionism of the early
1920s may illumine the enduring informal events of Humanist inquiry as
strongly revisionary, critical: two unwitting colleagues, Martin Heidegger
and R. G. Collingwood, may shed light on two unwitting Renaissance
colleagues, Nicholas Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla. Heidegger, in the lectures prior to the publication of Being and Time in 1927 (and the collapse of the Being and Time project), and Colling wood in the early
tracts, “Libellus de Generatione” (1920), Speculum mentis (1924), and
Outlines of a Philosophy of Art (1925), seemingly entirely unaware of each
other, react strongly against conventional philosophy: Robert Pippin
laments Heidegger’s “blistering criticism of rationalism and metaphysics;” Collingwood describes the philosophical Realism of his Oxford colleagues as “building card-houses out of a pack of lies.”2
This Modernist program claimed that the first useful topic of
inquiry is mental activity as primordial “ursprünglich.” Both Heidegger
and Collingwood deal with what Theodore Kisiel, in his Genesis of Being
and Time, calls a “pre-theoretical attitudinal complex,” that is, with primordial mental activities as generative matrix: in Being and Time this is
“thinking” as Care, Sorge, with its Concerns, Besorgen, sorted in Being
and Time as Understanding , Verstehen, Disposition, Befindlichkeit,
Locatedness, Verfallen.3 Both address, to be sure, not the primordial of
early hominid societies but our primordial of “thinking” plain: before
“theory,” before metaphysics, before systemic ambitions; it is inquiry with
a concern for historical concreteness, for activities not yet thematized, for
unrealized possibilities: for “firstness.”
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This disestablishmentarian revisionism could suggest a Renaissance
Humanism that functions, not so much as a discipline, or, particularly, as
a failed philosophical discipline, but as a “frame” for inquiry, as a set of
dispositions to understand “Heideggerean” understandings and dispositions: it is a mapping of pre-theoretical activity, and of the pre-theoretical
persevering in theory. Thus Rocco Rubini describes Petrarchan “familiarity” as both disposition (investigative filter) as attitude—vivid, perceptive,
expressive—and understanding as competence—exploratory, diffuse. 4
Katharine Eden relates the Humanists’ discovery of “intimacy” as a disposition using informality as access to classical texts.5 Both familiarity and
intimacy invest work that assumes inquirer’s experience necessarily corrects, extends knowledge. Rubini claims Petrarch’s discovery of the Letters
to Atticus in 1345 was seminal: that is, Humanism as frame sustains the
practice of using Cicero’s letters to interpret Ciceronian treatises. Inquiry
makes deliberate resourceful calls on phenomenological evidence—our
reactions to appearances—as modifications, improvements of doctrine,
theory: saving appearances, against theoretical self-concern. Familiarity,
intimacy also define a responsibility for response, engagement with
exchange, a sense of correctness, error as owned. It counters philosophical
solipsism with its focus on its own academic accomplishments, its faith in
systemic authenticity, authority. Humanists exchange dispositions: familiarity discerned, intimacy felt, understandings offered. It is investigation,
in short, in movement, with a desire, an obligation for its responses to
achieve effective responses. In short, the inquiry form, result, is criticism.
And, perhaps, Williams’s “un-disciplines.”
Certainly we may remark on the Renaissance Humanists as “anticipators” of modern Humanist research scholarship, clever in Classical
philology; but Humanists are, as well, avatars of ambitious modern critics—Empson, Kermode, Barthes, Benjamin. That is, engaged in making
specific, artful, reflective demands on the practice of inquiry. They are
ambitious for their own perceptive response, active in the definitions of a
wider discussion. They make revisions, at times provocatively eclectic, in
selecting sources and choosing applications: they can be almost antidisciplinarian in dissolving boundaries. They are obliged to take account of
historical dispositions, understandings that have fostered boundaries, theoretical limitations. And, at best, they assume basic efforts in inquiry revision should be linked to consequences, to history, to episodes of possible
“civil” reform. Nicolaus Cusanus (1401–1464) and Lorenzo Valla (1406–
1457) are exactly contemporaneous inquirers, and they shared, for a short

CUSANUS AND VALLA AS VIRTUAL COLLEAGUES   97

time, the intellectual liveliness of a domain, the papal court of Nicholas V.
I shall argue that Cusanus and Valla are paradigmatic Humanist revisers and inventive Humanist reformers. Cusa’s response to a painting,
and Valla’s to the Aesopian fable, are parallel paradigmatic instances of a
Humanistic responsibility of response to art as the Collingwoodian “first
form of experience.”

Criticism as Collegiality
Cusanus: De visione Dei
So, by his brother’s showing he will come to know that the picture’s
face keepeth in sight all as they go on their way though it be in
contrary directions; and thus he will prove that the countenance,
though motionless, is turned to the east in the same way that it is
simultaneously turned to the west, and in the same way to north
and to south, and alike to one particular place and to all objects at
once, whereby it regardeth a single movement even as it regardeth
all together. And while he observeth how that gaze never quitteth
any, he seeth that it taketh such diligent care of each one who
findeth himself observed as though it cared only for him.6

The history of ideas requires the history of inquiry practices. Here is a
remarkable practice: the argument of Cusanus’s “mystical” tract turns on
the edification, the instruction provided by a painting given to the monastic community: named the “Omnivoyant Icon,” its function is the representation of the divine visage, the divine possible gaze. Now consider
Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art: he assumes, first, art has access
to primordial understandings, dispositions, locatednesses; second, art can
make the primordial cares, concerns intelligible. Thus, Heidegger’s famous
reading of Van Gogh’s painting, Pair of Shoes (1886).7 It is “in the picture,
and only in the picture” that we confront primordial “working” equipmentality.8 The shape of the peasant boots offers a profound sense of usefulness, Dienlichkeit, reliability; the figure gives us the “world” of the peasant: toilsomeness, tenacity, loneliness, anxiety.9 “The painting spoke,” and
“suddenly we were someplace else.” 10
Cusanus’s use of the visual language: gaze, gesture, pose—as activities of portrait subject and beholder, claims the interlocutory capacity of
paint. “The painting speaks,” to use Heidegger’s expression: and it asks
for the monastic viewer’s response, which can be, should be, discovery,
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a text interpreted: here, divine omnivoyance as the viewer’s lived experience. For the preface describes discovery taking place in the church as
a communal practice: each monk must recognize his confreres’ experiences, wherever located in the church; the gaze must be acknowledged as
directed to each. Each monk may move and see the gaze follows him; each
monk must recognize his confreres’ movements, assume their belief that
the gaze follows them. Omnivoyance: the gaze generates their experience
of shared edification, meaning is delivered at the points of reception; it
is an obligation to understand an experience as common, a community
practice of interpretive discovery.
Collingwood, Heidegger’s unwitting colleague, makes stronger
claims in his account of art as “primordial:” art is “the original soil out of
which all other activities grow,” “the first form of experience;” 11 and, art
“worked,” is strengthened, revised by reflection, by the artist who is “also
historian and critic;” for “aesthetic [as in aesthesis (sense)] activity is the
necessary basis for any sound historical or critical work.”12 Certainly Cusa
claims the unity of thinking and seeing powers: of “vis intellectiva” with
“virtuti animali visiva.”13 And, we can locate this premise in our own historical discussion: thus Joseph Koerner’s account of German Reformation,
Enlightenment art, where “the private experience of art and nature replaces
organized religion as the site of spiritual transcendence.”14 But, the Cusan
experience in the De visione Dei is not, strictly, private; indeed, a great deal
of the meaning hinges on the experience as acknowledging the simultaneity of diverse experiences of diverse persons, sharing a space, but not,
possibly, a single point of view: difference, exchange marks this peculiar
episode of edification.
This, the “community” experience, raises an issue of current importance in aesthetic theory: that is, the contention that an art experience
is a strong instance of “shared” intelligibility, “embodied, intersubjective
intelligibility,” in Robert Pippin’s gloss.15 But Pippin, Hegelian enthusiast, chooses to emphasize the gain in “thinking” intelligibility. His very
strong focus is on art as furnishing a remarkable and idiosyncratic source
of “shared intelligibility:” “art works, by existing at all … embody the possibility of shared meaning.” 16 Sharedness defines the basic gestures, acts
of painting experience—to begin with, of course, it is not of nature, of a
person, but “an experience of an experience.” The experience of the painter
comes first, we come late; thus, Koerner’s explanation of C. D. Friedrich’s
Rückenfigur: in the painting the beholder views—from behind!—this
bold previous gaze, reminding us of our lateness.17 But the sharedness is
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not simply between artist and beholder, but in the exchanges between
responders, in the meeting of their glances, or in the historical succession
of possible viewings, in museum behavior. The painting’s shareability, of
course, as sensual, as physical, is “necessary,” necessarily shareable; but, the
individual beholder’s sharednesses, his acts, only possible, possibly isolate,
mutant, “contingent:” we may or may not “get the picture.” Humanism as
frame abets the use of image in inquiry.
Cusa’s mystical tract, with its prefatory aesthetic act, is a forced
march into intimacy, an experience of an experience of the divine. The text
is part and parcel of Cusanus’s developing critique of the contemporaneous Western philosophy: scholastic discourse is inadequate to originate
or complete an experience of religious discovery. And, Chapter 22 of the
De visione Dei argues against the capacity of discursive reason: “discurrere
et quaerere”—running, seeking is the activity of a dog ; basic, but surely,
impertinent, random.18 Certainly the pictorial experience imposes sensual
demands, unavoidable, investing his “mystical”—devotional—response.
But, as well, the rewarding possibilities of our “shared intelligibility” may
describe a motive for Cusanus’s heavy usage—throughout his texts—of
verbal and mathematical image and metaphor. The motive is, of course,
the figurative resolution of shared doctrinal difficulties. The painting experience interprets the religious experience: “Thou dost offer thyself to him
that beholdeth, as though thou receiveth being from him.”19 “In thee God
being created is one with creating—coincidit in te deus, creari con creare—
since the image which seemeth to be created by me is the truth that created me.”20 And the indefinitely shareable experience models “infinity:” “I
behold in the face of the picture a picture of infinity ... for its gaze is not
limited ... and is infinite—visus interminatus ... et ita infinitus.”21 Perhaps a
phenomenological hermeneutic.
Heidegger, in his Introduction to Phenomenological Research, insists
that if we wish to connect aesthesis with noesis, we need phantasia, imagination, the capacity to present the non-present.22 Cusanus observes the
human (faulty) intellect, if it is to find expression in action, requires
images, appearances, phantasmata, which need sense, and sense requires
body; “phantasmata, sine sensibus haberi nequeunt et sensus sine corpore
non subsistent.” 23 The imagination supplies images, “intuited” in sensible experience,24 for the image requires color, color quantified, “quia non
potuit facies sine colore nec colore sine quantitate exsistit.”25 The image,
of course, must figure truth? And the truth is in our activity, in intuition,
experience—“quod propterea non capit mea imaginatio”—“I cannot, by
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any imagining whatever, disprove the image’s effect” 26—thus, the centrality of imaginative powers in discovery—or not. But note the ontological
distinction: Cusa recalls one of Augustine’s definitions of imagination in
the De Genesi ad litteram, which deals with its “similitudes” of unknown,
not present bodies, “non ita sunt ille, sed ut occurrit, intuemur.” We know,
use our similitudes, imaginations not as “things that are,” but as they, the
imaginations, occur to us, “happen.”27 We notice the force of the distinction: it describes the opposition between the competences of “philosophical” knowledge and art’s intelligibility. This recalls Klaus Dockhorn’s
appeal to Quintilian on the peculiar necessity of an appeal to the imagination, not imitation, for making present whatever is non-present, gone—
say, past affect.28 Cusanus also insists that the image does not perfect, but
initiates our inquiry with an exemplar of truth, “sicut imago non perficit,
licet excitet ad inquirendum veritatem exemplaris.”29 Still, recall Chapter
22: “the image which seems created by me, is the truth, which creates me”:
“similitude enim, quae videtur creari a me, est veritas, quae creat me.” The
image is a check, constraint on my speculation.
Still, sharedness is a basic value of aesthetic activity; it is a double
creation of artist and beholder, a “witting” sharing, and, as such, develops
civil truth: for, the image is present, presents itself, appears to all and to
one simultaneously.30 The lesson of the image is grasped, should be grasped
as imposing equality, equally. Sharedness is precisely the normative value
delivered by the art to the viewer, reader. And, again, necessarily delivered.
Either by paint or by stone, sensation asserts both necessity (as basic primordial activity) and, at once, possibility—our reception, or not—thus
autonomy of gesture, with contingency of reception: freedom, freedom
offered or received, by art. And perhaps, the autonomy, the depth, the
depth of effect of the shared experience can be specific, peculiar to the
picture, to the “subtle skill” of the painter. 31 Art is an aesthetic activity
that funds sharedness; sharedness is the emotional, dispositional weight of
“civil” in Humanist inquiry.
To put it another way: what Cusanus describes in the De visione Dei is
an exemplary instance of the rhetorical figure apostrophe. The painter makes
material, sensual direct address by the image to the beholder, or, he offers
the possibility that the beholder can achieve a state of being addressed. The
rhetorical assumption is that an available figure is not solipsist, subjective.
Rather, the “Humanist” essence of the reciprocal gaze is that it is a public act,
generally accessible; both artist and beholder assume it is available to each and
all. Thus the image works as an “event;” it “occurs,” as Augustine explained.

CUSANUS AND VALLA AS VIRTUAL COLLEAGUES   101

The “event” nature of the aesthetic activity secures the experience as
intrusive, instructive. The truly seminal study of Cusan engagement with
Humanist inquiry is, of course, Ernst Cassirer’s Individuum und Kosmos in
der Philosophie der Renaissance (1927). Cassirer’s first chapter engages the
De visione Dei: he claims that “in these sentences” (of Cusa’s Chapter 6)
“we are at the focal point of his speculation.” But he asserts more: “here
we can see most clearly the connection of this speculation with the fundamental intellectual forces of the epoch,” which Cassirer names as Northern
mysticism, Heidelbergian scholasticism, and Quattrocento retrievals of the
accomplishments of antiquity.32 The Cusan text has a double pertinence:
to Humanistic inquiry strategies and to revisiting Cassirer’s concern for
possible interrelations of “Northern” and “Southern” inquiry modes. But
Edward Cranz’s articles counter Cassirer’s claim that there is no innovation
in Humanistic thought, only in Humanist style, here by making the case
that aesthetic form may constitute insight: the De visione Dei is remarkable
for its account of the experience of art, the phenomenology of paint. Cranz
notes as well the gradual estrangement of Cusa from scholasticism.33 The
text furnishes “the most fundamental context for his second main principle,
the coincidence of opposites … Christ is within the wall of paradox, the
wall of the laws of contradiction. Christ’s intellect is both truth and at the
same time image. Christ is both the way to truth, and He is truth itself.”34
In the very early manuscript Libellus de generatione Collingwood, citing
Cusanus, claims: “coincidence of opposites ... this is where Realism dies by
its own hand.”35
Very few “mystics” have Cusa’s epistemological ambitions; very few
philosophers would tolerate his aesthetic argument as epistemologically
sound. Michel De Certeau has noted the constraints of Cusa’s career: he
regarded himself as a (barbaric) German speaking Latin. He did not claim to
be a mystic, while writing “mystical” tracts. De Certeau and others have noted
the stark contrast of the fragility of his theory in diffusion, the many successes of his ecclesiastical career. Still, De Certeau restates the Heideggerean
argument for art’s accessibility to the primordial: Cusa’s aesthetic intrusion
“gives a language for what is already there. It offers words for knowledge the
addressee already held somewhere.”36 But perhaps the current dishevelled
discussion of the merits, flaws of Renaissance Humanism needs the generosity of Cusanus as a counter pressure to our disciplinary resistances to
the poetry and pictures of intelligibility: Humanism enhanced, reinforced.
Recall Cusa, Chapter 22: “For you draw us to you by every possible means of
attraction,” “trahis enim nos ad te omni possibili trahendi modo.”
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Valla’s Quintilianesque Critique
Revisionism is a crucial element in Camporeale’s entanglements of
Renaissance and Reformation moments. And, specifically in his reading of
Valla. In his monograph on Valla’s oratio or declamatio on the “Donation
of Constantine,” his fundamental aim is to account for the “radical liberty” of Valla’s inquiry; the “libertà radicale nel ripensamento del passato e
nella riflessione etica del presente:” mining Antiquity’s richness, but not a
work of Classical piety.37 Certainly Camporeale offers a thick, meticulous
summary of doctrinal issues; but he treats Valla’s radical liberty as an “attitudinal complex,” defining the investigator’s role.
Radicality is inflected as Valla’s concern for the originary religious
experience, and motivates his work to restore the concreteness of the evangelical narrative, not yet colonized by theological abstractness. Camporeale
claims the evangelical logos incarnato as paradigmatic human discursive
capacity for Valla, thus a concern for Humanistic philology as serious
practice. The embodied authenticity is to be retrieved in Valla’s inquiry
by rhetorical strategies of reading New Testament practices, by, therefore,
applying Quintilian’s types of usage—example, observation, custom. The
elements of quotidian Christian experience are embedded in, and available
to be experienced in, the scriptural text. Just so, Klaus Dockhorn describes
Luther as recapturing, imagining, the hidden past evangelical affect in his
“present day” German.38 Valla’s reading assumes “la continua rivedibilità,”
the easy accessibility of scripture: the imperative “look again,” claims rereadability; and, like revisionist Collingwoodian history, it is “re-enactment,”
our sheer gain, time gained in performance for a scriptural “now” as authentic, all ours.39 Recall Collingwood’s insistence that abstractness is the flaw
of both Idealism and Realism, that “theology is the negation of religion;”
for Valla, philosophical discourse is “the fount of all heresies.”40
Camporeale’s Repastinatio article, the most programmatic of
Camporeale’s articles on Valla, cites Wittgenstein (a great annoyance to
historians of philosophy) on the supplanting of metaphysical motives by
the quotidian, and proceeds to describe Valla’s shift of interest from verità
ontologica to verità logica.41 Valla’s logic, of course, is not formalist exercise,
but an account of the structure of language. And thus Valla’s anti-technical
moment: his reduction of the Aristotelian logical categories, predicaments
speaks directly to his sense of the tactics of proper inquiry; we are left with
thing, quality, action—res, qualitas, actio—and here Camporeale points
out that for Valla “bonità ha luogo soltanto in action,” goodness has place
only in action: a strenuous tactic of dereification.42 Camporeale’s account in
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Umanesimo e teologia of Valla’s retrieval of Quintilianesimo, of the program
as well as techniques of Quintilian’s work—is a narrative of rhetoric understood as the continual return of the continuously theoretically repressed:
We ... have to compose our speeches for others to judge, and have
frequently to speak before an audience of men who, if not thoroughly
uneducated, are certainly ignorant of such arts as dialectic: and
unless we attract them by the charm of our discourse or drag them
by its force, and occasionally throw them off their balance by an
appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable to vindicate the claims
of truth and justice.43

Camporeale embarks on a careful account of Valla’s use in the Dialectical
Disputations of Quintilian’s Book 5; this is the great book of transition:
here the vital context for Quintilian’s criticism, his critical reformulations,
is the loss, the absence of politics in imperial Rome: possible civil activity
is only legal; the time for philosophy is primarily retirement, as appropriate for “learned men seeking for truth among other learned men.”44 This
passage setting the goal of vindicating the claims of truth and justice immediately follows the text that sets the inquiry parameters: the tasks of topikē
(invention) and kritikē (judgment). For Book 5 must shift emphasis from
the domain of necessity, and apodeictic argument, to the domain of the
credible, the probable, the possible, the verisimilar—here most definitely
requiring the full armament of aesthetic enticement, emotional appeal,
philological care, of inductive arguments from example, of (incomplete)
rhetorical enthymeme; it becomes a realist, pessimistic working with dubious transactions; the edge to his account is his sense of political loss as
the strong motive for critical gain, awareness. Camporeale corrects earlier
scholarship, pointing out that Valla inserts whole chunks of Book 5 in his
text of Dialectical Disputations: Quintilian’s chapters 8–10 in Valla’s Book
2; chapters 11–14 in Book 3; from Book 2, 20 to the end it is all Quintilian;
the whole of Book 3,15 is from Quintilian 10. The splendid footnotes of
Copenhaver and Nauta’s edition, translation, of the Dialectical Disputations
list the numerous references to Quintilian scattered throughout.

Grammar as Reorientation
“Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority, and usage ... Usage,
however, is the surest pilot in speaking, and we should treat language as
currency minted with the public stamp. But in all these cases we have need
of a critical judgment.”45
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Thus Camporeale: “grammar is the point of reference for Valla’s
critical work.” 46 Quintilian may have spoken of grammar as scientia of
speaking, writing, or enarratio (interpretation) of poetry, but he also
claims that the task of judicium (criticism) invests them all.47 One’s competence is gained through refined sensitivity to diverse patterns of use;
Camporeale calls this “critical-philological method.”48 Valla, in short,
encapsulates disciplines within a simple critical obligation; here the grammarian/philologue’s customary “familiar” disposition corrects dependence on flawed “technical” disciplinary practice.
For, of the canons mentioned by Quintilian, consuetudo (custom)
dominates. That is, the custom of “dei colti e delle personi commune” of
“parlare commune;” “one must not stray from the most customary,” as
betraying the “natura loquendi.”49 Valla contrasts its pertinence to interpretation from the impertinence of the language of the “sophists,” who
create an autonomous, coherent linguistic system that is inappropriate,
useless, for civil activity. Just so, eggs. Aristotle claimed one is not a number, but an abstraction, concept, a beginning of number; but, women who
sell eggs know “one egg” when they see it.50 The women employ words for
usum (use); the philosophers for lusum (display). Or they, theory-laden,
are protective of their constructs: “like merchants who refuse daylight on
their goods.”51
Nauta, historian of philosophy, fine translator of Valla, notes (complains?) Valla has “put Aristotle on a diet.” On the contrary, Camporeale
argues that Valla’s program attempts to expand Aristotle’s hermeneutic possibilities exponentially: Humanists initiate a wider discussion by
removing disciplinary obstacles. Consider Valla’s reduction of the transcendentals to one, “res,” “thing.”52 Camporeale claims Valla argues only
“res” possesses intrinsically that “universal occasion” which constitutes
transcendence.53 “Universal” should be a judgment assigned by an inquirer
on a “thinking occasion;” criticism is a task with rigidly defined inquiry
responsibilities. Valla had warned that “transcendentals” had been deemed
“kings, emperors:” they arbitrarily rule.54 Valla questions tactics of reification, turning adjectives into substantives; and, “being,” he notes, is
only a participle. To call “unum, bonum, verum” values, goals, offers only
nominal goals; abstractions are not substantives, things; you may speak of
“verità logica,” but not of veritas: adjectives aren’t nouns.55 In sum, Valla’s
grammar reorients serious inquiry to target life’s dispositions, understandings that Heidegger described in Being and Time as proper philosophical
task, and that Cusanus located in a domain especially accessible to art and
its illuminations.
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Valla’s work is de-ontologizing ; he contends the contemporary
“sophists” and their raising the epistemological stakes by dialectical fiat: by
speculative, not historical rules. Valla proposes introducing history, that is,
philology [as simply “reception history”?], into philosophy.56 Valla expands
the domain of inquiry by eliminating arbitrary disciplinary constraints:
enlarging investigative competence, thus widening possible responsible
participation. Camporeale notes that Valla’s rhetoric is not merely formal,
or legal, or casuistic calling, but that it claims to deal with “all of historical
reality that can be expressed in human language.”57 Recall that Heidegger
claimed his was a program of “Destruction,” the elimination of the durable
terms and arguments of conventional philosophy: you use the terms, you
buy the arguments: you become entangled in a tissue of begged questions.

“Philosophy Can Be Simulated, Eloquence Not”58
Barbara Cassin uses Quintilian’s aphorism to explain rhetorical uniqueness: Cassin is a student of Hellenic inquiry; she makes a case for early
“non-Socratic” philosophy, for the Sophistic inquiry activity, engaged with
politics; she repeats Heidegger’s claim that early Greek rhetoric functions
only, always in politics in contrast with Platonic philosophy’s taste for
transcendence. Cassin argues that for Quintilian’s eloquence, only “effect,”
(not “style”), is index sui.59 Eloquence is effective, or not; success cannot be
simulated. Cassin defines not only rhetorical capacity, but philosophical
incapacity. Valla initiates a wider Humanist discussion; the width is for
effect, pertinence. And, for Quintilian, philosophical discourse does not
necessarily deliver a philosopher’s “way of life;” there may be a simulation,
a disjunction between generating foundational recipes, and practicing a
moral life. For Valla, eloquential effect simply wins, or not.
But here we have two contestatory modern accounts of Valla’s
Quintilianesque critique: we have Camporeale’s careful, diffuse account
of Valla’s criticism, energizing his strenuous inquiry practice, supporting
civil interventions, interferences, and we have Copenhaver and Nauta’s
introductory remarks to their edition, translation of Valla’s Dialectical
Disputations. They point out, justifiably, that Valla does not anticipate,
lead us to, post-Kantian notions of philosophical discipline, and that Valla
has an incomplete notion of the contemporaneous philosophical work
available to him. Their introduction, however, is overwrought.60
They mention Valla’s “titanic self-confidence,” his “odious selfregard” (vii). They note the “venom, bombast, self-celebration” (viii).
Valla’s text is a “sketchy medley” (xxiii), or, regrettably, “elaborate, dialogic
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stagecraft” (xxxv); he is often at work “berating, belittling, or being befuddled” (xx); “he displays attitude that sometimes collapses into a posture” (xxxv).
Copenhaver and Nauta, at times, simply adopt the tone of Poggio Bracciolini’s
Humanist invective. Also, they complain of investigative dysfunction:
Valla is an “eclectic pragmatic” (xxxvi), and that what Valla says about God
and the soul is “quite speculative ... heterodox” (xxii), that he philosophizes
on a grand scale, idiosyncratically, with great expectations about language
itself (xxxviii), that he “turns philolog y against philosophy” (xxxvi)—
they slight as faults what Camporeale regards as sheer gain.61 And, after
these strictures about his temper, Nauta is, I think, just plain wrong when
he observes Valla is “careless in his formulations.”62
They do speak of Valla’s grammar as “an archive of common usage
in speaking and common sense in thinking” (viii). Yet, their “common
usage” is not a neutral term; recall their horror at appeals to “ordinary
language” by modern Renaissance scholars of Valla; “ordinary language”
is, evidently, a heretical sect of current analytic philosophy. Their “common sense” functions merely as a commonplace, a personal skill. But the
use has none of the intellectual historical significance of Vichian common
sense as “the unreflective judgments of an entire class, a people, a nation,
or race” as disposition, understanding.63 An argument could be made for
a Humanistic continuity between Valla’s inquiry and Vico’s simply on the
basis of their parallel notions of this key construct in the history of political thinking. And of course their critique lacks the sophistication of the
revisionist Collingwood’s insistence on theoretical dispositions as possibly
the source of horrific political miscalculation, malpractice.64 Copenhaver
sees—in Valla’s work—rhetoric as anti-philosophy; 65 Camporeale reads
Valla’s rhetorical inquiry as anti-disciplinary dysfunction. Recall Valla
claimed all disciplines—civil and canon law, medicine, philosophy—
know nothing of divine things.66
Patterns of usage disclose dispositions, understandings: basic to
moments, and to revisions of sensibility to power. Camporeale insists on
Valla’s criticism as radical liberty performed, as lived, intrusive liberty. He
underlines Valla’s claim that the treatise on the Donation of Constantine is
an “oratio, qua nihil magis oratorium scripsi,” “I have written nothing more
oratorical, eloquent than this;” Valla reenacting a kind of evangelical, kerygmatic moment—words as acts.67 Freedom of speaking, loquendi libertas, is
a felt obligation to intrude. Valla proposes and performs an interconnected
range of genres with topical reverberations; yet he offers serious critique of
a particular historical—but unhistorical, inaccurate—clerical misuse of the
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language of secular power. Engaging in invective is not mischief or mischance
but revisionist care, Sorge; contest is a central, not peripheral skill. Thus
Camporeale cites Valla: “nisi et dicere audent,” “unless one dares to speak” as
asserting precisely an investigative imperative.68 And just so, Machiavelli as
Humanist distinguishes understandings, dispositions persisting in political
activity.
Camporeale’s account is readable as his re-enactment of Valla’s reenactments, a revival of the “attitudinal complex” of radical liberty as evangelical, certainly, but with a powerful sense of one’s own obligations to
engage with specific contemporary dysfunctions, our unique ad hominem
contests. Valla’s dialogue De professione religiosorum describes the temptations of reification, when the monastic-opponent takes the term “religiosi,”
which denotes disposition, attitude as referring to a strict institutional status. Valla’s opposition, ratio/religio, is cleverly translated: “I attack not your
Order, but your order of thinking.”69 Valla’s dialogue is a critical response
to uncritical practice: the monastic has made a category mistake.
Then, the biblical critique, Valla’s Collatio Noui Testamenti,
describes the false usages of the Latin version of the Greek text: thus making psychologistic observations, the evangelical representations of the personal necessity for metanoia, for “thinking again,” into a protocol, a rule
of penitence, as sacramental ritual.70 Valla would call the Latin translation
“barbaric.” And, the “churchly” Aristotelians of the Middle Ages, with no
“proper” knowledge of Greek (or Latin) have denied themselves historical
accuracy, deprived themselves of insight.71
Of course, Valla’s compendious Elegantiae displays a remarkable
Quintilianesque sensibility to the range of language’s aesthetic practices,
effects. Valla’s own aesthetic activity is abstemious, yet he knows and
exploits the aesthetic intrusion of narrative fables as figurative, explanatory. In the De libero arbitrio, a brief dialogue between Valla and Antonio
Glarea on the topic of free will/determinism, Valla offers a fable, possibly Aesopian, as a brief living narrative, claiming the authority of antiquity, carrying a fierce moral message. Here Sextus Tarquinius, surely
(emblematically) evil, goes to consult the oracle of Apollo. He hears
his fate; he will perform monstrous deeds and be punished. Tarquinius
laments: if his acts are fated, why the punishment? The opposition free
will/determinism, bogged down in a dysfunctional philosophical/theological terminolog y, here is restated, questioned by relocating it in an
imaginative story of lived experience, simplified, accessible. To grasp the
narrative is to note the lack of doctrinal explanation: the figure argues
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theoretical inadequacy. Valla’s narrative does not attempt to explain;
Valla tells Glarea “read [the intransigent] St. Paul.”72
The investigative value of the fable is attested by Leibniz’s response
in his Théodicée. Leibniz rewrites the fable, expanding the discussion;
Tarquin appeals to a second oracle, of Jupiter: fails again. But Athena
allows Jupiter’s priest, Theodorus, a dream that fables “fate” as a “memory” palace with an infinite number of rooms, each representing a possibility, an answer that, in effect, argues that the philosopher’s free will/
determinism false dichotomy cannot take in the notion of real historical
obduracy, of the infinite numbers of possible historical consequences: all
could be counted as “real,” including, of course, the real, historical effect of
Tarquin’s crime: the crime had the unintended consequence of mobilizing
the founding of the Empire of Rome; history is perhaps “the best of all
possible worlds” since we live in it.73 Leibniz’s claim for the pertinence of
modality: of necessity, probability and their instantiations, raises Richard
Sorabji’s issues: does necessitarianism, moral determinism leave space for,
allow our civil, moral discourse? That is, if we hold determinist theories,
entailed by our zeal in building exhaustive rationalist systems, “could we
still feel compunction, remorse, guilt, obligation, indignation, or resentment? Or could we engage in self-criticism, repentance, and forgiveness?
And finally, could we still be responsible, that is, deserving of praise or
blame?”74 Valla, in short, starts a wider discussion, the “effect,” the strong
historical effect of his fable is, we must acknowledge, Leibniz’s elaborate
fable of modality, and then, as postscript, Sorabji’s historical-philosophical
response. Fable historicizes theory; doctrine may ignore its place in the
civil space, delete the activities of praise and blame.

Renaissance and Early Modernity: Defining Humanism
“Ursprünglich” is a term of art in Heidegger’s revisionism; for both revisionisms, modern and Renaissance, inquiry prefers firstness, the factic,
to the late, theory-laden; both revisions penetrate history, criticism, and
may serve strong reform initiatives. Arguably, Cusanus’s De visione Dei
is the most inventive contribution to the discussion of art’s production,
reception of the incontestably brilliant Renaissance of the visual arts.
Arguably, Valla’s Adnotationes on the New Testament is the most significant treatise—made effective through Erasmus’s 1504 edition, and Luther’s
use—in the general European moments of Christian Reformation of the
sixteenth century.
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Rubini claimed the Petrarchan letter as “textual objectification of
the research moment:”75 Marc Fumaroli has argued the proper generic successor to the Petrarchan letter is the early Modernist Montaignian essay:
“it is a practice conducing to a liberty and a simplicity, properly philosophic,
[my emphasis] ... it is an adult literature, separated from all productions
which smell of the oil and the lamp of scholarly exercises.” The essay
requires informality, not simply the eschewal of disciplinary dialectics,
but a resort to experiential glosses. The necessary liberty, thus responsibility of the work gives space to the liberty, the effort of the reader “to think,
to freely accept or reject ... that is to judge, to criticize.”76 Thus reception as
task: “meaning is realized at the point of reception”: Charles Martindale’s
tenet—“philology is compendious reception history” is late Montaigne.77
The letter assumes exchange; the essay solicits change: it employs pauses,
interruptions, spaces for reader thinking, response, reception. The dishevelment of the text selects, favors, revisionary factors in inquiry practice,
promotes reform interests: “historical criticism.”
Rubini claims as well that the early Modernist Giambattista Vico
furnishes the link between Renaissance Humanist and modern Italian
inquiry.78 Vico announced his “new science” was civil, not moral; he dismisses solipsist moralizing, systemic self-concern. Vico also asserted the
“master-key” of his new science was the discovery that “poetry was first,”
and “entirety,” all mental activity is investigative duty.79 Rubini’s Vichian
gloss suggests that we focus on the combination of aesthetic and civil
interest, on a “primordial” aesthetic sensibility as generating, enhancing
civil values. His Petrarchan “Posteritism” reads in order to transform the
Classics for future readers’ possible use. Humanism as frame assumes the
task of critique as comprehensive civil awareness. Humanism as radical
possibility, not piety.

“Art Cannot Avoid Creating New Possibilities”80
The early Modernist Leibniz’s fable assumes infinite possibilities of activity,
and also assumes our freedom, thus our responsibility to judge; for Sorabji’s
Aristotle, the range of unrealized possibilities is a source of freedom, countering determinist regret. Then, Hannah Arendt has appealed to Kant,
and claimed that it is (responsible) judging activity that creates our public
space.81 Judging, then, is a “civil” act. Humanism as frame can possibly function to enable inquiry to be strenuously, even meticulously revisionist, and,
perhaps, to be engaged in generating the possibilities of reform.
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Defensor Pacis Transformed

Marsilian Ideas in Sixteenth-Century Politics*
Bettina Koch

I

N HIS WORK ON THE RECEPTION OF MARSILIUS OF
PADUA’S DEFENSOR PACIS, Thomas M. Izbicki emphasizes the
attractiveness of Marsilius’s work in early Reformation circles. Soon after
the publication of the first printed edition of Defensor pacis in Basel in
1522, a number of editions printed in Frankfurt and Heidelberg surfaced.
Izbicki highlights the fact that while Marsilius’s writings proved of interest to intellectuals as well as princes backing the Reformation—whether
for religious or political purposes, or a combination of both, Luther’s foes
simultaneously used Marsilius of Padua’s name as a means to attack Luther,
his supporters, and Reformation ideas more generally.1
This essay aims at following Izbicki’s line of inquiry by exploring the
earliest known German abridged translation of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis.
This translation, by M. Marxen Mueller von Westendorff, was initiated
by Ottheinrich of Neuburg-Pfalz (Palatine) and printed by Hans Kilian
in Neuburg an der Donau (Danube) in 1545.2 The German abridged version appeared ten years after William Marshall’s abridged “translation” of
Defensor pacis that aimed at supporting Henry VIII’s claim of supremacy
over the Roman papacy as well as the king’s supremacy in all temporal
affairs.3 Yet, despite the fact that both Henry VIII and Ottheinrich speak
to a Reformation context, their goals and specific contexts cannot be more
different. Henry VIII could use his power to gain independence from the
Roman papacy and the Roman church’s influence; Ottheinrich’s power
and influence as a regional count was, to say the least, limited. The latter is
not simply a result of the fact that Ottheinrich was a regional prince, but
also because he had failed to obtain the rank of Palatine Elector for years.
In the Bavarian succession treaty, settling the Landshut War of Succession,
Ottheinrich was granted the claim to the title of Palatine Elector. Yet,
because of his support for the Reformation cause, he did not receive the
title until February 1556, shortly before his death. 4 Thus, the context(s)
in which one has to place the Fridschirmbuch concerns regional early
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Reformation history as well as the history of the Holy Roman Empire
under Emperor Karl V. Because Mueller von Westendorff ’s abridged
translation is often mentioned but seldom studied, the present chapter’s
main interest lies in a (partial) comparison of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis
and the Fridschirmbuch. Before exploring the Fridschirmbuch itself, however, it is necessary to contextualize Mueller von Westendorff ’s rendering
of Defensor pacis.

The Fridschirmbuch in Context—Neuburg-Pfalz and
the Holy Roman Empire
In his dedication to Ottheinrich (“Dem Durchleuchtigen Hochgebornen
Fuerſten und herrn / Herrn Otthainrichen / Pfalgrauen bey Rein”), M.
Marx Mueller von Westendorff narrates that the Count Palatine had sent
him Marsilius’s Defensor pacis in three volumes, requesting that he renders
the work in vnnſer hochteutſche ſprach—“in our high-German language.”
Contrary to Ottheinrich’s apparent demand to translate the entirety of
Defensor pacis into German, Mueller von Westendorff apologized ironically for his partial disobedience. Instead of translating the whole of
Defensor pacis, Mueller von Westendorff suggests that he only supplied in
German the sections he considered essential under the circumstances. As
for his—again ironic—justification, he asserts that because of the work’s
length, a translation of the whole work would only bring disappointment
and displeasure to the Christian reader.5 At least to some degree, Marsilius
scholars can certainly sympathize with Mueller von Westendorff ’s frustration. Yet, whether to accept Mueller von Westendorff ’s claim that he
otherwise remained true to the text needs to be verified.6
Before examining the texts, it is necessary to explore the context further: Who is the translator? What is his relationship with Ottheinrich?
What is Ottheinrich’s role in the Reformation disputes? And how does
Marsilius’s Defensor pacis fit into the story? As far as the first question
is concerned, we have only very little biographical information about
Mueller von Westendorff. He seems to be identical with Markus Millenus,
who served as town clerk in Neuburg; he is also credited with the authorship of a Latin epitaph for Elector Palatine Ludwig V. 7 At the time the
Fridschirmbuch appeared in print, we find him as syndic at Augsburg. 8
Because Mueller von Westendorff was once in Ottheinrich’s service and
Ottheinrich personally commissioned the translation, we can assume some
measure of loyalty to the count palatine’s cause. However, the fact that the
selection of the sections was done at the translator’s discretion, contrary to
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Ottheinrich’s initial request, demands some caution. One may be tempted
to read some of Ottheinrich’s political program into the translated sections
of Defensor pacis.
While caution is necessary when attempting to draw conclusions from the particular content of the Fridschirmbuch, the interest in
Defensor pacis nonetheless falls into Ottheinrich’s greater political and
ecclesio-political program. Two years after Ottheinrich introduced the
Reformation (1542) into Neuburg-Pfalz, the Kilian printing house was
founded. Since 1537, the printer Hans Kilian served as Ottheinrich’s
Rentschreiber (“bursary officer,” Latinized, principalis questurae scriba),
responsible for the administration of Ottheinrich’s finances. Because
of Ottheinrich’s notorious shortage of funds, however, it is fair to suggest that Hans Kilian rather administered his significant debts.9 In the
case of Ottheinrich and his printer Hans Kilian, it is hard to overrate
the significance of the printing house for and in the context of the
Reformation. Despite, or maybe because of, Ottheinrich’s notorious
financial problems, his library, the Bibliotheca Palatina, was considered
the most significant Reformation literature library in the entire Holy
Roman Empire until 1622, the year in which Heidelberg was conquered
by the Catholic League.10
More important than the quality of the library was its political
relevance for the Reformation cause. The success of the Reformation
depended heavily on the development of printing technolog y. In the
Schmalkalden War of 1546—resulting in a sudden military defeat of
the Lutheran princes—Emperor Karl personally and explicitly ordered
the Kilian printing house to be destroyed. As Horst Stierkopf notes,
Karl’s order has to be seen in the context of the emperor’s knowledge
of an “engaged” and ambitious printing house in the service of the
Reformation. 11 Moreover, Helga Unger emphasizes the relevance of
the library and the printing house for Ottheinrich’s ecclesio-political
goals. Unger underscores the significance of Ottheinrich’s overt strategy
of returning to medieval works that could be utilized for Reformation
causes. For Ottheinrich, Mueller von Westendorff ’s partial translation of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis served as an exemplar. 12 In this sense,
Ottheinrich and his printer Kilian followed a more general pattern
observable throughout the Reformation age, namely, the identification of
useful medieval texts, particularly by early modern scholars and intellectuals leaning towards humanist and Reformation ideas.13 Moreover, Karl’s
order highlights the relevance of books and the ability to print them for
or against particular political causes. Yet, the significance Karl attaches to

118   Bettina Koch

the printing house also hints at Ottheinrich’s role in the conflict between
the Schmalkalden League, the Protestant estates (Reichsstände) more
generally, and the emperor. Thus, Ottheinrich’s role in the Holy Roman
Empire and in the Reformation needs to be considered.
While earlier studies suggest that Ottheinrich’s interest in the Holy
Roman Empire and its politics is only recognizable after he was eventually granted the rank of Elector Palatine, from 1556 until his death three
years later, Axel Gotthard vehemently objects to this view. Although the
young Ottheinrich is more concerned with the social aspect of political
gatherings (one finds him in the dancehall, not in the meeting room),
this attitude changes in the late 1530s. By the end of 1539, Ottheinrich
campaigns for a confessional alliance that propagates “teutsche libertät”
(German liberty) by suggesting that Karl would soon bring Spanish troops
into the German lands to initiate a war against such liberty in which religion would be only used as an excuse. By the end of the 1530s, Ottheinrich
makes a first attempt to join the Schmalkalden League.14 Because of his
disastrous financial situation, his first formal request to join the League
was rejected; the defeat of the League made a later attempt in 1546 impossible. Ottheinrich’s diplomats were still on their way to deliver the request
when the Schmalkalden League was defeated. In his second application,
Ottheinrich once again argues for the need to join the Protestant league
officially. Ottheinrich explicitly refers to Karl’s constitutional rhetoric
that, in Ottheinrich’s eyes, only serves as a rationalization for what he
deems essentially a religious war.15 Ottheinrich’s judgment is not without
merit. Karl did not justify warfare against the Schmalkalden League with
religious disagreements, but rather as a means to maintain the peace of
the empire. A similar argument was proposed when Karl rejected the free
cities’ request to move to the Lutheran creed, although the cities as well
as the German principalities pledged allegiance to him for all but the religious issue. This brings the question of confessional diversity to the forefront of the conflict.16
Even though Ottheinrich was not a formal member of the
Schmalkalden League, he was a respected supporter of the Reformation and
the Protestant cause. Frequently, one finds him in the role of a moderator
between the confessionally neutral and the Protestant estates. Simultaneously,
after he became actively engaged in the Reformation and the Protestants’
conflict with the Catholic League and Emperor Karl, Gotthard identifies an
increasing militancy in Ottheinrich’s attitude, not just in terms of content,
but also in terms of his methods: confrontation instead of compromise.
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Thus, in the 1540s and 1550s, one finds Ottheinrich as a constant promoter
of the Lutheran estates’ unifying strategy and politics.17
Although partly motivated by propaganda, Ottheinrich’s conversion
to the Lutheran creed was attributed to his desperate financial situation,
and thus viewed as primarily motivated by economic reasons. Switching
to the Lutheran rite meant instant access to the territory’s church property. Yet, early on, the accusation of conversion for financial reasons was
disputed.18 With his conversion to the Lutheran creed, Ottheinrich lost a
credit of 100 000 fl. At the time he failed to secure this significant credit,
Ottheinrich’s total debt amounted to about one million fl. Thus, the reason for Ottheinrich’s conversion seems unlikely to have been economic.
Although church property was inventoried in 1543, none of the monasteries in his territory were secularized. Although the inhabitants of the monasteries were encouraged to accept the new church order, forced conversions did not take place.19 Yet, although it is a widely shared assumption
that the Lutheran confession afforded a welcome ideology for territorial
state building purposes,20 it is apparent that Ottheinrich was not too interested in the political or worldly implications of that theology—at least
not as far as his subjects were concerned. As early as 1544, two years after
Ottheinrich introduced the Reformation into Neuburg-Palatine, he delegated the entire political administration of the territory to the provincial
diets (Landstände). Through this move, he could burden the provincial
diets with his enormous debts. Despite the economic benefits, Gotthard,
however, reads the delegation of administrative power to the Landstände
as an indication that Ottheinrich was more concerned about the wellbeing of his subjects’ souls than in their worldly welfare.21

Defensor Pacis Versus Fridschirmbuch
As indicated earlier, drawing direct conclusions from the translator’s selection of passages in support of Ottheinrich’s political and ecclesio-political
program is not unproblematic. It is worth stressing, however, that Mueller
von Westendorff did not translate a single section of Dictio I in which
Marsilius outlined his secular political principles, which defend popular
consent to government and the rule of law. Of the entire Defensor pacis,
which runs in Richard Scholz’s modern critical edition to 613 pages, 22
Mueller von Westendorff translated only a fraction. Fridschirmbuch consists of a one folio dedication, ten folios of Vorrede, and the abridged
translation of seventy folios; only the latter are directly concerned with
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Defensor pacis’s content. Thus, the Fridschirmbuch amounts to a little less
than one quarter of Marsilius’s original treatise.
With Dictio I of Defensor pacis completely missing, Fridschirmbuch
consists of eighteen chapters referring to sections of Defensor pacis’s
Dictio II23 and a chapter entitled schlußreden that contains selected sections from the second chapter of Dictio III. 24 While a thorough textual
comparison of the two texts would require at least a book-length study, a
brief juxtaposition of the sections taken from Dictio III (see Appendix 1)
affords a good impression of the topics that were absent in Mueller von
Westendorff ’s translation. (For the reader’s convenience, the sixteenthcentury German and the Latin texts are matched with Gewirth’s English
translation.25) Indeed, the omissions from the German version are more
telling than what is actually in the translation. For instance, Mueller von
Westendorff excises all sections that refer to the general council of believers that is at the heart of the ecclesiolog y of Defensor pacis. Similarly,
references to the human as well as the faithful legislator, implying that
some power belongs to the citizens and ordinary believers, disappeared.
Exceptions are clauses that grant the bishops the power, if sanctioned by
the faithful human legislator, to excommunicate the pope. Otherwise, the
human or faithful legislator only appears in contexts in which the citizens’
political role (and rights) can be ignored or read without attaching to it a
more inclusive meaning of “legislator.” Whether referring to the “human”
or the “faithful” legislator, Ottheinrich’s sixteenth-century context makes
it evident that the legislator equals the ruler.
Before his actual translation of Defensor pacis, Mueller von
Westendorff introduces it with a Vorrede in which he introduces the reader
to the evils of his times. He draws the picture of an utterly corrupt state in
which the poor are deprived of all (worldly) justice; fraud, perjury, highway robbery, and war even bring the formerly well-off into the almshouse
(Spital). Mueller von Westendorff points to the neglect of God’s word and
divine truth that has been caused by the papists, whom he portrays as followers of the Pharisees instead of the Apostles, as the source of all evil and
the reason for the state’s corruption. The words of pro-papal theologians
have become undecipherable by the apostles because they have turned
divine truth into the opposite.26 “Wherever you turn your head, you face
vicious, hideous, dreadful, and miserable things. It is war against the old;
the peasant against the noble man. All things [are] split, broken, scattered,
bringing you down to the floor. And it is to be feared that other more onerous and gruesome plagues will follow.”27 For Mueller von Westendorff,
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the origin of this misery is papal insolence. He notes that the papacy has
“highjacked” the power of the Roman emperor and the power of kings in
the Holy Roman Empire. The popes, who have taken both swords, neglect
the word of Paul and see themselves above the concilia and even the gospel.28 Yet, Mueller von Westendorff remains confident that divine punishment eventually will strike the papiſtiſchen Pfaffen (papal/Catholic priests)
down.29 In a sense, Mueller von Westendorff ’s narrative captures, although
with emphasis on the ecclesiastical realm by ignoring the political, the
spirit (and the polemics) of Marsilius’s Defensor pacis remarkably well.30
Indeed, the reader might even remain under the impression that nothing has changed in more than 200 years. Marsilius’s discontent with the
papacy in the first half of the fourteenth century reads remarkably similarly
to Mueller von Westendorff ’s narrative of the ecclesio-political situation
of the early sixteenth century. An innocent reader might even conclude
that the pope and emperor are still in an ongoing struggle over supremacy,
while in reality Karl V sided forcefully with the papacy and remained an
uncompromising defender of the old order and its religious outlook. The
German principalities’ claim for religious freedom—understood as the
privileged right of the empire’s estates that does not extend to ordinary
believers and the German principalities’ subjects—clashed with Karl’s traditional perception of the Roman church as the only religious authority
and of the emperor as her protection and shield.31
Yet, demonizing the Roman papacy assists Mueller von Westendorff
in his attempt to remain relatively true to the text of Defensor pacis. To
achieve this goal, however, Mueller von Westendorff has to eliminate
some ambiguities and ambivalence in Marsilius’s work. As is well known,
Marsilius often has the whole citizenry in mind when discussing the legislators, while on other occasions he refers to an aristocratic elite, namely,
the Seven Electors.32 Yet, Mueller von Westendorff does not completely
eliminate Defensor pacis’s vagueness. Citing Aristotle, he maintains that
ecclesia means the assembly of a people as yederman, everyman.33 Although
he keeps Marsilius’s wording, the meaning changes nonetheless. For the
German princes, yederman had come to designate whoever had a seat
and a vote in the Imperial Diet.34 Thus, even if traces of Marsilius’s more
inclusive conception of the citizenry and the human or faithful legislator remain in the translation, what they denote has shifted in such a way
that, for the sixteenth-century reader, only the princes and representatives
at the Imperial Diet could be designated by this terminolog y. For the
very same reason, Marsilius’s detailed discussion of the general council,
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particularly the more democratic-sounding sections in which he elaborates on the determination of lay representatives, could be or had to be
omitted.35 From a sixteenth-century Reformation perspective, the power
to determine church issues eventually rests with the princes. From the
perspective of the Holy Roman Empire, the princes and cities are represented at the Imperial Diets, constituting a version of a Marsilian
legislator. If one considers the Imperial Diets under Karl V, it was the
Reformation or religious issues more generally that caused most of the
tensions and disputes. Eventually, as Henry Cohn notes, “When religious
matters were discussed the more hard-line Protestant and Catholic estates
met in separate blocs, with moderate or ‘neutral’ princes of both faiths
sometimes mediated between them, instead of effective negotiations over
the religious disputes taking place in the colleges.” 36 In 1543, by the time
Ottheinrich requested his German translation of Marsilius’s Defensor
pacis, the religious parties had stopped meeting together entirely and
had begun assembling only separately. Yet, despite the difficulties embedded in the negotiations, the Imperial Diets were not without results. By
1544, at the Imperial Diet in Speyer, an agreement had been reached that
granted the Reformation princes the right, recognized by imperial law,
to seize church property. Thus, ecclesiastical revenues turned into a state
issue. The corresponding canon law that prevented the seizure of church
property was annulled.37
While one can, with good reason, assume that Ottheinrich’s interest in allowing his subjects an active say in religious matters was limited or nonexistent, Mueller von Westendorff had an additional reason
for omitting most of Marsilius’s sections on the general council: In the
Imperial Diets, one finds an institution in place that arrogates some of
the responsibilities Marsilius directed to the general council. Moreover, a
Lutheran prince like Ottheinrich claimed the right to determine theological disputes, a key purpose of Marsilius’s general council, in his territory
at his own discretion. A general council would only jeopardize his freshly
claimed authority over such matters.
Despite reasonable epistemological concerns about the direct
applicability of the translated excerpts to Ottheinrich’s ecclesio-political
interests, it is striking, although not especially surprising, how well the
translated sections and chapters suit the Count Palatine’s agenda. At
first, it was mandatory to reject all papal and lower-ranked officials
(bishops, priests) of the Roman church’s interference in coercive judgment or jurisdiction over princes, colleges, communities, lay persons
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and priests. 38 Christ did not claim temporal power; thus, temporal
power cannot belong to any pope, bishop, or priest. 39 This chapter is
followed by a narrative that provides further proof from Scripture,
repeating the claim that no one has to follow either papal commands
or decrees. 40 Most of the remaining chapters deal with the question of
how the Roman bishop claimed plenitude potestatis, how he secured
his power over lay persons and temporal authority,41 particularly over
the Roman emperor, 42 and why the papal claims are invalid and have
to be rejected. 43 While these chapters are important in the sense that
they demonstrate how the Roman papacy has usurped powers that
rightfully belong to the worldly authorities, the chapters in between
are of more practical concern. They discuss the authority of priests
and the question to whom the power to appoint and, if necessary, to
depose priests belongs. In these chapters, one also finds sections from
Marsilius’s discussion of church property. Here, again, Mueller von
Westendorff remains relatively true to Marsilius’s texts, while omitting
some sections and abbreviating others. Following the authority Christ
bestowed upon the Apostles, Mueller describes them first and foremost
as ministers of the sacraments. He emphasizes primarily the sacrament
of penance, including the power of loosing or binding the human soul
of mortal and less grave sins.44
The ability to perform the priestly office is, as with all offices,
dependent on the habitus animae. Mueller von Westendorff renders the
habit of the soul into the phrase the “soul’s subtlety.” The second cause
is necessity. The logic applied here is the same that has to be applied to
all other parts of the state; it has to follow the same rules.45 With the
claim that priests follow the same rules and perform the same duties as
other offices in the political realm, the first step, stated by Marsilius and
endorsed by Mueller von Westendorff, to subjugate the priestly office to
the political realm has been achieved. While Marsilius and Mueller von
Westendorff emphasize the priestly office’s equality in its power to bind
and loose, such theological equality does not eliminate order of ranks
among them. Through Christ’s appointment, all priests are equal in power;
through a second human appointment, hierarchy among them can be
established.46 Because the hierarchy is human, questions over the second
appointment (after Christ’s initial appointment of the Apostles) of priests
and bishops emerged. The conditions for the appointment of priests have
changed throughout history. The first appointment through Christ does
not exist any longer. Thus, the responsibility of appointing priests rests
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either in the community of the faithful or in the human legislator.47 Yet,
and not unsurprisingly, although Mueller von Westendorff does not translate the selected chapters completely, he follows Marsilius concerning the
dangers of appointing the wrong person to the priestly office. If a priest
turns out to be ain boͤ ſer Bueb / oder ain ungelerter Eſel (an evil knave or an
illiterate blockhead), he might lead the believers into eternal damnation.48
Marsilius emphasizes both the negative consequences for the believer in
the world to come but also—and perhaps more importantly—the consequences for the status of a citizen and the potential harm to the political
sphere more generally. The second issue, although not completely omitted
in Mueller von Westendorff, is Marsilius’s tipping point for finally locating
the authority to appoint and depose priests with the human legislator or
the ruler. Here, Marsilius follows his logic that whatever may cause harm
to the civitas must be under the authority of the civitas. 49 Even though
Mueller von Westendorff also speaks of nit ain klainer burgerlicher nachtail (not a small civic disadvantage),50 his wording emphasizes the importance of the eternal over temporal consequences. Nonetheless, he follows
Marsilius in eventually allocating the authority to appoint and depose
priests in the temporal authority. To use his wording, to avoid harm, the
priest should durch die Obrigkait aufgenommen / oder verworffen werden.51
Because for Muller von Westendorff the human legislator and the ruler are
identical, Obrigkait refers to the ruler, excluding other worldly authorities
like the human legislator as an assembly of all citizens, not ruled out in
Defensor pacis.
The shifting in wording and meaning is also relevant in the discussion of the auftailung der geiſtlichen pfruͤ nden (distribution of ecclesiastical benefices).52 The relevance of this issue is also highlighted by the fact
that it reappears among the very few clauses Mueller von Westendorff
selected from Dictio III for translation. 53 As indicated above, the issue
about the authority over church property was among the hotly debated
topics at the Imperial Diets, though the Reformation princes eventually
prevailed.
Given the significance of the topic in contemporary debate, then,
it makes sense that Mueller von Westendorff includes a significant part
of Marsilius’s discourse on ecclesiastical property. By divine law, the community of the faithful is required to provide the ecclesiastic ministers with
food and clothing, with which they ought to be content.54 The surplus may
be used to collect taxes “for the defense of the fatherland, the redemption
of prisoners, or to avert public grievances as deemed appropriate by the
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faithful and allegiant ruler.”55 Mueller von Westendorff, however, omits
that Marsilius explicitly speaks of the redemption of subjects taken captive
in defense and in service of the faith. Thus, Mueller is less restrictive in the
use of ecclesiastical funds than Defensor pacis.
Mueller von Westendorff undertakes another adjustment to the
text of Defensor pacis that is of greater significance. In Defensor pacis,
Marsilius refers to the examples of the Catholic kings of France to demonstrate that the authority to appoint bishops and priests rests in temporal
and not in ecclesiastical authority. Yet, Mueller von Westendorff replaces
the Catholic kings of France with the Roman Emperor in order to argue
that the appointment of priests as well as the determination of the use of
benefices and other temporal goods remains in the domain of temporal
authorities.56 Through this move, he adjusts Marsilius’s position regarding
a contested issue about the legal reality of the Reich, oscillating the authority between the Holy Roman Empire, the Imperial Diets, and the princes’
territorial power.

Conclusion: Marsilius of Padua Versus
Mueller Von Westendorff
Mueller von Westendorff ’s main technique in adapting Defensor pacis
to the needs and the context of a Lutheran prince is omission. While
one can observe occasional changes in wording, the shift in meaning of
political terms works in favor of relative fidelity to the text, while allowing for a significant transformation of meaning. Thus, even though
Mueller von Westendorff remains relatively true to the letter of Defensor
pacis, it does not mean he remains true to the spirit of Marsilius’s work.
Because the context of the Holy Roman Empire remains basically the
same, some of the pressing issues that are central in Marsilius’s work
still remain intact. While Mueller von Westendorff ’s translation can
be clearly seen as “remittance work,” his refusal to make the whole of
Defensor pacis speak German nonetheless remains puzzling. Was he
anticipating that Ottheinrich may not have appreciated Marsilius’s ideas
of civil liberties? Or did he omit them because they were simply irrelevant for the contemporary concerns? We cannot answer these questions
conclusively. Yet, it is obvious that he focused precisely on the section
from Defensor pacis that suited not just pressing questions of his time but
also Ottheinrich’s ecclesio-political interests extremely well, particularly
because Ottheinrich seemed to be primarily interested in the well-being
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of his own and his subjects’ souls, and evidently not as interested in the
purely earthly dimension.
Compared with Marsilius’s original fourteenth-century work,
its sixteenth-century vernacular version reads rather like an intellectual regression than a progression. Yet, submitting all religious issues to
worldly authority marks a significant step towards “modern” secularization. As Olivier Roy notes, “[a]s quietist Iranian religious figures understood when they asked for a separation of state and clergy: the absence
of a distinction between state and religion secularizes religion more than
it makes politics religious.”57 In this sense, Marsilius’s move to subjugate
religious institutions and the interpretation of doctrine under the political realm can be read as a first step towards the secularization of religion.
The Lutheran princes continued in this very direction by attempting to
subordinate the religious sphere completely under their authority, thus
furthering the secularization of religion, albeit by jeopardizing civic
liberties—at least for the moment— as prominently foreshadowed in
Defensor pacis.

Appendix 1
LXIXv – LXXr : Nun volgen hernach etlich ſchlußreden / inn disem Auszug begriffen
LXIXv
CONCLUSIO
I. Zu der
Seelenseligkait
ist von noͤ tten /
allain zuglauben /
was die Goettliche
Schrifft ſagt /
und was derſelben
gleichförmig und
gemaͤ ß iſt.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.1: Solam
divinam seu canonicam
scripturam, et ad ipsam per
necessitatem sequentem
quamcumque ipsiusque
interpretacionem ex
cummuni consilio fidelium
factam veram esse, ad
eternam beatitudinem
consequendam necesse
credere, si alicui debite
proponatur. Huius siquidem
certitudo est et sumi potest
19° secunde, ex 2a in 5am.

1. For the attainment
of eternal beatitude it is
necessary to believe in the
truth of only the divine
or canonic Scripture,
together with its necessary
consequences and the
interpretations of it made
by the common council
of the believers, if these
have been duly
propounded to the person
concerned. The certainty
of this is set forth in, and
can be obtained from,
Discourse II, Chapter XIX,
parapgraphs 2 to 5.
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II. Die Decretales
oder Decreta der
Roͤ miſch oder
anderer Biſchoͤ ff /
die on bewilligung
des menschlichen
Geſatzgebers
geordnet ſind /
moͤ gen bey ainer
zeitlichen ſtraff
niemants binden.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.7:
Decretales vel decreta
Romanorum aut aliorum
quorumlibet pontificum
communiter aut divisim
absque concessione legislatoris
humani *vel generalis concilii*
constituta, neminem obligare
pena vel supplicio temporali
*nec spirituali*: [12° prime, et
28° secunde, 29a.]

7. The decretals or decrees
of the Roman or any
other pontiffs, collectively
or distributively, made
without the grant of the
human legislator, bind no
one to temporal pain or
punishment: Discourse I,
Chapter XII; Discourse II,
Chapter XXVIII,
paragraph 29

LXXr
III. Kain Biſchoff
oder Prieſter
/ in quantum
huiusmodi, hat uber
kain gaiſtlichen
oder weltlichen
/ ob Er ſchon ain
Ketzer wer /gar
kain gewalt.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.14:
Principatum seu
iurisdiccione coactivam
supra quemquem clericum
aut laicum, eciam si
hereticus extet, episcopum
vel sacerdotem inquantum
huismodi nullam hebere: [15
prime, ex 2a in 4am, 4°, 5° et 9°
secunde ac 10°, 7a.]

14. A bishop or priest, as
such, has no rulership or
coercive jurisdiction over
any clergyman or layman,
even if the latter is a heretic:
Discourse I, Chapter XV,
paragraphs 2 to 4; Discourse
II, Chapters IV, V, IX, and
X, paragraph 7.

IIII. Es gezimbt
kainen Biſchoff
oder Prieſter / oder
derſelben Collegio
/ on ain gewalt
des glaubigen
Geſetzgebers /
yemant in Bann
zethun / oder die
Goͤ ttlichen aͤ mpter
zuverbieten.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.16:
Excommunicare quemquam
absque fidelis legislatoris
auctoritate ulli episcopo
wel presbytero aut ipsorum
collegio non licere: [6°
secunde, ex 11a in 14am, et
21° secunde, 9a.]

16. No bishop or priest or
group of them is allowed
to excommunicate anyone
without authorization by the
faithful legislator: Discourse
II, Chapter VI, paragraphs
11 to 14; Chapter XXI,
paragraph 9

V. All Biſchoff
haben onmittl
durch Christum
/ ainen gleiche
gewalt: Es mag
auch durch das

Defensor pacis, 3.2.17:
Omnes episcopos equalis
auctoritatis esse immeddiate
per Christum, neque
secundum legem divinam
convinci posse,

17. All bishops are of equal
authority immediately
through Christ, nor can it
be proved by divine law that
there is any superiority or
subjection among them
(continued)
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(continued)
Goͤ ttlich Geſatz
nit erwiſen werden
/ das Sy weder
inn gaiſtlichen
noch weltlichen
sachen /uber oder
untereinander ſein
ſoͤ llen.

in spiritualibus aut
temporalibus preesse invicem
vel subesse: [15° et 16°
secunde.]

in spiritual or in temporal
affairs: Discourse II,
Chapters XV and XVI.

VI. Durch den
Goͤ ttlichen
gewalt / mit
bewilligung des
menschlichen
glaubigen
Geſatzgebers
/ moͤ gen die
andern Biſchoff
ſamptlich und
ſonderlich / den
Babſt ſelbs in
Bann thun / und
iren gewalt wider
in gebrauchen.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.18:
Auctoritas divina, legislatoris
humani fidelis interveniente
consensu seu concessione, sic
alios episcopos communiter
aut divisim excommunicare
posse Romanum
episcopum et in ipsum
auctoritatem aliam exercere,
quemadmodum e converso:
[6° secunde, ex 11a in 14am, et
15° et 16° secunde.]

18. By divine authority,
accompanied by the consent
or concession of the faithful
human legislator, the
other bishops, collectively
or distributively, can
excommunicate the Roman
bishop and exercise other
authority over him, just as
conversely: Discourse II,
Chapter VI, paragraph 11 to
14; Chapters XV and XVI.

VII. Der
Geſatzgeber mag
ſich der gaiſtlichen
guͤ eter / nachdem
Er den Prieſtern /
kirchendienern /
und den armen /
ir notdurfft davon
geraicht / nach
dem Goͤ ttlichen
Geſatz / zu dem
gemainen nutz
wol gebrauchen.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.27:
Ecclesiastics temporalibus,
expleta sacerdotum
et aliorum evangelii
ministrorum, et hiis que
cultum divinum pertinent,
ac impotentum pauperum
necessitate, licite utilitatibus
aut defensionibus uti posse
legislatorem simpliciter et in
parte: [15° prime, 10a, at 17°
secunde, 16a, et 21° secunde,
14a.]

27. Ecclesiastic temporal
goods which remain over
and above the needs of
priests and other gospel
ministers and of the helpless
poor, and which are needed
for divine worship, can
lawfully, in accordance with
divine law, be used in whole
or in part by the legislator
for the common or public
welfare or defense: Discourse
I Chapter XV, paragraph 10;
Discourse II, Chapter XVII,
paragraph 16; Chapter XXI,
paragraph 14.
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Es moͤ chten
noch ander vil
und nuͤ tzlich
Schlußreden aus
dem yetzgemelten
notdurfftiglich
eingeſuͤ rt werden
/ Wir wellen aber
andenen erſettigt
ſein / Und disem
Außzug ain
endschafft geben.
FINIS.

Defensor pacis, 3.2.42:
Possent autem alie
quamplures et utiles
conclusiones ex prioribus
diccionibus per necessitatem
inferri quas tamen
deduximus, contenti, sumus,
quoniam ad predictam
pestem cum ipsius causa
succidendam facilem
atque sufficiente prebent
ingressum, et propter
abbreviacionem semonis.

42. We might infer many
other useful conclusions
which necessarily follow
from the first two discourses;
but let us be content with
those deduced above, because
they afford a ready and
sufficient entering wedged
for cutting away the afirementioned pestilence and its
cause, and also for the sake of
brevity.
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ͤ
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Part 3
Cusa and Philosophy
Origins and Applications

Cusanus’s Philosophical Testament
De venatione sapientiae
(The Hunt of Wisdom) (1462)
Donald F. Duclow

N

ICHOLAS OF CUSA (1401–1464) WAS A LEADING
CHURCHMAN, philosopher, and theologian of the fifteenth century. The son of a boat owner and ferryman in Kues—today BernkastelKues—on the Mosel River, he studied canon law at Padua and began a
long and often controversial career. Milestones along the way included
the Council of Basel, where his De concordantia catholica (1433–1434)
defended the Conciliar Movement; a dramatic switch to the papal cause,
and travel to Constantinople to accompany Byzantine representatives to
the Council of Ferrara/Florence; successful work in Germany on behalf
of Pope Eugenius IV against Basel’s anti-pope, Felix V; appointment as
Cardinal, and the legation tour through German-speaking lands (1451–
1452); six tumultuous years as resident bishop of Brixen/Bressanone
(1452–1458); and service in the Curia during his last years in Rome.1 In
the midst of this busy career, Nicholas wrote a series of speculative works,
beginning with De docta ignorantia (1440) and ending with De apice
theoriae (1464). These works reveal a restless, inquiring mind as Cusanus
rethinks issues of human knowing, cosmology, mathematics, perspective,
and religious tolerance. His core theme of “learned ignorance”—knowing
that we cannot know God—required a “conjectural” view of thinking as
always approaching truth without ever grasping it precisely. Consistent
with this view, Nicholas recognized the limits of his own inquiries, and
continually sought newer, more precise ways to speak of God. Hence, as
F. Edward Cranz and Kurt Flasch have shown, we can follow the development of Nicholas’s thought by attending to shifts in his vocabulary and
arguments, and to what his writings and library tell us about his reading.2
While this developmental approach is hardly novel for intellectual historians, more unusual is the material Cusanus gives us by self-consciously
highlighting his own evolving views and insights. This process becomes
especially clear in his intellectual autobiography, De venatione sapientiae
(The Hunt of Wisdom), and suggests his place at the edge of modernity.
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In his last years, Nicholas’s vision and health were failing. As
Erich Meuthen notes, he nearly died in June 1461, and gout pained him
for last three years of his life. 3 So it is not surprising that he worked to
build his legacy. With his family’s foundation—St. Nicholas Hospital in
Kues4—nearly complete, he commissioned and corrected manuscripts of
his works, which reside in his library at the Hospital and in the Vatican
Library.5 Similar concerns for his reputation led him to write De venatione
sapientiae late in the year 1462. In the Prologue he tells us,
My purpose here is to leave for posterity a summary record of my
hunts for wisdom—which up until this present state of old age I
have considered, on the basis of mental insight, to be quite true. For
I do not know if perhaps a longer and better time for reflecting will
be granted to me, since I have now passed my sixty-first year.6

Two related images would guide his efforts: wisdom as sapida scientia, the
tasty knowledge that feeds the intellect, and philosophy as the venatio
(hunt) for this food.7 Nicholas develops these venerable tropes in unusual
detail throughout the book, as he maps out wisdom’s three “regions” —
eternity, the perpetual, and time—and revisits ten “fields” where he has
hunted for it: learned ignorance, Possest or actualized possibility, non-aliud
or not-other, light, praise, unitas (unity), equality, connexio (connection
or union), terminatio (delimitation), and order.8 Of these fields, the first
three refer to specific works, while the others are themes that have guided
Cusanus’s inquiries—for example, his favorite Trinitarian scheme of unity,
equality and connection.
Yet this review is shaped by two complicating factors. First, Nicholas
tells us that it has been prompted by his reading of Diogenes Laertius’s
Lives of the Philosophers.9 He had also read two recent translations that he
had commissioned: Pietro Balbi’s translation of Proclus’s Theology of Plato,
and George of Trapezunt’s of Plato’s Parmenides. Recalling the ancient
philosophers’ hunts for wisdom, he recounts his own modest catches and
insights, “in order that more acute thinkers may be motivated to deepen
their minds further.”10 The second factor is that De venatione sapientiae
does not simply review Cusanus’s earlier writings and themes, but reframes
them in light of a new principle: “quod impossibile fieri non fit ”—“what
is impossible to be made is not made” or “what is impossible to become
does not become.”11 Nicholas uses this principle from Aristotle to advance
the novel approach to possibility and potency that he began in De possest (1460). De venatione sapientiae thus has a complex agenda: it presents
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Nicholas’s intellectual autobiography, reflects on the ancient philosophers
and their heirs— especially Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite—and
carries forward his own speculative agenda. Nicholas thus inserts himself
into the history of philosophy with his fellow hunters for wisdom, and
continues to pursue their common prey into still newer fields. Here we
cannot deal with this entire project, but we shall highlight two strands
within the work: 1) how Cusanus develops his thinking about the dynamics of possibility and potency, and 2) how he reads Plato, Proclus and
Dionysius on God and the One. In the process, we shall observe Nicholas
marking out his own place within an ongoing history of philosophy.

The Dynamics of Posse
Possibility and actuality, becoming and making, are central to De venatione sapientiae, as we see in the second field where Cusanus hunted wisdom: “Posset”—a name for God that he coined in the Trialogus de possest
(1460). Fusing the infinitive “posse” (to be possible or able) and the verb
“est ” (is), the term is difficult to translate. Matthieu van der Meer suggests “the-possibility-to-be-is,” while Jasper Hopkins prefers “actualizedpossibility.”12 Yet “possibility” misses other connotations of “posse”: ability,
capacity, potential, and power. So, I suggest that we avoid the translation
issue and stay with Nicholas’s paradoxical term “Possest.” His point is clear:
like many of Cusanus’s names for God, “Possest” places the divine prior
to all distinctions, even those “between something and nothing, being
and non-being, and prior to the difference between difference and nondifference.”13 It specifically emphasizes the coincidence of act and potency
or possibility within God, who transcends and grounds this very contrast.
For, as Nicholas tells us, “Possest is actually everything possible—Possest
est actu omne posse.”14 Simply stated, Possest is all that can be. In De possest, Nicholas had emphasized that actuality precedes possibility, but also
affirmed that “absolute possibility (potentia), absolute actuality, and the
union (nexus) of the two are coeternal ... They are eternal in such a way
that [they are] Eternity itself.” 15 Within Possest, possibility, act and their
coinciding union thus express the eternal Trinity. In their hunting, many
philosophers avoided the field of Possest because they sought God among
opposites, rather than “prior to a difference of contradictory opposites.”
For them, the principle of non-contradiction became a “No Trespassing”
sign closing off the field of the Possest, “where possibility-of-existing and
actually existing do not differ—ubi posse esse et actu esse non differunt.”16
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This had been Nicholas’s complaint since the Apologia doctae ignorantiae
(1449), where he lamented Johannes Wenck and the “Aristotelian sect’s”
refusal of the coincidence of opposites.17
As Nicholas rethinks De possest’s scheme in De venatione sapientiae,
he removes potency or possibility from the eternal Trinity, and describes it
as created and perpetual. He introduces the discussion in chapter 2, where
he cites Diogenes Laertius’s life of Thales, “the first of the wise, [who] says
that God is very ancient because he is unbegotten, and that the world is
very beautiful because it is made by God.”18 This broad claim leads Nicholas
to consider how God shines forth in the world’s beauty and order, and to
ask himself about “the designer (artificem) of this very admirable work.”
Seeking a secure basis for his inquiry, he recalls a principle so certain that
it is “presupposed and undoubted” by all philosophers: “quod impossi
bile fieri not fit—what is impossible to be made is not made.” 19 Nicholas
finds this principle in Aristotle’s Physics,20 but uses it to explore possibility,
becoming and making in ways that would have surprised Aristotle. Thales
and Aristotle thus launch a distinctively Cusan hunt for wisdom.
Chapter 3 begins by stating the obvious: “Since what is impossible
to be made does not come to be, nothing has been made or will come to
be which was not or is not possible to be made.”21 This tautology becomes
more interesting when Nicholas sets it against another claim: “That which
is, but which has been neither made nor created, neither was nor is possible
to be made or created. For it precedes the possibility-of-being-made (possefieri) and is eternal, because it is neither made nor created and cannot be
made other [than it already is].” Here we have De venatione sapientiae’s key
contrast between the posse-fieri—the potential or possibility of becoming or being made—and its “one absolute beginning and cause,” which is
so fully actual that “it is all that can be—est omne quod esse potest.”22 All
making presupposes the posse-fieri, which therefore cannot be itself “made
(factum).” But as a “passive potency,” it can neither make itself nor bring
itself to actual being.23 It therefore requires a beginning or principium,
and Nicholas says, “We speak of it as created, for it does not presuppose
anything from which it exists, except its Creator.”24 The posse-fieri is created from nothing—de nihilo.25 Here, the posse-fieri is no longer the coeternal “absolute possibility” of De possest. Rather, Nicholas distinguishes
between the creator as eternal and the posse-fieri as created and perpetual,
having a beginning but no end. To complete the scheme, Cusanus says
that the creator produces “all things subsequent to the posse-fieri” out of it.
Although created, the posse-fieri thus functions like Aristotle’s prime matter,
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a reservoir of potential and possibilities. 26 Indeed, Nicholas says that
Aristotle erred in claiming that posse-fieri has no initium (beginning ).27
He goes on to note how differently created things realize their potential.
Celestial and intelligible things—the heavens and angels—fully exercise
their specific, created capacities and are perpetual. Other creatures—like
ourselves—are not all that they can become; these “are never constant, and
perish ... They imitate perpetual things but will never attain them ... They
are temporal, and are called earthly and perceptible things.”28 Nicholas thus
presents a three-part structure: 1) the fully actual and eternal Creator, 2)
the perpetual posse-fieri, along with heavenly and angelic beings, and 3)
the shifting, sublunary world of time where we dwell. He explains this
structure in terms of enfolding and unfolding, complicatio and explicatio.
Looking toward the eternal, Nicholas sees “Actuality itself (ipsum actum)”
and “all things as enfolded in their absolute cause.” Gazing at “the everlasting and perpetual,” he sees the posse-fieri and within it “the nature of each
and every thing as it ought to be made in accord with the perfect unfolding
of the divine mind’s predestining.” Finally, looking into time, he perceives
“that all things are unfolded in a succession, in imitation of the perfection
of things perpetual.”29
Since the posse-fieri runs like a thread through the whole fabric of De
venatione sapientiae, we cannot trace it completely here. Let us look at only
two sections. First, in chapter 10, Nicholas returns to Diogenes Laertius
to discuss “How the wise name the posse-fieri.” Thales saw it in water, and
Zeno the Stoic similarly focused on air as the medium between fire and
water. But Nicholas objects that “the posse-fieri precedes all the elements
and whatever has been made.”30 Second, in the Epilogue, Cusanus recasts
his three-part scheme into a hierarchy of powers and possibilities. He distinguishes 1) posse-facere, God’s power to make and create, 2) posse-fieri,
the possibility and capacity for being made, and 3) posse-factum, potential
or “possibility-made-[actual].”31 The fully actual creator God becomes the
posse-facere, which Nicholas describes in a familiar litany: like Possest, it “is
all that can be”; it is maximal and minimal; like the non-aliud, it cannot
be other. Finally, “it is the efficient, formal or exemplary, and final cause
of all things, since it is the delimitation (terminus)”—the ninth field of
wisdom’s hunt—“and end of the posse-fieri and therefore of the possefactum.”32 The posse-facere is, in a word, omnipotent. As such, it contains
all that can be within itself “antecedently” or virtually, and “is present in
all things” as their absolute cause. Since it alone creates the posse-fieri “from
nothing” and sets its limits, the posse-fieri cannot perish and is perpetual.
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Sketching the relation between the posse-fieri and the posse-factum,
Nicholas says, “in all things that are made (factum), the posse-fieri is the
respective thing which has been made, but in a different mode of being:
in potency in a less perfect mode, and in actuality in a more perfect mode.
Therefore, the posse-fieri and the posse-factum do not differ in essence. But
the posse-facere ... is not essence, but the cause of essence.”33
To illustrate this scheme, Cusanus takes the example of heat. In all
hot things, the posse facere calidum or power-of-making-hot precedes the
posse fieri calidum, the possibility-of being-made-hot; and from this possibility, it brings everything hot into actuality.34 Citing Plato, Nicholas then
says that “what we call fire … is fiery or something on fire,” while “fire-perse precedes, and is the cause of, every ignitable thing and everything that
has been set afire.” Yet this fire-per-se is not simply an “Idea,” but rather—
as Dionysius explained—“a likeness of the First Cause.” For Paul describes
God as “a consuming fire.” 35 Cusanus signals his creative use of sources
when he claims that Proclus, Aristotle and the Platonists—if their statements are “correctly understood (sane intelligi)”—confirm his analysis of
the one cause and the order which unfolds from it.
Nicholas also explored these issues in De ludo globi (1462–1463),
and returned to them in his last work, De apice theoriae (1464). Here he
drastically simplifies De venatione sapientiae’s scheme by naming God and
the “quiddity” of all things as posse ipsum—possibility, potential or power
itself. As “posse” drops its qualifiers—est, facere, fieri and factum—its very
simplicity attracts Nicholas. Because, he says, “nothing can be more powerful (potentius), earlier or better,” posse ipsum exceeds Possest and every
other name for God.36 In this compressed view, there are only posse ipsum
and its appearances or manifestations. Commentators have noted the
“dynamization” in Nicholas’s late works that culminates in De apice theoriae. As Peter Casarella notes, here “Cusanus achieves an outright reversal
of the Aristotelian-Thomist priority of God’s actuality” over potentiality,
which he had retained—with qualifications—in De possest and De venatione sapientiae.37

Cusanus on Plato, Unitas, and History
Let us now look at another strand in the fabric of De venatione sapientiae:
the Neoplatonic theme of the One or unity. Central to Cusanus’s history
of philosophy is Plato. As Raymond Klibansky notes, De venatione sapientiae is Nicholas’s first work that shows his reading of the whole Parmenides
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in the Latin translation that he had commissioned from George of
Trapezunt.38 So he no longer interprets Plato mainly through Proclus’s
eyes, but occasionally against him as well. For example, he tells us, “Plato
affirmed that the First Beginning, God, is One through itself and Good
through itself. And the beginnings of other things—namely, of being, of
life, of intellect, and the like—he called being through itself, life through
itself, intellect through itself; they are the beginnings and causes of existing, living, and understanding.”39 Nicholas then criticizes Proclus’s handling of these issues. For in The Theology of Plato, Proclus correctly affirms
“the first God of gods” to be “the one good (unum bonum),” but errs
when he multiplies gods. He does so by considering the traditional triad
of being, life, and intellect to be distinct “maker-gods (conditorios deos).”
The first of these, “the cause of beings,” he calls “a second god, namely, the
Creator-Intellect,” which he identifies as “Jove, the king and ruler over all
things.”40 Complicating matters further, Proclus
posits celestial and mundane gods and various other likewise eternal
gods ... Nevertheless, at the head of all [these gods] he placed the
God-of-gods, the universal Cause of all things. And so, those
attributes which we ascribe to our good God— attributes which are
different only in conception and not in reality—Proclus is seen to
assert of different gods, because of different distinctions among the
attributes.41

For Cusanus, Proclus thus mistakes the names or attributes of God for
many gods. He traces this error to his basic assumption that “nothing is
intelligible unless it actually exists ... And so, everything that is understood, he affirmed to [really] exist. Thus, he asserted to exist intellectually … an intelligible man, an intelligible lion, and whatever else he saw
to be abstract and free-of-matter.”42 On these issues, Nicholas sides with
Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who “recognize that conceptual being is
constituted by our intellect and does not attain the status of real being.”43
They also have the advantage of not declaring the Good to be more
ancient than being, but rather to affirm “that one, being, and good are
interchangeable.”44 Yet Aristotle in turn errs by limiting the first cause’s
governing role to the heavens, rather than to the entire cosmos. As we have
seen, Proclus gets this point right by affirming that Jove rules all things.
Later in the work Nicholas sharpens his critique of Proclus on
these issues, saying that he “engaged in utterly futile efforts” (supervacuos
labores) to describe many “eternal gods” and their complex relations to
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“the one God of gods.” 45 This critique and its concomitant telescoping
of Plato’s Ideas and the Neoplatonic triad of being , life and intellect
into the Christian Godhead are a familiar story, going back at least to
Pseudo-Dionysius.46 But one more text will clarify Cusanus’s perspective
on this story.
Discussing De venatione sapientiae’s sixth field, unity or oneness,
Nicholas sees a common focus on transcendence and negation in Plato,
Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite. He tells us that Plato, by “denying all things of the One … saw it ineffably before all things.” In the
Parmenides he hunted for the One “by means of logic,” an approach that
Proclus summarizes when he says that “those who believe Plato remain
among negations.”47 Explaining this negative turn, Cusanus again follows
Proclus, noting that any “addition to the One contracts and diminishes
the excellence of the One,” and in fact displays not the One, but its other
or not-One.48 The Cardinal here puts us on the familiar metaphysical turf
of the Parmenides’s first hypothesis, but he also highlights the work’s dialectic. For, as Klibansky comments, Nicholas “is primarily interested in
the dialogue as demonstrating the process of thought by which the mind
approaches its highest object”—its “hunt for the One through logic.”49
Cusanus then adds Dionysius’s negative theology to the mix. Imitating
Plato, the Areopagite paradoxically claims that, when speaking about
God, “Negations that are not privative assertions, but excellent and abundant affirmations, are truer than [simple] affirmations.”50 Nicholas says
that Proclus follows Dionysius in denying that the ineffable “First is one
and good”—although we have seen Plato and Proclus himself affirm this
elsewhere. Finally, Cusanus praises all three thinkers as “marvelous hunters (mirandos venatores)” of wisdom, whose writings merit close study.
In light of this passage, we cannot ignore the ghost in the room:
Dionysius the Areopagite. As John Monfasani has shown, Nicholas knew
the suspicions concerning the dating and authorship of the Dionysian corpus that emerged in Rome beginning in the 1450s. 51 Lorenzo Valla challenged the works’ authenticity, but made no mention of their similarity to
Proclus. Yet in Cusanus’s dialogue De non aliud (1462), Pietro Balbi—who
was translating the Theology of Plato—asks the Cardinal to explain precisely these similarities. He replies, “It is certain that your Proclus was later
in time than Dionysius the Areopagite. But it is uncertain whether he saw
the writings of Dionysius.”52 Here Nicholas leaves open the question of his
influence on Proclus. Balbi and the Cardinal then discuss the two thinkers’ similar statements placing the “existing one” after “the unqualifiedly
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One,” and note Proclus’s reliance on Plato for this view. A year later in De
venatione sapientiae, Nicholas reaffirms Dionysius’s apostolic dating, and
states that Proclus—who cites Origen—comes later. In the passage cited
above, Nicholas then makes the stronger historical claims that Dionysius
“imitates” Plato and that Proclus “sequendo (follows)” Dionysius’s teaching. On this view, the Areopagite becomes a key intermediary between
Plato and Proclus. We now know that Cusanus gets this chronolog y
wrong, and with it his chain of readers and influence. Dionysius—now
Pseudo-Dionysius—relies on Proclus, not the other way around.
Yet a curiously tangled and revealing web remains in Nicholas’s
reading of these two thinkers. Werner Beierwaltes stresses that we cannot
neatly separate Proclus from Dionysius in Cusanus’s thought and works.
Indeed, he suggests that Nicholas unwittingly reads Proclus through the
“mask” of Dionysius.53 Yet we may also note that Nicholas uses Proclus
to clarify and accent the Neoplatonic themes and structures within
Dionysius’s writings. On this view, the two thinkers’ reciprocal influence
on Cusanus, and what he makes of them, become more compelling issues
than their scrambled chronolog y. For we can trace what Hans-Georg
Gadamer calls their “effective history” (Wirkungsgeschichte)54 in Cusanus’s
commissioning of translations, his reading and marginal glossing, and his
writing De non aliud and De venatione sapientiae. The latter work, indeed,
calls attention to Nicholas’s reading of Plato’s Parmenides, Proclus and
Dionysius within his broader history of philosophy. As Pauline Watts says,
“What Cusanus himself is doing in De venatione sapientiae, giving his own
individual interpretation of the interrelationship of various important
pagan and Christian philosophers and theologians and of the historical
developments they produce, is itself an enactment of his whole conception of the historical nature of philosophy and theology.”55 In this respect,
Nicholas shares the historical awareness that Eugenio Garin considers
central for the Italian humanists.56 This is hardly surprising since Cusanus
moved in humanist circles from his student days in Padua through his
later years in Rome, and adapted their attitudes and practices in his own
projects. Early in his career his haunting of libraries and archives led
him to discover twelve comedies of Plautus, and to judge the Donation
of Constantine apocryphal.57 He not only commissioned translations of
Plato and Proclus, but also learned sufficient Greek to correct George
of Trapezunt’s translation of Plato’s Parmenides against the Greek text. 58
These humanist habits inform De venatione sapientiae throughout. Its very
title echoes the Renaissance quest for prisca sapientia (ancient or primal
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wisdom), a search which mined ancient texts not for historical curiosities or isolated bits of useful doctrine, but for live items within a perennial tradition of unified truth. 59 This is the wisdom, the sapida scientia
or tasty knowledge, that for Nicholas nourishes the intellect and leads to
God. The work thus takes its start from Nicholas’s reading of Diogenes
Laertius’s Lives of the Philosophers, which he folds into his own studies of
Plato’s Parmenides, Dionysius, and Proclus to trace a history of philosophy in the Platonic vein. As Cusanus negotiates this history, he gives it a
strongly self-conscious turn by reviewing his own hunts for wisdom. For
he adapts and criticizes not only earlier thinkers, but also his own previous
conjectures and methods. He thereby inserts himself into this story, and
makes the whole into a remarkably personal history.60 Nor is this history
simply retrospective, since De venatione sapientiae introduces the possefieri, which opens a new “field” for Nicholas’s ongoing hunt for wisdom.
Hence, as Wilhelm Dupré comments, for Cusanus “the philosophical tradition … becomes the concrete starting point for a further development
of thought.”61 Further, Nicholas sees this development extending beyond
himself, as he offers his book to future readers in the hope that it will stimulate “more acute thinkers ... to deepen their minds further.”62
This self-conscious historical turn has received little attention,
although it fits well with Nicholas’s views of knowledge, perspective, and
creativity. In all these areas, Cusanus emphasizes human subjectivity—
knowing that we don’t know (learned ignorance); highlighting visual perspective and its limits; and viewing mathematics, measures and tools as
creations of the human mind. Since Cassirer, this focus on subjectivity
has fueled heated debates about Nicholas’s place at the edge of modernity: is he “medieval” or “modern”? 63 While Cusanus’s self-historicizing
has not figured in these debates, it casts a peculiar light on them. For it
clearly differs from the “modernity” of Descartes, who claimed to discard
tradition and to ground philosophy in an ahistorical act of thinking, “cogito ergo sum.” In contrast, Nicholas starts not with a clean slate, but in
conversation with Plato, Dionysius and Proclus as partners in the hunt
for wisdom. Philosophy is indeed an historical enterprise. But this turn
suggests another, more recent strand of modernity or post-modernity:
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer writes that “Real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity.”64 History is not
just one damned thing or text after another, but requires that we acknowledge and rethink our own relation to the events and texts that we study.
Hence, Gadamer writes, “The horizon of the past, out of which all human
life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in motion.

CUSANUS’S PHILOSOPHICAL TESTAMENT   147

The surrounding horizon is not set in motion by historical consciousness.
But in it this motion becomes aware of itself.”65 Like the Renaissance pursuit of prisca sapientia, Gadamer sees continuity between early texts and
their contemporary readers. But since tradition’s horizon continues to
shift, he recognizes that understanding remains forever incomplete and
open. Cusanus is aware of how “conjectural” his reading and thinking are.
Hence we see him correcting himself and continually seeking more adequate names for God, as he moves from De docta ignorantia’s “Maximum”
to “Possest,” “Non-aliud,” and “Posse ipsum.” This process bears fruit in De
venatione sapientiae, where Nicholas reviews the fields where he and his
forebears have hunted for wisdom.
Yet Cusanus may place himself so firmly within this continuing philosophical tradition that he pays little attention to the tensions
between the texts he reads and his own perspective on them. Hence, he
may fail Gadamer’s test of “guarding against overhastily assimilating the
past to our own expectations of meaning.”66 For example, he transforms
Aristotle’s obvious dictum that “the impossible does not happen” into
the posse-fieri, a principle central to De venatione sapientiae’s metaphysical scheme, which clearly differs from Aristotle’s. But even when Cusanus
attends closely to his sources, he often takes them in new and idiosyncratic
directions. Perhaps F. Edward Cranz gives us the most radical view of
Nicholas’s creative reading. Discussing the late works, Cranz argues that
“if Cusanus at the end accepts almost the whole of the philosophic tradition he does so only by translating it entirely into his own new terms.” 67
Dionysius the Areopagite becomes Cranz’s Exhibit A. While Nicholas
praises no thinker more highly than Dionysius, “the greatest of theologians,”68 the two men work with such different assumptions and goals that
Cranz speaks of the “Cusanizations of Dionysius.” 69 Where Dionysius
begins with beings and moves toward mystical union, Cusanus begins
with meanings and intentions and moves toward an “absolute concept”
and vision of the divine.70 For Cranz these differences mark Cusanus not
only as a self-aware “Renaissance” thinker, but also as continuing a major
“reorientation” that began around the year 1100 when Western thought
turned from thinking beings to thinking meanings and intentions. 71
More conventional historians date this shift to late medieval nominalism and Quattrocento humanism. Within either scheme, Cusanus plays a
pivotal and inevitably controversial role. Whether or not Cranz is right,
he certainly forces us to re-examine the assumptions—what Gadamer
calls “prejudices”—that drive our own readings of Cusanus, his sources,
legacy and position at the edge of modernity.
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Peter Abelard, Anselm of Havelberg, and
Nicholas of Cusa
Sources of an Ecumenical Tradition
Constant J. Mews

N

ICHOLAS OF CUSA LOVED COLLECTING BOOKS. Yet,
while he very likely became aware of the technological revolution
initiated by Johannes Gutenberg in Mainz in 1452 (and his assistant,
Giovanni Andrea de’ Bussi, would direct the first publishing house in
Italy), his personal library comprised books in manuscript rather than in
print.1 The catalogue of the manuscripts that he bequeathed to the hospital
he established at Cusa testifies to the remarkable range of his intellectual
interests.2 In this essay, I focus not so much on the thought of Nicholas
himself, as on certain twelfth-century authors who laid foundations that
Nicholas would develop and interpret in his own way. He was fascinated
by the ideal of how concord might be established in the light of reason
and providence. While it is common to identify Nicholas as a renaissance
figure who broke with scholastic tradition, close analysis of his ideas shows
that he was unusually aware of less well-known currents of thought in the
twelfth century. As Thomas Izbicki has emphasized, Nicholas of Cusa was
not just a philosopher and theologian, but a reformer profoundly concerned with ecclesiology and society.3 The issue of how to identify concord
was as much an issue in the twelfth century as in the fifteenth, even not
with the same range of resources as available to Nicholas within his library.
While it is common to define the renaissance in terms of the rediscovery
of classical authors, the books owned by Nicholas of Cusa remind us that
the intellectual renaissance of the fifteenth century was also shaped (particularly in northern Europe) by recovery of less well-known authors of
the twelfth and thirteenth century, whose writings did not gain authority
within a standard scholastic curriculum.
The sur viving books in Nicholas’s library demonstrate great
familiarity with the major Latin theological authors of the patristic and
medieval period. The catalogue, drawn up in 1905, reveals that it had
four volumes of Augustine (nos. 31–35), one of Anselm (no. 61)
and Peter Lombard (no. 66), three of Thomas Aquinas (nos. 72–74), and
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of Bonventure (nos. 75–77). Yet he also owned translations, some quite
recent, of various Greek Fathers, including Chrysostom (nos. 46–47) and
above all of Dionysius the Areopagite (nos. 43–45). His library also had
copies of the Scivias of Hildegard of Bingen (no. 63), the Opus tripertitum
of Meister Eckhart (no. 21), and seven volumes of the writings of Ramon
Lull (nos. 82–88). 4 Nicholas even sought out rare texts about Islam,
including a Latin translation of the Quran (no. 108).5 He was interested
in John of Piano Carpini’s account of the Tartars (no. 203). In this sense,
his library demonstrates his desire to come to terms with recognition of
cultural difference.
In many ways, the intellectual interests of Nicholas were fully medieval. While he owned and appreciated various Latin writings of Petrarch,
including his Liber de sui ipsius et multorum ignorancia (nos. 198–200),
an influence on his own De docta ignorantia, his library did not include
Cicero, but did contain many works of Aristotle (nos. 182–84) as well
as other texts shaped by Platonic tradition, such as the Consolation of
Philosophy of Boethius, preserved with a commentary from the early
twelfth century that mentions a master Manegaldus (no. 121). More unusual, however, was that he owned many writings of Plato himself, including his Phaedo, Apology of Socrates, Crito, Axiochus, Meno, and Phaedrus,
recently translated by Leonardo of Arezzo (no. 177), as well as the commentaries of Proclus on Plato (nos. 185–86), and heavily Platonic writings
like those of Avicenna (nos. 205, 298–300) and the Liber de causis, attributed to Aristotle (no. 195). Nicholas’s intellectual interests embraced both
theology and philosophy, including some of the most innovative currents
of thought in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He also collected texts
on medicine (nos. 222, 296–309), astronomy (nos. 207–16), and had a
very large collection on civil and ecclesiastical law (nos. 223–95), vital for
his own commitment to religious and ecclesiastical reform.
In singling out Nicholas’s debt to Thierry of Chartres, David
Albertson picks up on a discovery, first made by Pierre Duhem, that
Nicholas was particularly interested in the Platonic (and more particularly
Pythagorean) elements of Christian thought formulated in the first half of
the twelfth century by Thierry of Chartres in a commentary on the six days
of creation. Thierry’s writings were never widely copied in the twelfth and
early thirteenth centuries. 6 Nicholas never referred to Thierry by name
and we do not possess the precise copy he used, although he may well
have used a summary (Fundamentum naturae) of Thierry’s ideas to which
he had access when composing his De docta ignorantia in around 1440.7
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The difficulty with singling out the influence of Thierry of Chartres by
name is that it tends to privilege debt to an abstract Platonist tradition
such as the “the school of Chartres,” when this concept is itself highly contested. The so-called mathematical analogy of the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit as like unity, equality, and connection, was one that originally had
been mentioned in passing by Augustine in his De doctrina christiana, but
would be developed by both Thierry of Chartres and Nicholas. 8 While
Thierry was certainly an original thinker, fascinated by the challenge of
bringing together Platonic ideas as formulated in the Timaeus (on which
his brother, Bernard, wrote an important commentary in the early twelfth
century), I would suggest he was only one of a number of twelfth-century
authors who offered Nicholas an opportunity to depart from the more
stultifying aspects of scholastic theology, as defined by Peter Lombard and
his interpretation of the teaching of Augustine.

Nicholas of Cusa and Peter Abelard
A contemporary of Thierry who deserves attention as attracting the
interest of Nicholas is Peter Abelard, whose copy of the controversial
Theologia “Scholarium,” once in the library of the hospital at Cusa, now
in the possession of the Capuchin Friars in Koblenz-Ehrenbreitstein
(K Archivbibliothek des Provinzialiat der Rheinische-Westfalische
Kapuzinerprovinz, cod. 1), has largely escaped scholarly attention. The
only exception to this is a short paper by Rudolf Haubst, who suggested
that this text could have influenced certain parts of the De pace fidei and
De visione Dei, both written in 1453. 9 The codex, which seems to date
from the mid fifteenth century, contains two separate sections, one (fols.
3–97v) containing Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexameron, the other
(fols. 104–64v) Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium,” without identification
of its author.10 From a textual point of view, K does not offer anything of
particular value for establishing the text of Abelard’s Theologia and so its
variants were not included in the critical edition. From the perspective
of Cusanus studies, however, the manuscript deserves attention because
of what it reveals about the interest of Nicholas in Abelard’s treatise.
Unknown to Haubst is the fact that K contains every variant (and a few
more) found in another manuscript of the Theologia “Scholarium” that
once belonged to the cathedral school in Magdeburg (M Berlin, Deutsche
Staasbibliothek, Magdeburg 34). 11 Because the scribe of M includes the
date Mcccclii in die septem fratrum (11 July 1452) on fol. 283v, he must
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have copied the Theologia “Scholarium” (on fols. 193–261v) before this
date. This manuscript was one of many copied after the destruction of
the Magdeburg cathedral library by fire in 1450, from books preserved
in neighboring libraries. Most of the authors copied into the first part of
M (fols. 1–192v) are classics of high scholasticism: Alan of Lille, Thomas
of Augsburg (circulating as Aquinas), and Aquinas himself, while the second section (fols. 193–416) contains an anonymous copy of the Theologia
“Scholarium.” The conclusion must be that Nicholas of Cusa, who was
appointed papal legate in 1451 with a mission to reform the church in
Germany, became aware of the Theologia “Scholarium” in M and had a second copy made for himself, in order to acquire copies of both this text and
Bonaventure’s Collationes. The combination of Abelard and Bonaventure
in K itself attests to the range of Nicholas’s intellectual interests, and a
desire to distance himself from the major scholastic authors copied into M.
I shall argue that Nicholas incorporated certain ideas from Abelard in
that remarkable group of writings which he produced in 1453. I shall also
suggest that the manuscript of Abelard’s Theologia from which M and K
derive, is textually related to a copy owned in the twelfth century by a
reform-minded bishop of Havelberg (in the archdiocese of Magdeburg),
whose interests in religious parallel those of Nicholas of Cusa, who himself became papal legate in Germany in 1450, charged with implementing
the cause of religious reform.
The nine annotations that Nicholas makes to Abelard’s Theologia
reflect an intelligent awareness of its most important themes.12 Two occur
at the beginning of the section in which Abelard introduces philosophical testimony about the trinitarian nature of God as supreme good. In his
Sentences, completed in the 1150s, but still authoritative within scholastic
theology in the fifteenth century, Peter Lombard had certainly absorbed
certain of Abelard’s techniques of evaluating discordant testimonies about
the Trinity, but avoided any allusion to philosophical testimony to support
Christian doctrine, such as the notion that Plato’s idea of a world soul in
the Timaeus might refer to the Holy Spirit. Nicholas was particularly interested in how Abelard interpreted the key passage of St. Paul about philosophers’ natural knowledge of God in Romans 1:20 (in the Douai version:
“For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also,
and divinity: so that they are inexcusable”). Whereas Paul (and following
him, Augustine) had emphasized the moral failing of certain philosophers,
Abelard glossed the passage in a more positive way, saying that “the reason
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itself of philosophy” coupled with “the sobriety of a most continent life”
led to their capacity to understand that God was one.13 His annotation
on fol. 114va, “Tully, that the philosophers posit one God” (Tulius, quod
philosophi unum deum ponant) draws attention to a passage identified by
Abelard in the De inventione (widely assumed to be by Cicero), claiming
that philosophers did not think there were a multitude of gods. Abelard left
out the words about this being a probable opinion.14 Scrutiny of databases
of Latin texts reveals that no Christian thinker before or after Abelard had
picked up the potential relevance of this passage of Cicero. The only exception is that of Nicholas of Cusa who argued in a passage within his De pace
fidei, completed in 1453 (without alluding to the authority of Cicero or
Abelard): “At no time have philosophers ever been found to have sensed
otherwise that it was impossible for there to be many gods over which one
was not exalted.”15
Nicholas also added a note on fol. 115rb “Jerome on behalf of the
philosophers” (Ieronymus pro philosophis) to a passage in which Abelard
had found a passage in Jerome’s Commentary on Matthew, interpreting
the parable of the good and bad servants as about those who followed the
good life of the gentile philosophers rather than those who squandered
that life. This was in fact a slight distortion of Jerome, who actually said
that it could illustrate the good life of gentiles and philosophers, while
also referring to those who did not live up to their ethical ideals.16 It was
a little-known passage that may well have struck Nicholas as offering a
more positive apology for the potential of philosophers than traditionally
assumed of Jerome.17
Nicholas also indicated his interest in Abelard’s discussion of a philosophical understanding of how God the Son might be eternally generated
from God the Father with a note on fol. 113va: “how the nativity of anything is eternal” (quomodo cuiuslibet nativitas est aeterna). Nicholas highlights a passage of Abelard about how the Word of God did not just begin
with the birth of Jesus in Jerusalem, but rather was eternal because it had
been seen from eternity.18 This theme of the eternity of the Word is one
that Nicholas includes in his De visione Dei, completed on 8 November
1453, even though he goes much further than Abelard in reflecting on how
God could be seen beyond the coincidence of apparent opposites.19
Nicholas also singles out part of Abelard’s discussion about God’s
will in the third book of the Theologia with a note on fol. 151ra “Note the
two-fold will” (Nota duplex velle), when Abelard explains that the phrase
“God does whatever he wills” (Ps 93:5) refers to a different kind of will
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from the phrase “God wants all to be saved” (I Tim 2:4). 20 One refers to
his ordinance (which Abelard understands as implying that God cannot
act differently from the way he does, namely according to reason), while
the other refers to God’s desire, not always followed out, because people
could choose their own destiny. Again, it is a core theme of the De pace
fidei of 1453 that humans always have the free will to choose their destiny.
While Abelard did not provide Nicholas with his definition of God as an
infinite circle whose center was everywhere, his teaching that God could
not act other than he did, namely according to reason, reflects a theological perspective with which Nicholas resonated.
Nicholas also singled out a number of passages in the Theologia
“Scholarium” in which Abelard insisted on his teaching on the concordance between many teachings of the Platonists with those of the catholic
faith.21 Thus, on fol. 123vb, he adds the note De platonicis to highlight
Abelard’s quotations from Augustine’s City of God and Confessions, in
which he highlighted how Augustine often spoken positively of Platonist
writings, countering those other passages in which the bishop of Hippo
highlighted the gulf between the Platonists and Scripture. A little further on, Nicholas adds in the margin of fol. 124ra libro IIo de doctrina
Christiana and then (on fols. 124rb and 124va) Nota! to signal passages
in Augustine that highlight his debt to Plato. Unlike so many medieval
scholastics, Nicholas of Cusa never studied theology at Paris. Rather, he
studied at Cologne, where he absorbed from his own teacher Haimeric
de Campo (ca. 1395–1460) Platonist traditions transmitted by Albert
the Great and Eckhart. In Abelard’s Theologia he was discovering an
early strand of Platonic Christianity in the twelfth century before Peter
Lombard effectively eliminated any reference to the authority of Plato in
the teaching of theology.

Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium” and Anselm of Havelberg
The idea that there might be different ways of acknowledging one faith
had been mentioned very briefly by Gregory the Great in a letter to his
friend, bishop Leander, “that in one faith, is different custom is in no way
harmful to the Holy Church.” 22 This phrase would be quoted by Peter
Abelard in his Sic et Non, from where it would be quoted in Gratian’s
Decretum and Peter Lombard’s Sentences.23 Yet neither Gratian nor Peter
Lombard would develop this remark into a systematic exploration of
the relationship between Latin and Greek definitions of orthodox faith.
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Peter Abelard’s comparison of Latin and Greek theologies of the Trinity
went much further than that of any previous author with the possible
exception of St. Anselm.24 Peter Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium” never
circulated widely, however, in the medieval period. The controversy provoked
by the work in 1141, when Bernard of Clairvaux influentially condemned
it as heretical, was such that it circulated in very few manuscripts. There
survive only five known copies of the Theologia “Scholarium,” three from
the twelfth century (London, British Library Royal 8.A.I; Douai, Bibl.
mun. 357, from the abbey of Anchin; Paris, BnF, Bibl. de l’Arsenal 265,
from Saint-Victor), one from the mid fourteenth century (Oxford, Balliol
College 296), and one from the early fifteenth century (Paris, BnF lat.
14793), copied by Simon de Plumetot (1371–1443), himself a remarkable
humanist, who bequeathed his entire library ca. 1440 to Saint-Victor. 25
Rather like the writings of Thierry of Chartres, texts by Peter Abelard
were hard to come by, even in the mid fifteenth century. This makes it
all the more interesting that, just as Nicholas of Cusa was embarking on
a new administrative phase in his career, taking up in 1452 his appointment as bishop of Brixen (Bressanone), where his attempts at implementing reform would encounter severe resistance, he encountered Abelard’s
Theologia “Scholarium.”
One figure who has not been studied as transmitting awareness of
the Theologia of Peter Abelard is Anselm of Havelberg (ca. 1100–1158), a
bishop whose fascination with accepting religious diversity deserves to be
compared with that of Nicholas of Cusa.26 In the introduction to the critical edition of Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium,” I observe a series of significant textual parallels between the part of the Theologia “Scholarium” about
the contrast between Latin and Greek views of the Holy Spirit and the text
of the Antikeimenon of Anselm of Havelberg (ca. 1100–1158). Anselm was
a remarkable reform-minded bishop of the twelfth century, whose interests
could be said to presage those of Nicholas of Cusa in the fifteenth century.27
In brief, Anselm was an early disciple of Norbert of Xanten, archbishop of
Magdeburg (1126–1134), but developed his interest in religious diversity
after being sent to Constantinople in 1136, where he engaged in conversations with Nicetas of Nicomedia. Anselm’s Antikeimenon or Dialogi had
no influence in the twelfth century, but survives only in manuscripts, one
copied in Freising in 1437, another from the sixteenth century. The writings of Anselm of Havelberg were like those of Abelard in that they were
rediscovered in the fifteenth century by humanist minds keen to go beyond
the scholastic orthodoxies of a previous generation.28
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There has been occasional recognition of parallels between the
thought of Anselm of Havelberg and Peter Abelard with regard to the
recognition of plurality of perspectives within the church. 29 It has not
been realised, however, that Anselm was directly familiar with the text of
the Theologia “Scholarium” in his Antikeimenon, written 1147–1149, but
recalling debates in Constantinople from a decade earlier. Anselm studied
in Liège, but is not known to have spent time in Paris. Anselm’s interest
in Abelard is all the more intriguing given that his mentor, Norbert of
Xanten, was identified by Abelard as an ally of Bernard of Clairvaux and
a critic of his teaching. Anselm could have obtained a copy of Abelard’s
Theologia from sympathetically minded cardinals, like Guido di Castello
(who became the short-lived Celestine II in 1143–1144). 30 In any case,
Anselm withdrew to Havelberg to write the Antikeimenon between 1147
and 1149, drawing on his experiences to provide theological justification
of his vision of how the Holy Spirit governed one church, but in many
different ways.

Nicholas of Cusa, Anselm of
Havelberg, and Peter Abelard
While there is no firm evidence that Nicholas of Cusa came across the
Antikeimenon of Anselm of Havelberg, it is a remarkable coincidence that
the earliest-known manuscript of that work, produced at Freising in 1437,
was prepared in the same year as Nicholas was sent to Constantinople
to seek reconciliation of the Greek and Latin churches. Four years earlier he had written his De concordantia catholica, asserting the conciliar
cause about the importance of consent and representation. His experience in Constantinople provoked his writing in the 1440 De docta ignorantia, while he was working in his first spell as papal legate in Germany
(1438–1448). Administrative duties did not prevent Nicholas from being
extraordinarily productive during these years, a period that culminated in
his being appointed Cardinal in 1448 and then sent to Germany again
in 1451 to reform the church. It is in this period, I suggest, that he came
across a copy of Peter Abelard’s Theologia “Scholarium,” perhaps discovered
in the process of replacing the library of Magdeburg cathedral, destroyed
by fire in 1450. On the eve of Gutenberg’s printing of the Bible, libraries
were still constituted by handwritten books.
In his Antikeimenon Anselm of Havelberg anticipates the concerns of Nicholas of Cusa about overcoming diversity, but, in the twelfth
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century, this was understood only through the divergences between different forms of Christian life:
Behold the one body of the church is seen to be vivified by the
one Holy Spirit, who is unique unto himself and multiplied in
the diverse distribution of his gifts. Truly this body of the church,
vivified by the Holy Spirit and divided and separated through its
different members in different ages and times, begins with the
just Abel and is consummated in the last of the elect, always one
in the one faith, but greatly separated by the manifold variety of
ways of living.31

Anselm of Havelberg was not particularly interested in those philosophical aspects of the Theologia “Scholarium” that so interested Nicholas of
Cusa. Nonetheless, Anselm shared Abelard’s interest in the way the Holy
Spirit could be manifest in many different forms in different periods of
history. In this respect, Anselm was picking up themes of Rupert of Deutz
(originally active in Liège, before moving to Cologne), while foreshadowing elements in Joachim of Fiore. As Lees argues, Anselm’s theology
gave recognition to history as a place where new ideas could legitimately
develop.32
Anselm shared with both Abelard and Nicholas of Cusa disgust
with hypocrisy in religious life. While Anselm acknowledged the importance of Bernard and the Cistercian order in renewing monasticism, he
also spoke highly of the canons regular, a movement promoted by Norbert
of Xanten, and refused to engage in the traditional arguments between
these two movements of reform. Anselm’s recognition of religious diversity was subtly different from that of Bernard, who only spoke about the
divine inspiration behind the Latin Church. Anselm, by contrast, spoke
glowingly of the diversity of modes of practicing the Christian faith:
In the Eastern church, among the Greeks and Armenians and
Syrians, there are different kinds of religious who are in accord
in one catholic faith, and yet in behaviour, order, habit, food and
office of psalm-singing, they are divergent from each other in no
small way.33

Anselm’s exposure in Constantinople to the cultural diversity of
Christendom led him to insist on acknowledging the multiplicity of
the gifts of the Spirit. Nicholas of Cusa certainly sympathized with
this perspective. Whether or not he precipitated the copy of Anselm’s
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Antikeimenon in 1437, prior to going to Constantinople, three centuries after Anselm’s own visit to that city, both writers were much more
aware than Bernard of Clairvaux of the reality of the diversity of rites in
Christendom.
The theological discussion of the Holy Spirit that Anselm draws
from the Theologia “Scholarium” offers a similar perspective that the difference between the Latin and Greek theological perspectives may not be
as great as often considered. In his theology of the Holy Spirit as divine
goodness, Abelard was consciously aware of the power and importance of
Platonist tradition, as mediated through the Timaeus of Plato. Abelard
argued against those Greeks who insisted that the Holy Spirit proceeded
only from the Father, but acknowledged that while the ecumenical councils insisted on uniformity of faith, this did not necessarily mean diversity
of words, only diversity of faith: “Therefore just as diverse is taken as opposite, thus it is not incongruously tied in a different way, that is differently
in place of being in an opposite way.” 34 Anselm of Havelberg shared with
Abelard a testimony of Dindimus about the Holy Spirit as the spirit of
truth, proceeding from the Father and the Son. At the same time Abelard
did not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeded principally from the Father.35
Anselm did not include, however, Abelard’s philosophical reflection that
if any took a more philosophical gaze on Platonic reason they would see
that Plato was talking about the profound rationality of creation.36

Thierry of Chartres, Peter Abelard,
and Nicholas of Cusa
Whereas Bernard of Clairvaux focused in his theology on the visiting of
the Word of God to the soul (exemplified for him by the narrative of the
Song of Songs), Abelard had always devoted much more attention in his
Theologia to the Holy Spirit. Bernard’s theological perspective was always
more shaped by Augustine’s conviction that the human soul, even after
sins had been forgiven through receiving the grace of baptism, was marked
by the stain of original sin. Augustine’s anti-Pelagian rhetoric was directed
against what he saw as an excessive optimism about human nature. Bernard
continued an Augustinian perspective about the stain of sin, while introducing themes of awareness of the experience of love as part of the process
by which sin was overcome. Abelard, by contrast, was much less comfortable with this Augustinian perspective on human nature. His reading of
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Plato’s Timaeus in particular led him to reflect on the fundamental goodness and rationality of creation. In this sense, Abelard shared a very similar
perspective to Thierry of Chartres, even if he did not have Thierry’s expertise
in the study of the natural world.
Abelard and Thierry certainly knew each other, as is evident from
Abelard’s account of his trial at Soissons in 1121, when he describes how
Thierry was rebuked by his bishop, namely Geoffrey of Chartres, for mocking the theological accusations being made against Abelard, that he was
effectively denying divine omnipotence. In his commentary on the seven
days of creation, Thierry made a concerted, and perhaps naive attempt
to reconcile the accounts of Genesis and the Timaeus (as also the brief
details he knew about Hermes Tresmegstus). Without any of Abelard’s
careful discussion of Plato’s image of a world soul as a metaphor or covering (involucrum) not to be taken literally, Thierry asserted that what
Plato called the world soul and described by Virgil (Aeneid 6:723–25) as
the interior spirit nourishing the world, was the same as what Christians
called the Holy Spirit. 37 In his Dialectica, Abelard mentions that there
were Platonists who went too far in simply identifying the two concepts.
Because Abelard refines this critique of Thierry’s argument in each version
of his Theologia (and goes into more detail on precisely those passages of
Virgil cited by Thierry), it seems most likely that Thierry may have composed his discussion of the days of creation before the Dialectica, possibly before 1117/1118.38 Thierry was then still under the influence of his
brother, Bernard of Chartres (d. 1126) who had produced an important
commentary on the Timaeus, which steered away from potentially controversial connections with Christian doctrine. Because Thierry never
repeated these claims about the world soul as being the same as the Holy
Spirit, it seems more likely that Thierry decided to immerse himself in the
study of the Opuscula sacra of Boethius as an authoritative framework on
which to base his teaching.
Nicholas of Cusa never identifies by name Abelard, Thierry of
Chartres or Anselm of Havelberg in his writing. Nonetheless, each of
these three figures of the twelfth century offered ideas to Nicholas of Cusa
quite different from the most widely copied theologian of the twelfth century, namely Peter Lombard. As is evident from the contents of the library
at Cusa (of which Abelard’s Theologia was originally part), Nicholas was
aware of the diversity of medieval thought, in particular of the twelfth
century, to a much greater degree than most of his contemporaries. Yet
Nicholas was also influenced by later writers, such as Ramon Lull and
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Meister Eckhart, that I have not touched on here. The originality of
Nicholas is such that his ideas cannot be traced back to any single literary
source. Nonetheless, this little glimpse into one corner of his library enables us to see that he was always fascinated by how other writers handled
the same problems of diversity and concord with which he was engaged.
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25
Mews, Introduction to Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 232–38,
243–64.
26
On Anselm, see the excellent study by Lees, Anselm of Havelberg.
27
Mews, Introduction to Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 267–68; the
parallels are between Antikeimenon (Dialogi) 2.7, 2.24–26 (PL 188: 1174BD,
1202D–1207CD) and Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 1.122 and more
importantly 2.157–64, 368, 483–88.
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Lees identifies these three MSS in Anselm of Havelberg, 287. The earliest
may be Munich, BSB Clm 6488 (from Freising, dated to 1437). The Antikeimenon was edited by d’Achery in 1677 (from an unknown MS), and reprinted in
PL 188: 1139–1248; the first book is translated (but without any further critical
edition) by Salet, Dialogues.
29
Eberhard, “Ansätze zur Bewältigung ideologischer Pluralität,” mentioned
by Lees, Anselm of Havelberg, 209 n. 146.
30
On the MSS owned by Guido di Castello, see Mews, “Introduction,” 268.
31
Anselm of Havelberg, Antikeimenon 1.2 (1144BCE), 44: “Ecce apparet manifeste unum corpus Ecclesiae uno Spiritu sancto vivificari, qui et unicus est in se, et
multiplex in multifaria donorum suorum distributione. Verum hoc corpus Ecclesiae
Spiritu sancto vivificatum, et per diversa membra diversis temporibus et aetatibus
discretum et distinctum, a primo Abel justo incoepit, et in novissimo electo consummabitur, semper una fide, sed multiformiter distinctum multiplici vivendi varietate.”
32
Lees, Anselm of Havelberg, 205–6.
33
Anselm of Havelberg, Antikeimenon 1.10 (1156CD), 160: “Item in Orientali Ecclesia, apud Graecos et Armenos et Syros, diversa sunt genera religiosorum, qui in una quidem fide catholica cordant, ac tamen in moribus, in ordine, in
habitu, in victu, in officio psallendi non parum ab invicem discrepant.” Cf. Lees,
Anselm of Havelberg, 212–13.
34
Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 2.152, 481: “Sicut ergo diuersum
pro opposito dicitur, ita diuerso modo, quod est altiter, pro opposito modo non
incongrue sumitur.”
35
Ibid., 2.163, 486: “Proprie tamen seu principaliter eum a patre procedere
non negamus.” Cf. Anselm of Havelberg, Antikeimenon 2.25 (1205B): “Anselmus
Havelbergensis episcopus dixit Quod Spiritus sanctus a Patre proprie procedat,
non negamus, quia id ipsum doctores nostri nos docuerunt sive hoc ipsi a viestris,
sive vestri hoc ab ipsis habuerint.”
36
Peter Abelard, Theologia “Scholarium,” 2.167, 489.
37
Thierry, De sex dierum operibus 27, in Thierry, Commentaries, 567.
38
Abelard discusses the texts quoted by Thierry in Theologia “Scholarium,”
1.177–178, 392–93. Häring (Thierry, Commentaries, 46–47) is not aware of the
subtlety of Abelard’s discussion of Platonists in the Dialectica, or its implications
for assigning a date before 1118 for Thierry’s De sex dierum operibus, which he
thinks could have been written between 1130 and 1140.
28
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Nicholas of Cusa, the Papacy, and
World Order
Vision and Reality
James Muldoon

T

HE FIFTEENTH CENTURY IS THE HISTORIAN’S
DISPUTED NO-MAN’S LAND. For Johan Huizinga “the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ... [were] the end of the Middle Ages ...
the age of medieval thought in its last phase of life ... fully unfolded and
developed,” the waning or the autumn of the Middle Ages.1 For others,
the fifteenth century is like John Wyclif, the morning star of the modern
world.2 In recent years, some medievalists have become even more aggressive, arguing for the long Middle Ages, stretching the period up to the
seventeenth or eighteenth century, while some modernists have moved in
the opposite direction, beginning the early modern era in the fourteenth
century.3 The fifteenth century has thus lost some of its significance.
While this debate might seem to be of interest only to a small number of specialists, it is important for the organizing of the great amounts of
data available to historians into manageable units. Furthermore, the terms
medieval and modern are commonly used when discussing levels of social
and cultural development in international affairs. Are the medieval and
the modern eras universal stages of human development, is modernity the
rejection of the medieval, is it the next stage in a gradual course of human
development, what is sometimes termed the theory of progress? Or is the
three-fold structure of development, ancient, medieval, modern not universal but only applicable to Europe?4
What can be said of the fifteenth century as a whole can also be
said of leading figures and events: did they reflect medieval or modern developments and intellectual currents? Such judgments obviously
depend on the perspective from which the observer begins. Nicholas of
Cusa is one such individual. According to Ernst Cassirer, from a philosophical perspective Cusa was “the first modern thinker,” while Jasper
Hopkins has taken the opposite position, asserting that Cusa never
crossed “over the threshold that distinguishes the Middle Ages from
Modernity.”5 Perhaps Thomas Izbicki best categorized Cusa, saying that
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he was “a protean figure,” one whose writings dealt with a wide variety of
contemporary intellectual concerns, old and new, pointing in particular
to Cusa’s work on “history, theology, philosophy, science and art.”6 One
omission from Izbicki’s list of disciplines to which Cusa made a contribution was the realm of international relations, a topic that was of growing
importance in the fifteenth century and culminated in the creation of the
great European overseas empires.
In fifteenth-century terms, the problem of international relations
was a two-fold one. In the first place, there was the problem of contentious relations among European states that were beginning to acquire
overseas territories and trade routes in the Atlantic. In the second place,
there was the larger question of the relation of Christian societies to nonChristian societies. These problems were becoming increasingly complex
as Iberian seamen were moving down the west coast of Africa and out into
the Atlantic in the search for a water route to Asia that would outflank the
Muslim cordon that blocked the land routes.7
There were a number of responses to these issues in the fifteenth
century, ranging from the theoretical, even visionary, to the hard-headed
and practical. One can illustrate this range of options by comparing the
way in which Nicholas of Cusa discussed the place of infidel peoples in his
Catholic Concordance with the way in which contemporary papal policy
dealt with Christian–infidel relations. The papal position is found being
developed in the letters of popes Nicholas V (1447–1455) and Alexander
VI (1492–1503) dealing with the Castilian and Portuguese exploring
activities in the Atlantic.
Cusa was not only a speculative thinker but also a participant in
the ecclesiastical crises of the fifteenth century, in the conciliar controversy as a theoretician, as an activist at the Council of Basel (1431–1449),
as a reform-minded bishop, and as a member of the papal court. He also
contributed to political and legal theory by his emphasis on “the consent
of the governed [that] runs like a leitmotif through what Cusa has to say
about empire and church alike” and on his discussion of representation as
the means for achieving such consent.8
Although Cusa’s writings dealt primarily with the internal crises facing the contemporary Latin Christian world, he was also aware of
the world beyond Europe, an aspect of his work that has received little
attention except for his discussion of the Muslim world.9 The increasing interest in the non-Christian world, those who inhabited it and how
Latin Christians would deal with these newly revealed peoples would
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have reached Cusa from two sources. In the first place, he was serving
the papacy when access to the only inhabited Atlantic island chain, the
Canaries, the site of missionary activity, became contested. The Portuguese
and the Castilians sought a monopoly of Christian access to the islands
and appealed to the papacy to regulate Christian entry into them for the
well-being of the indigenous population and to prevent conflict between
Christian nations engaged in exploration.10 In the second place, he learned
of the wider world being revealed from the contemporary interest in geography through his friendship with Paolo dal Pozzo Toscanelli (1397–1482),
a scholarly humanist who was interested in ancient geographers, especially
Strabo (d. 23 ad), and who proposed reaching Asia by sailing west, perhaps also being an influence on Christopher Columbus.11
From the beginning of Iberian overseas voyages the papacy had
been involved, especially in issuing bulls dealing with the Canary Islands
because they were the only inhabited islands that Europeans had discovered in the Atlantic.12 The fact that the islands were inhabited justified
papal involvement in European contact with them because of the church’s
mission to preach to all mankind. In addition, popes sought to reduce,
if not prevent entirely, conflict between Castile and Portugal over access
to these islands and the other lands Europeans encountered in the course
of seeking a water route to Asia by regulating Christian access to them.
In 1436, King Duarte of Portugal (1433–1438) requested Pope Eugenius
IV (1431–1447) to resolve a dispute over access to the Canary Islands,
which led to two legal briefs and a papal bull that foreshadowed the great
Spanish debates about the legitimacy of the conquest of the Americas in
the coming centuries.13
Cusa discussed the relation of infidel peoples to Christian society
in his Catholic Concordance, a vision of “an ordered harmonious universe
[that] was derived from the version of the Christian world view,” found
in the work of Dionysius the Aeropagite (fifth century).14 He began the
Concordance with the premise that all of creation is designed to reflect
“the underlying divine harmony in the church,” a harmony that would ultimately include all mankind as the church expanded throughout the world.
According to Cusa, “Every living being has been created in harmony”
so there is a natural inclination to bring all mankind into a harmonious
world order.15
The harmony that Cusa envisioned was not, however, the result of
an inevitable developmental process. It required the coming together of
people who form a government in which all are represented and the rulers
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of which govern with the consent of the people. In Book 3 of the Catholic
Concordance, he discussed the nature of right-ordered government according to Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero who had described the nature of “wellordered political, economic, and monarchic regimes.” According to these
writers, “Natural laws precede all human consideration and provide the
principles for them all.”16 To determine these principles as they pertain
to human existence, humanity has “been endowed with reason” so that
men might recognize what will best serve their needs. The ancient thinkers concluded that reason led men to recognize that “association and sharing are most useful” in order “to achieve the purpose of human existence.”
Consequently, men “have joined together and built villages and cities in
which to live together.” The stability and good order of such communities
“would be maintained by laws adopted with the common consent of all—
or at least with the consent of the wise and illustrious and the agreement
of the others.” Thus, the harmony that ought to exist will not inevitably
develop; it will require the active participation of human beings, wise men
working with the consent of their fellows, to work out the specific details
of the harmony.17
Cusa’s description of the proper human way of life, that is, in
organized societies in which all the members participate to some extent
in governance, reflected not only the ancient writers, but prior European
thinkers such as Marsilius of Padua (1275–1342/43) as well, and the
experience of Europeans, especially in the Italian city states, no doubt
contributed to his understanding of government. Such communities
require an agricultural base and at least some trade in order to acquire
goods and services not available locally but that are necessary for full
human development. To achieve the ideal order, the ruler “should take
special care to avoid great inequality among his subjects.”18
According to Cusa, although all men are “naturally inclined to
civilized life,” not all are capable of participating in governance. Citing
both ancient pagan authors and Ambrose (337–397), bishop of Milan,
he offered the example of “the ignorant and stupid” who clearly lack the
capacity to participate fully in civic affairs. Can they share in any way in
civic life? In fact, they can to some degree because “God has assigned a
certain natural servitude to the ignorant and stupid so that they readily
trust the wise to help them to preserve themselves” from the consequences
of their ignorance.19 Given the often violent conflict within and between
Italian city-states, this seems optimistic but it does reflect Cusa’s theme of
the essential harmony of God’s creation, so that all the elements should
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work together according to their God-given capacities, in effect creating a
good society by reconciling the wisdom and capacity for leadership of the
“wise and illustrious” with the natural desire of the “ignorant and stupid”
to improve their lot.
Cusa did not see the “ignorant and stupid” as an entire category
of people destined to remain such generation after generation, that is,
Aristotle’s “natural slaves,” as it came to be understood in the sixteenth
century, and he did not assert that they should be enslaved or otherwise
physically controlled any more than any other citizen.20 Individuals were
wise or stupid, not entire communities of people. Their condition was due
to ignorance, not biology. As Ambrose wrote, following the ancient philosophical tradition, “the wise man is free and the stupid man a slave.”21
To demonstrate this point, Cusa turned to the story of Noah and
his sons, re-writing it somewhat in order to support his argument. The
patriarch had cursed his son Ham and his descendants for laughing at him
while drunk and naked, thus not showing proper respect for his father, a
characteristic of the ignorant and stupid. By the terms of the curse, Ham,
the elder brother, and his descendants, would be household slaves to his
brethren because of the lack of respect Ham had shown to his father, the
wise elder. To reinforce his point, Cusa then pointed to the story of Esau
and Jacob wherein the younger brother Jacob, “who was preferred [by
their father] to the older, brother, Esau, because of his wisdom” and so
inherited from their father.22
These biblical examples reinforced the teaching of the ancient
pagan philosophers with a Christian twist. Within a family there could
be a wise son and an ignorant one and the wise parent supports the virtuous son and restrains the ignorant one. In each case there was a “devoted
father [who] was torn between his two sons in fatherly affection” but
when facing the choice of an heir the decision had to be “made on the
basis of merit,” not affection. In the final analysis, “certain wise men act
as guides for the unthinking people.” They rule “through the imposition
of their power which they use to compel the unwilling to obey those who
are wiser and to submit to the laws.” Cusa then added a curious comment:
“Servitude can be by choice—it is less worthy if by compulsion and better
if freely chosen” by those who recognize their need to be guided by the
wiser. At the same time he also wrote that “nature does not make a slave,
but ignorance, nor does manumission make one free, but learning.” Those
who do not recognize their limitations and follow their natural inclination to accept the leadership of the wise will be compelled to accept it.
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Again quoting Ambrose, Cusa added that “law is only imposed on the
ignorant, and how because of sin he is compelled by fear of punishment to
obey the law” which he would not do of his own volition.23
Cusa’s approach to the issue of the disparity of intelligence among
men is an interesting shift from the Aristotelian one. For Ambrose and
Cusa, true slavery was not biologically-based but rooted in man’s sinful
nature. He is a “slave of fear ... desire ... avarice ... lust ... malice ... anger.”24
These sinful proclivities can and should be restrained for the good of
the individuals who submit themselves to them and thereby enslave
themselves. If education and adherence to the guidance of the wise do
not restrain the sinners from their wicked behaviors, then force can be
employed.
Cusa’s discussion of the responsibility of the wise to assist, even
restrain, the “ignorant and stupid” and his stress on the importance of just
government based on the consent of the governed dealt with the situation
of Latin Christendom. These issues, however, were not unique to Europe
but concerned all mankind, not just Christians, although he provided
only brief references to these issues in non-Christian lands. What would
be the nature of European relations with the peoples of Asia who lived in
highly developed, civilized societies such as those Marco Polo described
and were the sources of the products that Europeans sought? Where and
how would these people fit into Cusa’s Concordance?
Cusa did not specifically mention primitive peoples in the nonWestern world, but his premises suggested that if there were no indigenous
wise leaders to bring their fellows to a civilized level of existence, then perhaps European Christians ought to do so. Christian missionaries seeking
the conversion of the peoples whom they encountered would be in a position to instruct such people not only in religion but in the skills necessary
for civilized existence as well.25 They could serve as the wise men to whom
these primitive people could look for leadership and guidance.
Relations with non-Christian governments that Europeans
expected to encounter in Asia were another matter. Men after all were
naturally inclined to joining together to achieve the fullness of human life
so that government was a natural development, as the ancients, especially
Aristotle, demonstrated. It was not only a natural way of life, however,
because “all rulership is sacred and spiritual and comes from God,” whether
the ruler is a Christian or not.26 Cusa considered the status of non-Christian
rulers from two perspectives. In the first place, there was the question of
their relation to the Holy Roman emperor who was “the vicar of Christ,
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the King of kings and Lord of lords” in Cusa’s opinion. He “is first over all
other princes because he rules in subordination to Christ … and subjects
himself to Christ and his laws.” The result is that “the Christian empire is
higher than all other governments because it is the one closest to God.”27
The ultimate standard for determining the moral quality of any government is therefore the degree of adherence to Christian principles. This is
not to say that infidel rulers are by definition illegitimate, only that they
do not live up to the highest standards.28
Having described the emperor as the highest ruler in the world
because of his close relation to God, Cusa then turned from the theoretical and visionary to the practical. Although the emperor possesses the
supreme status as ruler, “his power to command does not extend beyond
the territorial limits of the empire under him.” The Roman law termed
him “the lord of the world” because “the Romans had the greater part of
the world under their rule,” but not the entire world. Beyond the boundaries of the Roman Empire there were numerous regions stretching from
Norway to the Himalayas to the great lands of the east, China, India,
and Ceylon, and to Libya and Mauritania in the south where the Roman
eagles never appeared. Cusa recognized the extent of these regions, quoting Ptolemy’s observation that these lands “make up no small part of the
world” and are quite heavily populated.29 He added that in Africa, probably Ethiopia, there was a ruler, “Prester John who is said to be a Christian
and a most faithful deacon with seventy kingdoms subject to him” but
Cusa was not impressed, concluding that “those kingdoms are not very
populous or large.”30
It is easy to see how the Latin Christian kingdoms and lesser political units of Europe could be fitted into Cusa’s harmonious structure, but
what about the inhabitants of these distant lands? Cusa had no difficulty
in fitting them into his scheme. In the first place, all men are by nature in
social and organized societies “to preserve unity and harmony” and “established guardians of all these laws with the power necessary to provide for
the public good,” just as European Christian rulers did.31 Furthermore, “all
rulership is sacred and spiritual and comes from God.” All rulers are not
equal in status, however, and “there are gradations in excellence according to [the ruler’s] closeness to, or distance from God.” The ruler “who
in his public rule resembles God least is least worthy while the one who
resembles him most is the greatest.” Cusa then provided a brief list of rulers and where they stand in the order of excellence. In his opinion, “a king
of the Tartars is the least worthy because he governs through laws least in
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agreement with those divinely instituted,” while “a king who belongs to
the Mohammedan sect is greater since he venerates the laws of the Old
Testament and certain of those of the New Testament.” A “Christian king
is the greatest because he accepts both the laws of nature and those of the
Old and New Testaments and the orthodox faith.”32 In other words, mankind exists in a gradated series of nations at various stages of development
toward ideal rule and the Christian God.33
The purpose of rulers in Cusa’s schema is to establish peace and
“to direct their subjects to their eternal end” and to the “means to reach
that end.” This was not the responsibility of Christian rulers alone, but
of all rulers by the very nature of their office. Cusa pointed out that
the ancient “pagan emperors were called supreme pontiffs because of
the care which they took for religion.”34 For a ruler to fail to support the
religious development of his subjects was therefore to fail in his most
important function.
The overseas voyages introduced Europeans to a wide range of
other peoples and lands, not all of which fitted the image of Asian societies provided by Marco Polo and other travelers. Some places, particularly
the Azores, Cape Verde, and Madeira island chains, were uninhabited.
Others, the Canary Islands and the coastal regions of Africa, for example, were inhabited but not with great trading cities. The inhabitants that
Europeans encountered lived at a variety of levels, from the most primitive
to the organized, although not as developed as the Asian countries such
as China. In Cusa’s vision, those peoples who had not reached the level of
existence associated with towns and agriculture would submit to the wise
leadership of the Europeans and begin the process leading to civilized status and Christianity. As for Muslim, Tartar, and other infidel rulers who
had reached a civilized level of development, when presented with more
sophisticated forms of society and with the Christian religion, they would
accept them and bring their people to the fullness of human development
as was their responsibility.
What Cusa did not explain was exactly how in practice the goal
of universal concordance was to be accomplished. He suggests that the
nature of mankind would move people in the direction of universal
concordance under the guidance of Christian missionaries. Given his experience as a lawyer, papal official, and bishop, he had to have recognized that
even within Latin Christendom his vision was not being realized. As for
the Muslims and the Tartars, they were traditional enemies of Christians
and showed no willingness to become Christian and participate in
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Cusa’s concordance. Likewise, the less developed societies, those peoples
who lived in the fields and the forests, did not always appreciate the wisdom of missionaries and did not readily accept civility and Christianity.
Was the concordance to be only a fantasy or would it be possible to
implement it to some degree?
One way to appreciate the difference between Cusa’s vision of a
harmonious world order and contemporary political reality is to examine
contemporary papal letters that deal with relations with non-Christians. There
were more than one hundred such letters beginning about 1420. Taken
together, they outline the developing papal policy regarding Christian
overseas expansion. The letters of two popes are especially interesting.
The first was a letter of a pope contemporary with Cusa, Nicholas V,
who issued the bull Romanus Pontifex (1455) dealing with a longstanding issue, conflicting Castilian and Portuguese claims to access to the
Atlantic islands and the coast of Africa, and with the traditional enemies
of Christendom such as Muslims. The second was a series of letters, those
of Alexander VI, three bulls usually referred to by the heading of the first
of the series, Inter caetera (1493), issued following Columbus’s first voyage. These were concerned with peoples with whom Europeans had had no
previous experience, the peoples of the New World who would provide a
unique challenge.
The bulls of Nicholas and Alexander opened with a statement of
papal responsibility for achieving the salvation of all mankind. For Pope
Nicholas, his responsibility was to contemplate “with a father’s mind all
the several climes of the world and the characteristics of all the nations
dwelling in them,” in order to secure “the salvation of all.” The world was
not, however, at peace and Christians have to “restrain the savage excesses
of the Saracens and of other infidels, enemies of the Christian name”
before peace is secured under Christian direction and the work of missionaries is possible.35
Nicholas V pointed to the work of “the noble personage Henry,
infante of Portugal” who was leading efforts to spread the church and its
teachings overseas. According to the pope, the Infante has been encouraging seamen to sail south and east into lands “unknown to us westerners” where dwell people of whom “we had no certain knowledge” but who
might be helpful in the wars against the Saracens and other enemies of
Christendom. The Infante was expected to support missionary efforts
among these peoples, suggesting that they would receive the missionaries peacefully and not as the result of conquest. In this the Infante was
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following in the heroic tradition of Portuguese monarchs, “inflamed with
zeal for the salvation of souls and with fervor of faith” seeking out “the
most remote and undiscovered places, and also to bring into the bosom
of his faith the perfidious enemies of him and of the life-giving cross,”
work that continued the crusades and has brought part of Africa, Ceuta,
under Christian domination. One consequence of this Portuguese activity
in Africa was that “many Guineamen and other negroes, taken by force,
and some by barter of unprohibited articles, or by other lawful contract
of purchase” have been acquired by the Portuguese and “converted to the
Catholic faith” and been saved.36
The slave trade mentioned in Romanus Pontifex as a source of converts posed a problem for Pope Nicholas. What troubled him was that
some slaves had been purchased with weapons and other war materials that
could be employed against Christians. Those engaged in such trade were
“strangers induced by covetousness” who sought to evade long-standing
papal bans on such trade.37 One of the responsibilities of the Portuguese
was to police European contact with the recently discovered lands and
ensure that unauthorized Europeans did not enter. In effect, the Portuguese
would have a papally-granted monopoly of access to these lands and therefore a monopoly of European trade there. In return for managing European
Christian entry into the lands and receiving a monopoly of trade, the
Portuguese would also be responsible for establishing “churches, monasteries, or other pious places” and they “may send over to them any ecclesiastical persons whatsoever” to minister to “all who live in the said lands or who
come thither in the future” in the course of Portuguese activities there. The
profits of trade with Africans would subsidize the missionary efforts among
the indigenous population and also provide spiritual care for Europeans
who migrated there.38
From the papal perspective, the peaceful reconciliation of all
mankind was not a likely prospect, at least not in the immediate future.
Some of the Africans were converted, but there was no mass conversion
of an infidel people led by their ruler. 39 The expansion of Christianity
was largely reduced to the uninhabited islands of the Atlantic that were
“peopled with orthodox Christians,” that is, colonists brought from
elsewhere. There was, however, one place where there were significant
numbers of converts. In an apparent reference to the Canary Islands,
the pope noted that “many inhabitants or dwellers in divers islands situated in the said sea ... have received holy baptism,” thus expanding the
Christian world.40
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In Romanus Pontifex Nicholas V dealt with some of the problems
that those who wished to fulfill Cusa’s dream of universal reconciliation would face, and he outlined a way in which such a process might be
achieved at least to some degree. The grant of a monopoly of access to and
trade with the newly found lands to the Portuguese and the heavy responsibilities that such a grant carried with it would become a model for later
explorers. Christendom was besieged by hostile Muslims and Tartars who
were resistant to missionary efforts and to the accepting of a place within
Cusa’s harmoniously constructed world order. If the Portuguese were successful in evading the infidel cordon and reaching Asia by water, however,
it might be possible to connect with Christian rulers believed to exist in
Asia and to engage jointly in a last great crusade that would lead to Cusa’s
vision of concordance. Almost fifty years later the possibility of this actually happening occurred when Christopher Columbus announced to the
world that he had reached the outer edge of Asia.
When Columbus returned from his first voyage and announced
that he had achieved the long-sought goal of a water route to Asia, he presented a new and potentially useful situation for Latin Christians to consider. The people he encountered were not Muslims or Tartars or any other
known enemy of Christians so they could be approached peacefully and
in this way would not only expand the Christian church but also provide
support for a last crusade. By sailing west, Columbus had not only evaded
the Muslim cordon, he also avoided impinging on the papally authorized
Portuguese monopoly of access to the Atlantic Ocean along the coast of
Africa, although the Portuguese were not sure of that at first and held him
for some time on his return when he sailed into the port of Santa Maria in
the Azores.41 When Columbus returned to Spain, Ferdinand and Isabella
approached Pope Alexander VI to provide them with a monopoly of the
western route to Asia, similar to the grant to the Portuguese. The result
was three bulls issued on May 3 and 4, 1493.42
The initial bull, Inter caetera, was in the tradition of papal letters
stretching back to 1420, but also recognized that Columbus’s voyage led to
situations not dealt with in the earlier bulls. It began by placing Columbus
within the crusading tradition, specifically the Spanish conquest of
Granada in 1492, at which Columbus was present.43 His first voyage was a
logical consequence of the monarch’s crusading spirit because the Spanish
monarchs “had intended to seek out and discover certain lands and islands
remote and unknown and not hitherto discovered by others” in order to
bring the inhabitants of these lands to the Christian faith. They supported
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Columbus who rewarded the monarchs by discovering “certain very
remote islands and even mainlands that hitherto had not been discovered
by others,” that is, by other Europeans, especially the Portuguese. The people that Columbus found did not, however, inhabit cities and engage in
the trade for which Columbus searched. Instead, he found “many peoples
living in peace, and as reported, going unclothed, and not eating flesh.”
At the same time, there was a positive side to Columbus’s encounter with
the people of the Caribbean, namely, that they “believe in one God, the
creator in heaven, and seem sufficiently disposed to embrace the Catholic
faith and be trained in good morals.”44 To some degree, they fitted Cusa’s
program of concordance. Thus, one of the Spanish monarchs’ goals was
potentially achieved, the conversion of the peoples of the Caribbean.
The pope’s response to the request for papal recognition of what
Columbus had accomplished led to Inter caetera in which he declared that
this bull will “give, grant, and assign forever to you and your heirs ... all and
singular the aforesaid countries and islands ... discovered by your envoys
and to be discovered hereafter.”45 What this authorized was the patronado,
the authority to establish and administer the church in the newly discovered lands.46 The profits of the trade monopoly would subsidize the work
of the church in these lands. There was, however, an exception to this
general grant. It applied only to lands that “at no time have been in the
actual temporal possession of any Christian owner.” This phrase refers to
the Christian kingdoms believed to exist in Asia and linked to the story
of Prester John.47 There was no need to grant a trade monopoly to Latin
Christians to establish the church because it already existed in such lands.48
There were more than a score of Christian communities across
Asia, although none actually formed a kingdom. These churches, the largest being the Greek church, were separated from the Roman church by
schism, that is, by rejection of papal universal jurisdiction and not by heresy, that is, doctrinal differences. The papacy had been attempting since
the thirteenth century to reconcile these churches with Rome, a part of
the concordance that Cusa sought. The Greek Orthodox church was of
special interest because of the Byzantine Empire’s role in the crusades.
From the thirteenth century onward, western support for the Byzantines
was linked to re-uniting with Rome.49 Cusa was involved in these negotiations when he served as a legate for Pope Nicholas V at Constantinople in
1437.50 Reconciliation with the other eastern churches was proposed by
Pope Gregory IX (1227–1241) who outlined how such a reconciliation
would proceed in his bull Cum hora undecima (1239).51
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In return for receiving a papally-authorized monopoly of Christian
access to spread Christianity in the newly encountered lands the Spanish
were expected to “appoint to the aforesaid countries and islands worthy
and God-fearing, learned, skilled, and experienced men to instruct the
aforementioned inhabitants and residents in the catholic faith, and to
train them in good morals.” The bull also forbade “all persons of no matter
what rank” to go to these lands to trade or for any other purpose “without
your special permit” and authorization.52
The third bull in Alexander VI’s series Inter caetera (May 4, 1493)
clarified the zones assigned to the Spanish and the Portuguese, “drawing
and establishing a line from the Arctic pole ... to the Antarctic pole ... the
said line to be distant one hundred leagues towards the west and south
from ... the Azores and Cape Verde.” The bull also restated the ban on
other Christians from entering these regions without the formal permission of the responsible Christian monarch.53
Taken collectively, Cusa’s Concordance and the papal bulls outlined
the development of fifteenth-century Christian thought about peaceful
Christian–infidel relations ranging from Cusa’s broad vision of a peaceful, harmonious world order fulfilling the church’s universal mission to
the papal letters that chart the development of policies that would implement such a vision but not necessarily in an entirely peaceful fashion. The
manner in which Cusa’s vision is described is rather like a schematic for a
complex machine. The parts are shown neatly laid out, ready to be slipped
into place to create a harmoniously balanced operating machine by the
actions of a skilled mechanic, relying on man’s natural desire for association with his fellows and rulers’ natural responsibility for the spiritual welfare of their subjects.
Cusa’s system assumed the cooperation of all involved, but what
if incompetent or stupid individuals refused to accept their proper place
within the social order? Or what if an infidel ruler denied that he had a
responsibility for the spiritual welfare of his people or that he did have
such a responsibility, but rejected Christianity and favored another religion? Should force be employed to insure that individuals accepted their
place and that rulers fulfilled their obligation in Christian terms?
The papal letters provided an answer to the questions Cusa’s vision
raised. They opened with a statement of the church’s universal mission
that reflected Cusa’s vision of a harmonious world order under papal headship, but they recognized that this will not occur without the use of force
in some cases. Christians will have to defeat their longtime enemies and
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they may have to coerce uncivilized peoples to recognize that only with
wise Christian leaders will they advance to the civilized level of existence
that is natural for mankind. The papal letters did not, however, present a
static picture of the unfolding situation. To some degree, papal policies
were gradually modified and expanded as the Iberians had more experience in the world beyond Europe and faced situations that Cusa and earlier popes had not contemplated. The Tartars and Muslims for example,
with whom Christians had warred for a long time, had never shown any
interest in accepting Christianity peacefully. In the thirteenth century a
Mongol Khan had even responded to a papal letter seeking his conversion by ordering the pope to submit to him. 54 In the fifteenth century,
while the papacy was praising the crusading fervor that characterized the
Portuguese and Spanish advance against the Muslims in the west, Islam
was advancing in the east, seizing Constantinople in 1453 and advancing
up through the Balkans, reaching Vienna in 1683. A harmonious relationship did not appear likely.
The second issue the papacy had to face was that many of the peoples
the Spanish and the Portuguese were encountering were not town dwellers, agriculturalists, and merchants, but people living at a pre-civilizational
level. Furthermore, they existed as social groups, not random individuals as Cusa described and seemed to fit Aristotle’s conception of natural
slaves. At the least they would need training in the basic skills required
in a civilized society as well as religious instruction. What if they were
not inclined to accept civilizational and religious instruction?55 Could or
should they be coerced to do so for their own good?
These fifteenth-century figures were participants in an early stage of
what Lewis Hanke termed the Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest
of America.56 They were not isolated academic thinkers, but ecclesiastical officials who were engaged in directing a church that claimed universal jurisdiction in spiritual matters and could call upon secular powers
to assist it. From the perspective of Cusa and the popes discussed here,
Christians were engaging in legitimate trade and missionary efforts around
the world. Cusa seems to have envisioned a peaceful path to, ultimately,
the concordance of all mankind, a naturally and divinely ordained goal.
The papal letters, however, took a harsher position: it would be necessary
to fight against the traditional enemies of Christendom in the course of
creating the desired harmony and it might be necessary to use some force
in order to achieve a greater good, the harmonious world order that would
enable all mankind to achieve their nature and their supernatural goals.
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In the final analysis, Cusa and the popes stood astride the medieval–modern
divide. They all proclaimed the universal mission of the church, but Cusa
did so without any discussion of how this would actually be achieved. The
popes, however, had a fuller appreciation than did he of the difficulties
that would have to be faced in achieving Cusa’s vision. They were dealing
with the first stages of the construction of European overseas empires that
had their own conception of world order.
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Part 4
The Great Schism and the Conciliar Option

The Great Western Schism, Legitimacy,
and Tyrannicide
The Murder of Louis of Orléans (1407)
Joëlle Rollo-Koster

O

N SEPTEMBER 13, 1376, THE PAPACY RETURNED TO
ITALY after some seventy years spent in Avignon, on the banks of
the Rhône. By 1376, the circumstances that had kept the papacy away
from its traditional seat had evolved. The Hundred Years War and rebellions in Rome and the Papal States were in remission, and Gregory XI,
intent on returning the papacy to its historical location, concretized the
move.1 Gregory did not enjoy his accomplishment for long: he died on
March 27, 1378. A few days after his death, the first Roman conclave
opened since Nicholas IV was elected in 1287, close to one hundred years
previous. Sixteen cardinals were present: eleven French, four Italian, and
one Spanish. Regardless of internal divisions within the conclave and a
noisy crowd chanting words like “We want a Roman pope—or at least an
Italian. If not, we’ll cut you to pieces!,” the cardinals chose Bartolomeo
Prignano, archbishop of Bari, as Pope Urban VI. A well-qualified curial
servant, Urban had never belonged to the cardinalate.
Crowned on April 10, 1378, the man was changed by the office.
Urban VI was rigorous and a man of integrity, but he could also be temperamental and violent. Displeased French cardinals eventually moved
out of Rome to Anagni. On August 2, 1378, the cardinals publicly questioned the election, and on August 9 they denounced Urban as illegitimate by reason of procedural impropriety, as the election had taken place
under duress and violence. They labeled the pope intrusus (usurper), and
anathematized him.2
On September 21, 1378, thirteen “rebellious” cardinals entered
their own conclave at the court of Onorato Caetani in Fondi, in the
Kingdom of Naples, where they had found refuge. The cardinals elected
Robert of Geneva, who took the name Clement VII. Clement was
crowned in Fondi a month later, on October 31, with the papal tiara
brought from Castel Sant’Angelo by Gregory XI’s former camerlengo,

194   Joëlle Rollo-Koster

Pierre de Cros, who had joined Clement’s side. After learning of the
election of his rival, Urban VI responded by remaking his College of
Cardinals, naming twenty-five new candidates. This act confirmed the
Schism. For the first time in its history the papacy had two popes, with
two courts, two colleges of cardinals, and two sets of political supporters
or obediences that perpetuated for over close to forty years. This was not
the first time the papacy was divided. Antipopes had quite frequently
been set up by the external intervention of Holy Roman emperors, for
example. But, never had a college disowned and delegitimized its own
election to start a new one. Close to two generations of the faithful lived
with and accommodated themselves to a double and even triple papacy.
But eventually unity was restored when the Council of Constance
(1414–1418) elected Martin V as sole pope recognized by all.
This essay will dwell not on the Schism per se, as much as focus
on its rhetoric and the consequences of its actors using the language of
usurpation (intrusus). I will argue that the use of this kind of vocabulary
during the Schism may have facilitated a slip into the rhetoric of tyrannicide, and may have incited it. I will suggest that the climate and rhetoric
of the Schism may have led John the Fearless to rationalize tyrannicide
against his cousin, Louis of Orléans.3 In a circuitous way, I will also propose that the rhetoric of usurpation during the Schism may have in turn
allowed the Council of Constance to maintain powerful oversight over
the pope. In his defense, Burgundy argued that, first, it is permissible to
kill a tyrant; second, the Duke of Orléans was a tyrant; and, third, the killing of Orléans was thus permissible. When it came time to condemn the
logic of this assertion—it is permissible to kill a tyrant—the Council of
Constance tergiversated on many procedural points, but did not condemn
the syllogism. By equivocating on tyrannicide did the council leave itself
open to accept papacide?
General reflection about legitimacy and quality of governance was
bound to happen when two popes ruled Christianity. During the Schism,
religious and secular authorities contemplated the means of responding to
illegitimacy with one aim, restoring unity: The self-explanatory so-called
way of force and warfare; the way of cession with a withdrawal of obedience; and the way of council with the deposition of a pope or two by a
general council, or a pope’s self-imposed resignation.4 The way of council
included a huge caveat, that of finding the legitimate authority that would
call the council. These were the respective “ways” chosen by ecclesiastics
and princes. Though in hindsight we now know that a council did solve the
Schism, the question of violence against an unjust ruler lingered throughout
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the period, and was effectively used in the early years of the Schism (the
so-called via facti), and in the secular world for the 1399 deposition of
Richard II of England (and his eventual murder), and the violent murder of
Louis of Orléans in 1407, upon which I will particularly focus.
It is somewhat easy to consider political murder, especially that of a
so-called “tyrant,” part of the late medieval zeitgeist. From the mayhem of
Italian city-states, to the deposition of Richard II (1367–1400), and John
the Fearless’s own murder in 1419, it seems that a narrative of just retribution surrounded proponents of unseating despotic rulers.5 The legitimacy
of killing an unjust ruler, tyrannicide, was debated both in light of the “non
occidere” Christian injunction, as well as how unjust rule was defined.6
Anna Lisa Merklin Lewis summarizes medieval views most clearly:
In medieval discussions of tyranny a distinction was made between
two types: tyranny quoad executionem referring to the rule of a bad
king or despot with proper title to the throne, and tyranny quoad
titulum, referring to a usurper. Virtually all medieval theorists
believed that a usurper could be killed legitimately by anyone,
although some commentators argued that killing should be a last
resort. However, they stated that even though a usurper lacked the
right to rule, the consent of the people would eventually give him
legitimacy and confer on him the right to demand obedience from
his subjects.7

A key thinker of the fourteenth century, Bartolus de Sassoferrato
(1313–1357), drew a sharp distinction “between power unlawfully
acquired and power unlawfully exercised.”8 More simply, he differentiated
between the ones who held power “ex defectu tituli” and “ex parte exercitii,”
that is, between usurpers and despots.9 This approach seems to have been
somewhat counter to that of Thomas Aquinas. According to John Finnis,
In the writings of his last period, however Aquinas seems to have
lost interest in the contrast between usurpers and other kinds of
tyrant. In either kind of tyranny, the injustice of tyrannical exercises
of authority renders them devoid of authority in the conscience
of the subject and gives the tyrant the moral status of a brigand.
Aquinas’ thesis (not denied in his late writings) that the tyrant can
be killed by public authority (as the Emperor Domitian was put
to death by the Roman senate) stands and falls with his theory of
capital punishment. If one sets that aside, as it seems one should,
there remains considerable scope for acts of war against the leader or
leaders of a regime which is not merely tyrannical but violent, and
who cannot otherwise be stopped from pursuing their oppression.10
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Bartolus’s On Tyranny, composed some thirty years before the initiation of the Schism, moved away from Aquinas’s harshness and was addressed
to secular rulers, but could still make popes and clerics squirm in their seats,
especially after 1378. Bartolus’s definition of a usurper was one who was
“ex defectu tituli,” who governed arbitrarily, was of a proud spirit, non jure
principatur, who lacked a sound title, had “been chosen unlawfully,” was
“crowned without being elected,” and “did not rule according to law.”11 This
form of tyrant wallowed in pride (superbia) and had usurped power from
“regular, established government.”12 As we will see, a usurper did not need
to be named tyrant to be recognized as one. Thus, during the Schism, either
obedience could argue that Bartolus’s definition fitted either pope.
In his Paragraph Thirteen, Bartolus asks,
What is a manifest tyrant by defect of title in a commonwealth?
My answer is: One who rules there openly without a lawful title, as
is evident from our previous definition. This may happen in divers
ways. First, if the city or fortified place (castrum) in which he lives
has not the right to choose its own ruler, and one acts there as ruler,
he is a tyrant because he is ruling contrary to law, and he is subject to
the lex Julia majestatis. The same is true if an official, after his term
of office has expired, continue in it against the will of him who has
the right of decision (ad quem spectat) [probably the overlord].13

Again, ruling “openly without a lawful title” is an accusation that could be
made against either pope by the other.
By the end of the fourteenth century, tyranny was defined and associated with usurpation or illegitimate taking of power.14 According to
Guenée, Bartolus de Sassoferato broke from all the various past definitions
of a tyrant when he defined the tyrant as “solely the one who had seized
government illegitimately. A few decades later, the Great Schism made
tyranny a daily concern of the clerics. The other pope, and soon the two
popes were in their eyes usurpers, tyrants who had appropriated power,
criminals who by maintaining the schism committed the highest of all
sins, divine lese-majesty.”15 Guenée intuitively understood that the Schism
had to affect any discussion of political legitimacy, and anyone who had
been “in/formed” by the crisis. However, Guenée offered no evidence for
this assertion. How prevalent, then, was the vocabulary of tyranny and
usurpation during the Schism?
There is little doubt that, from the start of the Schism, it was the
Clementist “lobby” that imposed the epithet “intrusus” upon Urban VI.
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But a word of caution is needed. The historiography is muddled with
biases. Obviously, Clementists then and later had to rationalize their views
by demonizing the rival pope. If they found the election illegitimate, it
is logical that they would label the pope a usurper. Theodoric (Dietrich)
of Niem, a partisan of Urban VI, describes their effort at debunking the
pope. 16 Clementists made their first public attack, uttering the word
“usurper” during a sermon. 17 The anonymous Clementist author that
Baluze chose as his “second biographer” for Pope Gregory has no qualms
about liberally using the word “usurper” throughout his text in speaking
for the rival obedience. He explains how shortly after the election, cardinals surreptitiously left Rome, “duo una die, unus alia, unus cum licentia, alter sine licentia,” despite Urban’s interdiction upon cardinals leaving
the city. They reached Anagni to initiate proceedings against this usurper
who wanted the papacy so badly that he did not fear using violence. 18
The author explains that the declaration of August 9 was pronounced in
Anagni Cathedral after a sermon. 19 The letter named the Apostolic seat
vacant, “apostolica Sede vacante,” and called the election illegitimate with
words like “nepharia intrusio in papatu.”20
A survey of Clementist narratives of the Schism reveals considerable evidence of the construction of Urban VI as usurper. From there it
is not difficult to imagine the slip into the language of tyranny.21 Baluze’s
first volume dedicated to the lives of the popes counts some sixty incidences of the word “intrusus” (usurper) attached to Bartolomeo Prignano.
The word appears nowhere before the first life of Gregory XI, the pope
whose death precipitated the initiation of the Schism. From then on the
word is used liberally where referring to Urban VI in phrases such as,
“ille non esset papa, sed intrusus;” 22 “Post paucos vero dies domini cardinales inceperunt exire Romam ... taliter quod nullus Gallicus remansit;
et omnes iverunt Anagniam, volentes procedere contra dictum intrusum;”23 and “Et post sermonem fecerunt legere per unum clericum declarationem contra intrusum.”24
A copy of a letter from Queen Joan of Naples in regards to Urban
employs similar language, “Sane credimus in toto regno nostro Sicilie et
in omnibus regnicolis nostrisque comitatibus Provincie et Forqualquerii
manifestum ... quod etiam ad partes totius Ytalie ac ad remotas et varias
mundi partes transivit notitia qualiter occupata Sedes apostolica contra
canonicas sanctiones per intrusum illum de Neapoli, olim episcopum
Barensem.” 25 Similarly, the word abounds in the lives of Clement VII,
where “dictum Bartholomeum intrusum” becomes a leitmotif.26
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Sometimes a touch of pseudo-reality adds to the construction of
illegitimacy. According to certain texts, Urban VI was not only a usurper
but he also behaved like someone who had no legitimacy. The author of
Gregory XI’s second life adds that the usurper “traveled (rode) like a fool,
without a cross or the Host preceding him, and without any of the cardinals, and went to a city, which is called Tivoli.” 27 No papal cortege would
have stooped to such level of ceremonial inadequacy; only a false pope
who did not know what he was doing could travel in such a manner.
Other documents, like the so-called Libri de Schismate, contain
depositions offered to the Spanish kings of Aragon and Castile to persuade
them to side with the Clementists, which the kings eventually did. The
depositions, edited in the 1940s by Michael Seidlmayer, contain a wide
array of information.28 The inquest into the 1378 election started in 1379,
and was pursued into 1380–1381, with some 150 individuals from all
ranks interrogated about what they saw during the election. Again, phrases
like “declaravit ... Bartholomeum intrusum et dom. papam Clemente in
papam septimum verum pastorem” abound. 29 In 1380, Cardinal Pierre
de la Vergne declared in the Libri de Schismate, “et alius B. est intrusus
et fuit positus per impressionem Romanorum”; similarly cardinal Pierre
Flandrin repeated, “Barensis esset intrusus.” 30 Petitioning Clement VII in
May 1381 to assent to Urban VI’s provision that allowed Spanish bishops
to keep the “fruits that they had levied,” the king of Castile asked “que
provea de nuevo et ratifique las provisiones de los obispados fechas por
el intruso, otrosi que los proveidos deillos non sean tenidos a tornar los
fruitos que han levado.”31
The language actually became so ingrained that any discussion of Urban
VI was categorized with the words “usurper.” He was the party or faction of
the usurper: “Ea que sunt facti pro parte intrusi.”32 Another example is found
in the following Libri’s chapter titles, “Informaciones tradite mag. Stephano
Fortis ad informandum dom. infantem Petrum de Aragonia super suis revelacionibus, ubi continentur multa mala de Roma, de Romanis et de intruso” or
“Secuntur ea que sunt facti in scismate principali pro parte intrusi.”33
For the Clementists, most of whom were French, “intrusus”
was the accepted denomination for the “illegitimate” pope, Urban VI.
Illegitimacy, of course, was a concept that varied with obedience. One can
find very few instances where the word was used by the Urbanists against
the Clementists. And, when it was used, it was not the direct “Clement
is a usurper,” but rather a more generic “opponent” who was defined as
“usurper,” and in certain cases, also “heretical.” For example, in May 1379,
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Urban addressed his legitimacy in a bull sent to the episcopate of Liège.
The bull states, “ad significandum et affirmandum sue electionis factum
tanquam canonicum et sue partis adverse hereticum et intrusivum.”34
The third volume of the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, covering the years 1350–1394, offers several examples of the use of “intrusus”
that fall in line with contemporary usage. From 1378 on, the university
described the papal election as non-canonical and Urban as a usurper of
his title.35 A 1379 letter of the king asked the university to declare that
Bartolomeo was “intrus ou sainct siège de Rome, et pape Clement VIIme
est vray pastour de l’eglise universelle.”36 Still, the fourth volume of the
Chartularium, which ranges from 1394 to 1452, shows no instances of the
word “intrusus” linked to Urban, who died in 1389, or to his successors.
This could mean that some of Bartolus de Sassoferrato’s legal opinions,
namely that an illegitimate ruler can gain legitimacy with the acquiescence
of his followers, may have gained ground with the recognition of the two
obediences.37 One pope may have been a usurper, but his obedience gave
him legitimacy.
The French cardinals’ insistence on using strong wording facilitated
a slide of vocabulary from “usurper” to “tyrant.” It was in a sense a way
to “demonize” the other pope. While the word “tyrannus” itself was not
employed for the “illegitimate” pope, the association of “fear” with “usurpation” led readers down that path. As Bartolus had stated, a usurper
who gained his title by fear was a tyrant. Edited by Louis Gayet, depositions taken by representatives of the Spanish king insist on fear during
and especially after the election.38 For the French, fear was the ground on
which the election had been uncanonical. For example, the Cardinal de la
Vergne states,
on Easter, I assisted in the coronation of so-called Bartholomew
[note that he is not named pope] and I rode throughout town with
the other cardinals because I could not act any other way, and I
feared that if I showed repugnance in doing so the Romans would
have put me to death. And so, everything I did in relation to him
during that conclave, and after, I did for fear of death, otherwise I
would not have. I never had the intention of approving what had
been done with him, nor of giving him any rights to the papacy.39

The Bishop of Assisi knew from conversation with Roman officials that if the cardinals were to renege on the election, “they and their
servants would be put to death. This was known throughout Rome.”40
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Depositions show that Roman militiamen were warning the French not
to utter any words against the validity of Urban VI’s election, or “that
he had been elected and crowned by force and violence. He is pope, all
hold him as such and obey him, and that’s enough for us. He is pope, one
must not doubt it, because if anyone would dare question the election,
the Romans would certainly cut him to pieces, and his ear would perhaps
be the largest chunk left of him.”41
Fear had impeded a canonical election, as the cardinals make clear
in their August 2 and 9 declarations: “Officials compelled the cardinals
to elect a Roman or at least an Italian to ensure that the curia remained
at Rome. [...] They added that the cardinals had to declare publicly before
the whole people that they would comply with the wishes of the population in order to avoid grave perils and danger. [...] They believed that all, or
at least the ultramontane cardinals, would have been slain, if one of them
had not had the idea of announcing to the people that they had elected the
Cardinal of St. Peter.”42
Thus, for the generation of thinkers born before or during the
Schism, violence and illegitimacy impeded just rule and Christian unity,
and solutions were needed. Options were laid out and one of them could
be removal of the usurper by violence if necessary. This is the intellectual
landscape that produced Jean Petit, the architect of the justification of the
murder of Louis of Orléans,43 in which he states, “My third truth is, That
it is lawful for any subject, without any particular orders from any one, but
from divine, moral, and natural law, to slay, or to cause to be slain, such
disloyal traitors; I say it is not only lawful for anyone to act thus in such
cases, but it is also meritorious and highly honourable, particularly when
the person is of such high rank that justice cannot be executed by the sovereign himself. I shall prove this truth by twelve reasons, in honour of the
twelve Apostles.”44 Would he have used the same defense if the Schism had
not happened? And, taken to the extreme, could these words also incite
papacide?
The “Murder of the Rue Vieille du Temple” remains a marker of
French history, a medieval equivalent of the shot heard around the world. It
is in that street, now in the heart of the Marais district, that on November
23, 1407, Louis of Orléans, brother of “mad king” Charles VI of France,
rode unknowingly into a deadly trap. Returning from visiting his sister-in
law Isabeau of Bavaria, who had just lost her newborn child, and making
his way from the Hotel Barbette to the king’s royal residence, Louis was
assaulted by a large group of men who literally hacked him to death. A few
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days later, while the murder was under investigation, the duke of Burgundy,
John the Fearless, came forward and openly confessed that in a moment
of weakness he had ordered the assassins to strike. He had done this some
three days after having achieved a truce with Orléans.45
The combination of perjury and murder brought consternation to
the nation. But in a serendipitous moment Burgundy embraced his decision
and defended it. He rationalized his gesture by accusing Louis of treason and
lese-majesty, arguing that he had acted in the interest of king and nation.
He organized a campaign aimed at justifying his action by hiring a famously
eloquent theologian, Jean Petit, to plead his case in front of the court and
to disseminate his defense throughout France, Burgundy, Flanders, and anywhere people were willing to listen.46 A feeble Charles VI seemed to have
acquiesced to his defense. But this left Valentina Visconti, Orléans’s widow,
and their sons, especially Charles of Orléans, thirsty for revenge.
On September 11, 1408, Thomas du Bourg, Abbot of Cerisy, publicly attacked Burgundy’s defense on several grounds. Claiming the king’s
justice, he rebuked Petit and denied the so-called tyranny of Orléans. Like
many of his contemporaries, he argued that justice was the backbone of
peace and needed to be rendered fairly. And thus, after much equivocation, on March 9, 1409, the Peace of Chartres sealed the renewed “friendship” that united Orléans’s heirs to Burgundy. Most knew that the peace
would not last, especially when Burgundy managed to again control the
king. After his mother’s death in December 1408, Charles of Orléans
buttressed his forces in 1410 by marrying Bonne of Armagnac, who was
granddaughter of the Duke Berry, but, most importantly, daughter of the
formidable Constable of France, Bernard of Armagnac, friend of Louis,
and a great military leader. The Armagnac/Orléans party was born.
As early as March 1411, Charles of Orléans asked the University
of Paris to condemn Petit’s Justification, but gained no results. Petit
died in July 1411 but his words lived on. Paris suffered through the proBurgundian Cabochien revolt of 1413, and it is perhaps during that time
that the renowned theologian Jean Gerson decided that Petit and his
defense were wrong: the defense disseminated errors that were false, subversive, and scandalous, that caused ills to France, and, as such, were worth
refuting. Thus was born Gerson’s obsession with rebutting the Justification.
In September 1413, he drew from Petit’s Justification seven clauses that he
hoped to see condemned by the University of Paris. Between November
1413 and February 1414, Gerson faced opposition on the accuracy of his
interpretation of Petit at a “Council of Faith” set up to discuss the issue.
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His seven assertions were deemed exaggerated, and were revised to (ironically) nine. Finally, on February 23, 1414, the university condemned the
nine assertions.47 On February 25, copies of the Justification were burned
in front of Notre Dame.48
Still, the opening of the Council of Constance in November 1414
offered the Duke of Burgundy the occasion to renew his offensive. He
brought his case forward to the council, and Gerson followed. But the
appeal was somewhat limited in that it “had only to consider whether or
not the Paris assembly had been entitled to form an opinion unilaterally
on the heretical character of Petit’s ideas and not whether that opinion
was in and of itself justified.”49 The debate came to a close on January 11,
1416, when the council voted on the nine assertions: twenty-six members
condemned them and fifty-one did not. The council’s rationale was simple: the assertions did not concern faith so were not judiciable by that
body. On January 15, 1416, the three cardinals in charge of the affair
annulled the Paris sentence of February 23, 1414. Orléans and Gerson
had lost their battle in Constance and were left with a limited victory in
Paris. On September 16, 1416, the French Parliament defended advocating tyrannicide as permissible without judgment, and forbade the copying
and publication of the Justification.50
The historiography of the Petit affair is meager. When the
Justification is mentioned, it remains a piece of propaganda, a moment in
Orléans/Armagnac-Burgundy factionalized politics. It is rarely analyzed
on its own terms.51 It is, above all, woven into the fabric of French politics
and its political implications are considered above its moral, theological,
and doctrinal overtones.52 When it is discussed in its conciliar context it is
usually framed around Gerson’s ideological obsession.53
The council did in fact debate the question in depth. Alfred Coville,
Petit’s foremost historian, remains perplexed and ponders why it occupied
such a central place at the Council of Constance. Coville states,
In Constance, the Jean Petit Affair held a disproportionate place
when one thinks that the council aimed at re-establishing union
in the church, at restoring the papacy, at judging heresies way
more serious than this case, like Jean Huss’, Jérôme of Prague’s,
and Wyclif ’s, and finally at reforming the church. One can gauge
the importance of the affair externally when perusing the number
of manuscripts that hold deliberations of the council focused on
that topic: 380 folios for the official transcript of the deliberations
… 500 folios for the personal copy of the bishop of Arras, Martin
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Porée ... and 668 columns in-folio of Gerson’s works ... and by the
important complements offered by H. Finke in his Acta concilii
Constanciensis.54

Still, the council refused to take a firm stand on Petit’s assertions. It
argued on procedure but never deliberated on the foundation of the
Justification: is it permissible to commit tyrannicide for the greater good?
It provided a diluted, anti-climactic “procedural” response, regardless of
Jean Gerson’s robust attacks and quest for conclusion. Did the council
have ulterior motives?
Discussing inquisitorial processes at the council, Sebastián
Provvidente argues “that in the case of the inquisitorial processes led by
the Council of Constance a close association can be ascertained between
inquisitorial practices and the consolidation of conciliar authority within
the ecclesiastical ordo iudicarius.”55 Following the argument presented by
Philip Stump on the reforms of the Council, Provvidente quotes Stump:
“‘If the council could condemn abuses of papal power in a reigning pope,
it could presumably also take action to prevent those abuses by limiting
the exercise of papal power in the future’.”56 Provvidente further insists on
the importance of discussions surrounding “the council’s potestas executiva and its at least contingent consolidation as the ultimate hierarchical
instance of the church in possession of the clavis potestatis.”57 Referring to
the council’s debate surrounding the condemnation of Wyclif, he presents
Pierre d’Ailly’s affirmation that “condemnation should be made in the
name of the council since concilium est maius papa cum sit totum, et papa
sit pars eiusdem [the council as a whole is greater than the pope and the
pope is a part of the council].”58 Provvidente concludes that even after the
election of a single pope the council attempted to consolidate its power:
“Indeed it is through judicial praxis that the council sought to affirm
its own iurisdictio and demonstrate its potestas executiva as the ultimate
instance within the church ordo iudicarius.”59
If we accept that after Haec Sancta the council flexed its conciliar
muscles, I would suggest that the lack of response to the Petit affair may
suggest that the council wished to keep its options open. When the council did not firmly condemn an apology of tyrannicide after a thorough and
lengthy review, it could intimate to any future papabile that he needed to
behave because the “Petit option” (and it is terribly tempting to call it the
“nuclear option”) was always available. To be clear, the council had condemned Quilibet tyrannus on July 6, 1415, which states that “Any tyrant
can and ought to be killed, commendably and meritoriously, by any vassal
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or subject, even by secrets, plots and subtle blandishments or flatteries,
despite whatever oaths or confederations between them, and without
waiting for a judicial sentence or mandate from anyone.”60 The council did
not, however, condemn Licitum est, which limited “the legitimate targets
of tyrannicide to those who are actively conspiring against the physical
well-being of the king, and who have such great power that they cannot be
brought to justice any other way.”61 Did Petit’s Justification face the church
with a reality that it did not want to face? Or did the Council purposefully embrace that reality?
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Baronio, Cesare, Domenicus Giorgi, Joannes Dominicus Mansi, Antonius Pagi,
and Odoricus Rinaldi. Annales ecclesiastici Caesare Baronio, 37 vols. Paris:
Ex typis consociationis Sancti Pauli, 1538–1780.

208   Joëlle Rollo-Koster

Boutier, Jean. Étienne Baluze, 1630–1718: Érudition et pouvoirs dans l’Europe
classique. Limoges: PULIM, 2008.
Brincat, Shannon K. “‘Death to Tyrants’: The Political Philosophy of Tyrannicide—
Part I.” Journal of International Political Theory 4 (2008): 212–40.
Cable, Martin John. “Cum essem in Constantie … ”: Raffaele Fulgosio and the
Council of Constance 1414–1415. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
Chatelain, Emile and Heinrich Denifle. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis:
Sub auspiciis consilii generalis fac. Parisiensium, 4 vols. Paris: Delalain,
1889–1897.
Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, contenant le règne de Charles VI., de 1380
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Dispensing Against the Apostle
John Wyclif and the Canonists
Ian Christopher Levy

A

CCORDING TO JOHN WYCLIF IT IS THE PREVAILING
OPINION among the canon lawyers of his day that if anyone is pope
he is thereby faultless (impeccabilis). And so it is that whatever the pope
ordains is just since his letters may even possess greater authority than
Holy Scripture. What is more, these canonists claim that the Gospel is
not to be believed except on the pope’s authority. It is for the pope both to
interpret Scripture and to explain its application. So great is his power it
is said that he can render Holy Scripture heretical and make Catholic even
what contradicts the Christian faith itself.1 In this same vein, if phrased
slightly differently, Wyclif will complain of papal decretals being placed
on par with the Gospel Books and surpassing the Epistles of Paul. Thus
the canonists assert the right of the pope to correct the Gospel and dispense against the Apostle. The current situation is so dire, laments Wyclif,
that any theologian who would dare confine the pope’s authority to a solid
scriptural foundation is now labeled a heretic.2
Although Wyclif often painted the canonists with a broad rhetorical brush, there is some substance to what he recounted. Their affirmations
of papal power, despite numerous caveats and conditions, could seem startling at first glance. Wyclif had a great deal to say about the late medieval
papacy in its many facets, but this essay will concentrate on the pope’s
authority to grant dispensations, which would appear to contradict the
teachings of Holy Scripture. Specifically, we will examine Wyclif ’s reaction to the pope’s aforementioned right to “dispense against the Apostle.”
In this case Wyclif was directly engaged with one canonist in particular: Johannes Teutonicus, compiler of the Glossa Ordinaria on Gratian’s
Decretum, whom Wyclif often designates simply as the “glossator.”

The Authority of the Pope to Dispense
In his Decretum Gratian had defined dispensation as a merciful relaxation
of the severity of discipline granted for reasons of usefulness or necessity.3
For Gratian and the later decretists the Roman pontiff claims the right to
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dispense in his unique role as “lord of the canons.” He alone has the power
both to make and change the law in addition to interpreting the law and
granting exceptions.4 Yet even as the decretists deduced from the pope’s
supreme legislative power his authority to dispense, they did acknowledge
limits. The pope could not change or relax the law arbitrarily or without
cause, nor could he do damage to the fundamental order and well-being
of the church, otherwise known as the “status ecclesiae.” Hence although
Johannes Teutonicus, in his Glossa Ordinaria, allowed for relaxation of
the common law done with knowledge by the one who has the right to
dispense, he also insisted that no dispensation might be permitted to
deform the state of the church.5
The parameters of the pope’s power to dispense were tested with
regard to lawful ordinations. Gratian had discussed at length the so-called
rule of the Apostle (regula Apostoli) laid down by Saint Paul in his First
Epistle to Timothy and in his Epistle to Titus. Here Gratian addressed
central questions regarding who is eligible to ascend to which grade of
orders; whether or not a man can be restored to his order after having
sinned; and which sins constitute grounds for removal from office.6 In 1
Timothy, the Apostle Paul stated that a bishop should be “the husband of
one wife” (1 Tim 3:2), and applied this rule to deacons a few verses later
(1 Tim 3:12). Then in the Epistle to Titus (1:6), he laid it down also for
presbyters. So it was that the men seeking these offices could not be twice
married (the presumption being that they had remarried as widowers).
Three canons in the Decretum were devoted, however, to specific
instances in which the pope seems to have acted contrary to the aforementioned “rule of the Apostle.” These canons, which were attributed (erroneously) to Pope Martin I, formed the basis of further discussion among the
canonists, not simply regarding orders, but more broadly papal prerogative in handling irregular cases. According to Si subdiaconus (D. 34 c. 17),
if a subdeacon takes a second wife he should henceforth be counted
among the ranks of the lectors and porters. Gratian in his own comments
found some flexibility here as he determined that in cases of necessity the
twice-married man can be promoted to the rank of subdeacon. 7 Gratian
seems to have secured this view on the basis of the following canon,
Lector (D. 34 c. 18). This canon states that if a lector takes as his wife the
widow of another he must remain in that office and not be promoted.
Yet the text goes on to say that in cases of necessity he could rise to subdeacon, although no further; and the same is said of the twice-married
man.8 Everything might appear to have been settled except for the fact that
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a third canon attributed to Pope Martin, Si quis viduam (D. 50 c. 8), holds
that the man who marries a widow must not be admitted to the ranks
of the clergy and should be deposed if he had been already ordained. 9
Now the same pope seems to have closed the door on all such ordinations
without allowing for flexibility in cases of necessity.
In his treatment of this topic, Stephan Kuttner points out that the
first generation of canonists believed that the Apostle Paul’s rules applied
only to major orders. Hence, in the case of the subdeacon (D. 34, c. 17),
the pope was not actually dispensing “contra apostolum;” he was merely
granting a dispensation from positive law. And if it seemed that Pope
Martin was contradicting his own canon (D. 50, c. 8), Huguccio argued
that in one case Martin was speaking “de iure” and in another “de dispensatione,” remarking that necessity can prompt a dispensation. Yet some of
the more conservative canonists believed that the subdiaconate did qualify as a major, or sacred, order. Pope Alexander III, moreover, declared
that twice-married men promoted to sacred orders must be deposed, since
it is not lawful to dispense against the Apostle on this matter. How then
could the canonists reconcile Pope Martin’s decisions with current practice? Here recourse was had to considerations of historical context. In
Martin’s time such a dispensation was lawful because the subdiaconate was
not yet reckoned a sacred order. According to Hostiensis, the canon Lector
(D. 34, c. 18) should be understood according to the state of the primitive church, although these days the pope could not easily (de facile) grant
such a dispensation to a subdeacon. Huguccio, for his part, maintained
that Martin never intended to legislate in this case, but was only offering
counsel to his successors. Yet, he said, the pope is nevertheless not bound
by Martin’s decrees; in fact, the pope can dispense not only against his
predecessor but also against the Apostle. For by reason of his jurisdiction
every “apostolicus” is greater than the “apostolus.” So it is that the pope
can dispense against the Apostle in all matters except those that pertain to
faith and salvation. Hostiensis followed this line, noting that the one who
stands in the place of Peter is greater than Paul in matters of administration: “Quia ratione prelationis quilibet apostolicus est maior quam fuerit
apostolus.” Even were Saint Peter himself to prohibit something, the pope
would still not be bound inasmuch as equal has no authority over equal,
a principle that had been enunciated by Pope Innocent III (X. 1.6.20).10
By the thirteenth century such discussions turned on the papal
fullness of power (plenitudo potestatis), which was extended to cover the
pope’s supreme legislative authority and appellate jurisdiction. In his
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decretal Quanto personam (X 5.39.31), Innocent III made the case that
only the pope could approve an episcopal translation on the grounds that
God alone could dissolve the bond of marriage between a bishop and his
flock; and that this divine authority had been granted by Christ to Peter
and his successors. According to Innocent, “the pope has this authority
because he does not exercise the office of man, but of the true God on
earth.” Later jurists built upon this principle as they outlined the breadth
of papal authority. Thus when Goffredus of Trano glossed Quanto personam he determined that, as God’s vicar, the pope stands above the law,
such that he is free to dispense against the Apostle (ipse dispensat contra
apostolum).11 Pope Innocent IV took matters beyond the Pauline Epistles
as he claimed that the pope could also dispense from the obligations of the
Gospels, although he qualified this assertion noting that it applied only to
the letter (verba) rather than the spirit (mentem) of the text. Along these
lines, Guido de Baysio asserted that the pope could dispense from the
evangelical counsels, although not the precepts and prohibitions. There
were always limits, therefore, placed on the papal authority to dispense.12

Wyclif ’s General Position on Canon Law
John Wyclif was a theologian by trade, a Master of the Sacred Page (magister sacrae paginae), and, like many of his fellow theologians in the late
Middle Ages, he was distrustful of canon lawyers and their expanding
influence throughout the church. This is not to say that Wyclif discounted
papal legislation and canon law out of hand. He did concede to the papacy
the right to formulate statutes designed to promote the greater welfare
of the church. And whenever popes do institute such laws they ought to
be accepted, so long as they do not prove contrary to Holy Scripture. Yet
it was surely blasphemous to imagine that such decrees, simply on the
grounds that they are issued by the pope, might then claim equal authority
with the Gospel.13 Hence Wyclif declared that he would accept only those
canons that could be considered explications of the divine law already
revealed in Scripture. Actually, says Wyclif, canon law at its best is just an
abbreviated form of divine law, although it has been corrupted over time
by spurious teachings.14
Wyclif was adamant that papal authority must always be kept
within clearly defined limits, which the canonists, with their exuberant
claims made on behalf of the Roman pontiff, often seemed to overstep.
For, given that a sitting pope can lapse into heresy, according to Wyclif—a
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possibility that canon law itself admits—his constitutions could not possibly be placed on par with Holy Scripture. Granted, there may be some
Catholic principles contained within papal decrees that do possess the
full authority of Scripture, but then such authority will rest upon their
having been confirmed by Christ the Truth, not for having been asserted
by the pope.15 For Wyclif, therefore, the pope possesses a purely subsidiary authority as promulgator of the Divine Law already revealed to the
Church in Holy Scripture.
At the heart of these questions of authority is the principle of
authorship; a text is only as authoritative as its author. Wyclif would rely
upon the classic argument made by theologians in asserting their superiority over the canonists: the former study a divinely inspired text whereas
the latter read documents authored by men. Directly authorized by God,
says Wyclif, Holy Scripture must be of infinitely greater authority than all
the papal decretals, since the latter are mere human creations.16 Exceeding
all human traditions in both authority and subtlety, the sacred canons
of Scripture thereby form an absolute standard by which all ecclesiastical legislation will have to be judged. 17 No matter what the lawyers may
say, Wyclif was confident that the Decretum itself supports his case, as he
appealed to the canons in Distinction 9 to the effect that Holy Scripture
holds a place of unique preeminence in the church. Thus to imagine that
papal decrees could achieve the truth and certitude of Scripture would
be to exalt their papal authors to the heights of Christ himself. In fact,
the inherent instability of papal legislation would appear to undercut its
claims to authority: an endless procession of contradictory bulls with each
new one revoking the effects of the last.18
Even if Wyclif does not call for the abrogation of canon law wholesale, all legislation will have to be brought into conformity with the only
true law: the Law of Christ (lex Christi). So it was that, in the opening
years of the Great Western Schism, Wyclif declared that the faithful are
not bound to acknowledge either Urban VI or Clement VII except insofar
as these claimants legislate in accordance with the Law of Christ. In fact, it
would appear that God had ordained the Schism, says Wyclif, precisely in
order to demonstrate that the Law of Christ is the sole test of orthodoxy.19
For Wyclif, the Law of Christ is a distillation of Jesus Christ’s own life
and teaching, succinctly summed up by Saint Paul: “love is the fullness
of the law” (Rom 13:10). Civil and ecclesiastical laws, therefore, are only
beneficial to the extent that they promote this perfect law of charity.20 The
authority of this law, moreover, is grounded in the Person of Jesus Christ.
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Thus one does not first obey the law only then to be drawn up towards its
creator. Rather, according to Wyclif, one first loves the law-giver himself
and thereupon loves his law, which is the perfect expression of his will.21
Wyclif ’s attacks on the superfluity of papal legislation looked to
his opponents like an attempt to stifle the legitimate development of
authoritative texts necessary for the governance of the church. If one
were to follow Wyclif, so the argument runs, it would seem that the Four
Gospels should have sufficed, thus rendering the letters of the Apostle
superfluous and even sinful. Indeed, it would seem that all the commentaries of the saints, along with the laws of the church, should likewise be
reckoned harmful. For Wyclif, the fatal mistake of such an argument is
its assumption that Holy Scripture and canon law might be placed on
equal footing, as though the growth of the former justifies that of the
latter. The inspired authors of Scripture, says Wyclif, added books little
by little for the good of the church in order to explicate previously hidden truths. The Holy Spirit himself determined that the Pauline Epistles,
Acts of the Apostles and Apocalypse would complement the Gospels. It
belonged to the divine plan, therefore, that books be added progressively
to the canonical collection for a defined period of time. The problem
now, though, is that Antichrist and his disciples daily fabricate new documents designed to take their place alongside Holy Scripture as co-equal
authorities, the implication of which is that Scripture is deficient and
thus in need of supplementation.22

The Glossa Ordinaria on the Papal Authority
to Dispense
Throughout his later works Wyclif demonstrated not only a familiarity, but even a facility, with canon law and the works of the canonists.
Hostiensis and Guido de Baysio, for instance, were frequently cited and
often at length. Professional misgivings aside, engagement with the canonists could hardly have been otherwise for a university theologian in
the late fourteenth century, for the very fact that canon law reached into
virtually every aspect of Christian life. Just as Wyclif read a glossed Bible,
so when it came to reading Gratian’s Decretum he would have turned to
Johannes Teutonicus’s Glossa Ordinaria. If we are to understand Wyclif ’s
responses to Johannes, sometimes presented in abbreviated form, it
is best to begin by examining directly those texts from his Gloss that
framed the debate over papal authority to dispense against the Apostle
(contra apostolum).
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First of all, with regard to Si subdiaconus (D. 34 c. 17), Johannes
noted that in this case Pope Martin had permitted the man to remain in
minor orders “by way of dispensation, since by common law he should
forfeit his clerical privilege.”23 Then, commenting on Lector (D. 34 c. 18),
Johannes observed that if anyone in minor orders takes a widow for a wife
or has been twice married, he can be promoted to subdeacon by way of
dispensation (ex dispensatione), although in other cases not. What is of
special note, however, is the comment that follows: “So it is that the pope
dispenses against the Apostle, as he does here and in the canon Presbyter.”24
When commenting on Presbyter (D. 82, c. 5) directly, Johannes observed
that in the time of the Apostles (in tempore apostolorum), clerics were
deposed for manifest fornication. Yet the holy fathers gathered at the
council of Gangra tempered this line of severe discipline. There they established that a repentant presbyter who freely confessed his crime could be
restored to his earlier position following a ten-year penance. According to
Johannes, some understand the ruling outlined in this canon as a dispensation (de dispensatione) while others take it as a matter of law (de iure),
such that no one may be deposed for fornication today unless he perdures
in that crime.25 As it is, Johannes finds here in Presbyter further support
for the principle enunciated previously in Lector, inasmuch as “the council
dispenses against the Apostle in matters of punishment.”26
A central canon in Wyclif ’s arsenal supporting scriptural authority
over that of papal legislation was Sunt quidam dicentes (C. 25 q. 1 c. 6).
In fact, this was one of the most pivotal canons to emerge in the debates
among theologians and canonists, since it touched directly upon papal
authority relative to Holy Scripture and the Church Fathers. This canon
begins by affirming that the pope is certainly entitled to make new laws,
although it maintains that in those instances where Christ, the apostles, or
the holy fathers have already clearly defined something, the pope is obligated to defend those precedents. And, what is more, were the pope to
attempt to undermine apostolic doctrine, such an error would deprive his
judgment of any force. Salvation consists in not deviating from the statutes of the fathers and thereby preserving the rule of faith.27
It is clear, therefore, that the authority conceded to Holy Scripture
and apostolic teaching was regarded as sacrosanct. Indeed, Johannes noted
in his Gloss that if the pope attempted to issue a statute that contravened
the Gospels, Apostles, or Prophets he would stand convicted as a heretic.28
Yet this basic statement of principle had somehow to be squared with the
whole matter of lawful dispensations. For Johannes will then comment:
“Here it seems that the pope could not dispense against the Apostle or
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the Lord. How, then, did Martin dispense with the twice-married man
against the Apostle as we find in the canon Lector (D. 34 c. 18)?”29 As he
continued, Johannes recalled that one reads in Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5) that
the Council of Gangra had dispensed against the canons of the Apostles
that called for the deposition of a fornicating priest. What is more, the
pope appears to have dispensed against the Lord (contra Dominum) when
releasing subjects from their oaths and vows as we see in Iuratos (C. 15
q. 6 c. 4), even as Holy Scripture says, “You shall fulfill your vows to the
Lord” (Ps 76:11). Given all this, Johannes concluded: “The pope does dispense against the Apostle, but not in matters that pertain to the Articles
of Faith. And in the same manner he dispenses with respect to the Gospel,
by interpreting it.”30
Perhaps no single issue so defined Wyclif ’s reform agenda as the
call for clerical disendowment; private property does not befit those who
have been called to follow the poor Christ. Does canon law permit clerics to possess private property? This is the first question that Gratian deals
with in Case 12; and the answer seems to be that it does not: “That clerics are to possess nothing is commanded by many authoritative sources.” 31
As one might expect, however, the full answer is more complicated. In his
Gloss, Johannes noted that Gratian first proves that clerics should not have
property, only later to prove the contrary. Then, having cited sources on
both sides of this issue, Gratian had attempted to resolve the matter. But,
according to Johannes, he did not do a good job of it (more on this below).
In his own introduction to this question Johannes offered some guidance
that might help to reconcile the various competing texts. Generally speaking, clerics can indeed possess property. If, however, they have renounced
their property, whether tacitly or expressly, then they may no longer keep it.
Johannes admits that in the primitive church (ecclesia primitiva) all believers, whether clerics or lay, possessed no property of their own; for all goods
were held in common. Yet possession of property is lawful today. As such,
any canons that would appear to prohibit clerical ownership must either be
referring to the time of the primitive church; to those who have renounced
their goods; or they are speaking by way of a counsel rather than a precept.32

Wyclif ’s Response to the Gloss of Johannes
Wyclif ’s campaign for clerical disendowment was most fully spelled out
in his 1376 De civili dominio. Arguing that all goods of the clergy should
be held in common apart from civil property rights, Wyclif waded into
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Case 12 and the discussion surrounding the interpretation of its various
canons. Specifically, he addressed his opponents’ invocation of the canon
Episcopi de rebus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 19) that permits bishops to leave their
own property to their heirs, while ecclesiastical proceeds remain in the
right of the church. Here then, his opponents say, the distinction made
between the bishop’s own goods and those of the church proves that clerics may possess private property. In response, Wyclif turned to Gratian’s
attempt to resolve this larger question when commenting on the canon
Praecepimus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 24), which states that the goods of the church
are in the power of the bishop. Gratian determined here that clerical property rights affirmed in various texts may be applied to Eastern bishops who
have wives and children; and also to some Westerners, who, as laymen or
in minor orders, had families before receiving sacred orders. To these men
is conceded the right to have goods of their own. But, says Gratian, those
who have been in religious life from childhood are not permitted to possess their own property. This resolution proposed by Gratian was all that
Wyclif needed to cement his case that clerical property is limited to use
alone, rather than civil ownership.33
Yet, as we touched on above, Johannes had specifically criticized
this attempt by Gratian to harmonize the conflicting canons. In the Gloss
on Praecepimus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 24) Johannes reminded the reader of his own
opening appraisal of Gratian’s efforts: “male solvitur.” Thus Johannes once
again affirmed that clerics can have property; contrary statements must
therefore be counsels, refer to the early church, or pertain to those who
had renounced their goods. 34 Wyclif was sure, however, that no correct
reading of the law could allow for clerical civil ownership. Making his case
he cited the comments of Guido de Baysio on the aforementioned Episcopi
de rebus (C. 12 q. 1 c. 19) to the effect that clerics are permitted use alone
rather than ownership of ecclesiastical goods. Guido, as Wyclif duly notes,
had proceeded to cite many canons to the effect that clerics may not claim
goods as their own, but must regard them as communal. Bishops therefore
function as dispensers, not owners, of ecclesiastical goods.35
Displeased as Wyclif may have been with Johannes’s curt “male
solvitur,” he was positively furious with his gloss on Dilectissimis (C. 12
q. 1 c. 2) wherein Pope Clement I, determining that the clergy were to
have only the common use of goods, said “we command you to obey the
teachings and examples of the apostles.” 36 Here Johannes had reduced
Clement’s “precept” (precipimus) to a word of advice (id est monemus
...), thereby loosening its strictures for future generations. Allowing for
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historical development in matters of ecclesiastical discipline, Johannes
granted that this may have indeed been a precept in the early church, just
as continence was also commanded. But to demand clerical disendowment today, said Johannes, would amount to deforming the state of the
universal church (deformare statum ecclesiae universalis).37
Wyclif was aghast at this accommodation; never has he heard such
an erroneous claim! Rather than introducing deformity, as Johannes
believes, the observation of this precept would conform the church to
the life of Christ and the apostles, and thus would constitute a beautiful
expression of moral conduct (non foret deformitas, sed morum formositas).
Perhaps, opines Wyclif, it is best to leave such matters to the theologians,
who have been taught by Christ, when it comes to preserving the “status ecclesiae.” That Johannes may have been a great doctor (magnus doctor) in his own discipline notwithstanding, Wyclif continues, one should
not trust him in matters of theology unless what he says is founded upon
Holy Scripture. The allowance of clerical civil property is clearly not so
founded; hence Wyclif ’s appeal to comments of Guido de Baysio on a separate canon, Nolite timere (C. 11 q. 3 c. 86): “However great the doctor,
I am not obliged to believe him unless his statement be proven through
authoritative Scripture.”38
Yet, in an effort to forge some consensus, Wyclif looked for ways
that Johannes’s gloss could be salvaged. Of note here is that Wyclif seems
less concerned with what Johannes intended than with what the text itself
might be construed to support. Here is a case where authorial intention
appears to be of secondary interest. “Whatever Johannes may have been
thinking” (quicquid senserit), says Wyclif, on closer inspection his comments might not imply the lawfulness of clerics as civil owners after all.
Rather, this gloss may mean that they are permitted to have certain goods
in their private ministry for the sake of distributing them to needy members of the church. A little further on Wyclif actually conceded Johannes’s
point that the holy doctors spoke of the renunciation of goods as an evangelical counsel. But this does not derail Wyclif ’s argument, due to the fact
that he reckons that all clerics—not just those in religious orders—are
obliged to observe the divine counsels across the board, most especially
poverty. “Every counsel of our abbot Jesus Christ,” according to Wyclif,
ought to be received by his fellow secular clerics as nothing less than a
precept. As Wyclif sees it, therefore, if one is discussing the “‘state of the
Church,’ it is more precisely the state of the primitive church (secundum
statum primeve ecclesiae) that must be preserved; this is the sole standard

JOHN WYCLIF AND THE CANONISTS   223

for clerical life into the present age.” 39 A few years later, in his De veritate sacrae scripturae, Wyclif similarly contended that neither historical
development nor papal dispensation (temporis variacio nec papalis dispensatio) can release priests from their obligation to follow the example of
Christ’s way of poverty. Wyclif has already, he says, proven this from Holy
Scripture, the testimony of the saints, and from multiple laws which state
that the goods of the church belong to the poor and are not subject to
clerical dominion.40
Within the debate over clerical property Wyclif ’s opponents had
also appealed to the canon Auctoritatem (C. 15 q. 6 c. 2), the central purpose of which was to confirm the pope’s authority to nullify an illicit vow.
His opponents, however, were primarily interested in another aspect of this
case. Clerics held captive had been forced to make vows alienating ecclesiastical goods to their captors. Having released them from the coerced
vows, Pope Nicholas thereupon urged these churchmen to recover the forfeited goods by means of both the spiritual and material sword. Wyclif,
in keeping with his bedrock principles of clerical poverty and disendowment, was not moved by this precedent. Clerics, he said, should not seek
such civil restitution in the law courts; instead, they ought to be content
to live by natural and evangelical law alone. Indeed, they should be willing
to suffer injury with patience. Thus, even as his opponents had appealed to
the freedom granted clerics under canon law to recover lost goods, Wyclif
looked to the words of the Apostle Paul: “Take heed lest your freedom
become a stumbling block to the weak” (1 Cor 8:9). And it is here that
Wyclif ran up against the Gloss on Auctoritatem, wherein Johannes took
the opportunity to assert the pope’s right to dispense against the Apostle.
Having canvassed a range of opinions regarding dispensations from vows,
Johannes concluded: “I say that [the pope] can indeed dispense against
natural law, although not against the Gospel or against the Articles of
Faith. Yet he does dispense against the Apostle [evinced in] Distinction
34, Lector and Distinction 82, Presbyter.”41
Reckoning this a dangerous principle articulated by “the glossator,”
as he refers to Johannes here, Wyclif called upon his fellow theologians to
resist such sweeping claims advanced by the canonists on behalf of papal
prerogative. The foundation upon which Wyclif ’s objection stands is the
plenary inspiration of Scripture, which brooks no chasm between different portions of the New Testament; they are all equally authoritative. It is
the Christological nature of Holy Scripture that guarantees full authority
to all of its parts; the whole of Scripture is replete with the voice of Christ.
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Wyclif regarded the Apostle’s determinations inviolable, precisely because
Jesus Christ himself was speaking through Saint Paul (in quo Christus
loquitur). Having raised the stakes in this way, Wyclif argued that if these
Pauline injunctions can be overturned, the Catholic faith itself will be
imperiled. Furthermore, to dispense against the Apostle, whose Epistles
belong to the biblical canon, would be tantamount to dispensing against
Holy Scripture itself. And that, in turn, would automatically invalidate
the papal dispensation. For it would then be proven false by virtue of its
opposition to Scripture, which is itself the indefectible source of divinely
revealed truth.42
In this same vein, as Wyclif observes further on, the Apostle Paul
himself declares that Christ is speaking through him (2 Cor 13:3). Christ
the Eternal Word speaks not only in the Gospels, therefore, but also in
the Apostle. Actually, according to Wyclif, the Apostle can claim equal
authority with the Four Gospels on the strength of the divine revelation he received when taken up into the third heaven (2 Cor 12:2). Here
again, therefore, if the pope could issue dispensations against the Apostle’s
directives, there would be no end to his authority over Scripture. Soon he
would be discounting the authenticity of the Epistles on the grounds that
the pope alone determines the canonical authority of the biblical books.
From there, surmised Wyclif, it is but a short leap to the pope dispensing
from Articles of Faith and declaring previous Catholic truths heretical.
No matter the exception Johannes makes for the Gospel and Articles of
Faith, therefore, once the pope is allowed to dispense against the Apostle
the entire garment of biblical and Catholic truth unravels.43
As Wyclif proceeded to critique Johannes’s argument, he turned to
the two aforementioned canons cited in support of the papal right to
dispense against the Apostle: Lector (D. 34 c. 18) and Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5).
Wyclif does not, in fact, find in these canons any contradiction of the
apostolic texts. This is an interesting turn of events, as Wyclif sets out to
secure in these instances canon law’s agreement with Scripture. In so
doing he will thereby weaken the case for the papacy’s right to dispense
against the Apostle, precisely by eliminating the apparent contradiction.
Wyclif observes that in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, the Apostle’s
law pertaining to the orders of deacon and bishop (and presbyter) are not
the subject of the canon Lector (D. 34 c. 18), which allows for promotion only to the level of subdiaconate. Of greater import, however, is the
case to be made on the basis of historical development. Even if Saint Paul
had claimed it is necessary for every cleric in each of the seven orders to
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be the husband of one wife—which, Wyclif notes, we do not have in our
codices—this dispensation would still not be contrary to the Apostle.
Granted that at the time of the apostles (pro tempore apostolorum) such
stipulations may well have been fitting, indeed even best practice. Yet later
on, as the church progressed (in processu ecclesiae), came the realization
that in cases of necessity it would be permissible to dispense with clerics
in these orders. Wyclif concludes that such a dispensation is not contrary
to, but actually consonant with, the words of the Apostle himself: “Let all
things be done honestly and according to order” (1 Cor 14:40). In other
words, such a dispensation would still be in keeping with the Apostle’s
teachings. Yet, as Wyclif knew, Johannes remarked in his gloss on Lector
that Pope Innocent III had determined that it is not lawful to dispense with
the twice-married (Nuper a nobis, X. 1.21.4) as had Pope Martin in Si quis
viduam (D. 50 c. 8). Wyclif, though, countered that Innocent was referring
to clerics in higher orders (supple quoad superiores), and so too Pope Martin
in Si quis viduam. The point being that, since these two papal prohibitions
did not apply to lower orders such as lector, there was never any dispensation against the Apostle’s own rule. Thus, proclaims a triumphant Wyclif,
when it comes to the interpretation of Lector, Johannes’s comments have
been revealed as baselessly incompetent (infundabliter inhercia).44
And so too with the canon Presbyter (D. 82 c. 5) on the matter of
clerical fornication. Although the “canons of the Apostles” do say that a
fornicator ought to be deposed, while Pope Sylvester (according to the
text) determined that he may be reinstated after a ten-year penance, Wyclif
sees no contradiction. For it is always the case that when a priest commits
an act of fornication he must be deposed from the state of the priesthood.
The only question is whether he can be reinstated following a suitable penance. Thus the decision, allowing for reinstatement after the fact, does not
thereby contradict the original apostolic ruling.45
It is interesting to note that some years later in his 1382/83 Trialogus,
Wyclif declared that in the primitive church (ecclesia primitiva) two orders
of clerics were sufficient, namely presbyter and deacon. Moreover, in the
time of the Apostle (in tempore Apostoli) presbyter and bishop were one
and the same; all of which Wyclif believes is made clear in 1 Timothy and
Titus. Indeed, that “profound theologian” Saint Jerome backs this up in
his commentary on Titus as recorded in the canon Olim (D. 95 c. 5). So
it is that by the faith of Scripture (ex fide scripturae) presbyters along with
the deacons who serve them seem to be sufficient. It was only Caesarean
pride that introduced all these other orders. Had they been necessary for
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the church it is rather strange, therefore, that Christ and the apostles never
made any mention of them. As it is, though, this multiplication of orders
is just another example of the exaltation of papal laws (papalia iura) above
Jesus Christ himself.46

Conclusion
Committed as he was to securing the authority of Holy Scripture against
papal encroachments, it is not surprising that Wyclif staked a lot on the aforementioned canon Sunt quidam dicentes (C. 25 q. 1 c. 6). Here is proof, he says,
that neither the pope nor an angel from heaven (cf. Gal 1:8) could dispense
against Holy Scripture. For if Scripture really is an infallible and necessary rule
of truth, no one could possibly be authorized to abrogate its determinations.47
Wyclif thus converts to his own purposes the general principle of the decretists,
that the right to interpret the canons belongs to the one who has the authority
to make them. Yet, as the pope is not himself the author of the Scriptures, he
does not have the power to interpret them anyway he likes. In fact, he must be
resisted in any attempt to distort their original divinely intended meaning.48
Wyclif knew, of course, that Johannes’s extensive gloss on Sunt
quidam dicentis ends up allowing for the pope to dispense against the
Apostle. In this case, therefore, Wyclif appealed over the head of the gloss
to the canon in its own right, which bears the true authority in this matter. If the pope cannot proceed against the sacred canons, as this text
makes clear, then by that rationale neither can he dispense against the
Apostle. Hence the canon itself makes the case against the very action that
Johannes was advocating in his Gloss. As Wyclif pressed his point, this
university theologian’s basic disdain for the lawyers was barely concealed.
“Having set their scythe in another man’s field,” these canonists (doctores
decretorum) are again revealed to be out of their league.49
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Henri Louis Charles Maret (1805–1884)
Last of the Conciliarists?
Francis Oakley

F

OR A FELLOW MEDIEVALIST LONG PREOCCUPIED
WITH THE COUNCILS OF CONSTANCE (1414–1418) and
Basel (1431–1449), and with the enduring conciliarist tradition, one of
Tom Izbicki’s most interesting contributions to our understanding of that
tangled stretch of ecclesiological history has been his willingness to reach
out beyond the conciliar epoch itself in order to track down the present
papalist reactions to Constance and to its historic superiority decree Haec
sancta (April 6, 1415). By so doing, he was able to highlight the impact
across time of the constantly changing theopolitical climate on the way in
which the conciliar epoch and the conciliarist tradition have been understood.1 In the context of a Festschrift, then, what better way of celebrating
his achievement as an historian than to follow his example and share his
willingness to step outside the perimeter of the species of home turf familiar to the late-medieval specialist?
In an effort to do precisely that, the step I propose to take is a rather
long one. It will take me forward beyond the silver age conciliarism of the
early-sixteenth century, beyond the renewed flurry of conciliarist writing evoked by the Venetian Interdict of 1606 and the contemporaneous
imposition of an oath of allegiance on English Catholic recusants, beyond
the traditional Gallicanism of Bossuet and Tournély in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as the flowering in the Germanies
of Febronian and Josephinist ideas, not to mention the contemporaneous
Anglo-Gallicanism prevalent in English Catholic recusant circles affiliated with the Cisalpine Club, all the way down, indeed, to nineteenthcentury France and the theopolitical strife that punctuated the decades
leading up to the assembly in 1870 of the First Vatican Council.2 When,
in his View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages, the English historian Henry Hallam had come in 1818 to write about the ending of
the Great Schism at the Council of Constance by the deposition of the
rival claimants, he spoke of “the Whig principles of the Catholic church”
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embodied in the decree Haec Sancta (asserting the jurisdictional superiority under certain circumstances of council to pope), and described that
decree as one of “the great pillars of that moderate theory with respect to
papal authority which ... is embraced by almost all lay men and the major
part of ecclesiastics on this [the northern] side of the Alps.” 3 Within little more than a quarter of a century, however, what he had had to say
was no longer true even of France, the traditional center of theological
Gallicanism, the country where the four articles of the 1682 Declaration
of the Gallican Clerg y, with their unambiguous affirmation of the
Constance decrees, had long loomed so large. Napoleon had embedded
those articles in the “organic articles” that he appended to his 1801 concordat with Pius VI along with the stipulation that they be subscribed
to by all French teachers of theology.4 And in many of the theological
and canonistic textbooks used in French seminaries down into the 1850s
adhesion to those articles was treated as a matter, at least, of “free opinion.”5 But things ecclesiological had begun to change already during the
years of Bourbon restoration. At that time, reacting sharply against the
old-style political Gallicanism of the French bishops of the day, the abbé
Felicité de Lamennais had struck out in a different direction. Increasingly
liberal in his politics, emerging as one of the leading intellectual voices of
his day, and anxious to guarantee the freedom of the church from state
control, he sought for a while to attain that end by evoking the balancing power of the papacy and embracing the ultramontane views that he
propagated with some success among the lower clergy.6 Ultramontane
sympathies notwithstanding, however, his theopolitical views proved not
to sit well with Gregory XVI (1831–1846) and, in the encyclical Mirari
vos (1832), they were to be condemned. That prompted Lamennais in the
following year to relinquish all his ecclesiastical functions and led him
thereafter to abandon at least the public profession of the Christian faith.
In the decades that followed, then, it was not to be Lamennais who
stood at the epicenter of the ecclesiological and theopolitical strife that rumbled on in France down into the mid and late nineteenth century. Instead it
was a churchman who was destined to be overshadowed, historically speaking, by such French leaders of the anti-infallibilist Minority at Vatican I as
Bishop Dupanloup of Orléans and Archbishop Darboy of Paris. As a result,
his name is largely forgotten today.7 Staunch affirmer of the principles of
1789 (rooted ultimately, he believed, in the verities of the Gospel), liberal
in his understanding of church no less than civil society, critical participant
in the conflicted process that eventuated in the publication of the Syllabus
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of Errors in 18648 and in his politics an advocate eventually of Christian
democracy, Mgr. Maret, the man in question, was the author of what has
well been described as “the sole French work that counts in matters ecclesiological since the time of Lamennais” and again, indeed, as “the most significant work of Gallicanism in the nineteenth century.”9 And the man himself
is certainly deserving of greater attention than our general church histories,
at least, have seen fit to accord him.10
Henri Louis Charles Maret, then. He was born in 1805, pursued
his seminary studies at Saint-Sulpice in the 1820s, was ordained priest
in 1830, appointed a professor of dogma in the Sorbonne Faculty of
Theology and as Dean of that Faculty in 1853, but was to find his nomination to the bishopric of Vannes blocked by Pius IX, who was wary of
his liberal views and Gallican proclivities. Maret’s appointment instead as
titular bishop of Sura in partibus infidelium, no more than a consolation
prize, proved however to be an important one in that it was to make him
eligible, some nine years later, to participate as a voting member in the
proceedings of the Vatican Council. And at that assembly he was to be the
leading French theologian in the ranks of the anti-infallibilist Minority.
In preparation for that council, moreover, and after a long period of study,
he submitted to the pope in 1869, and as a species of preparatory memorandum, his major piece of ecclesiological writing, the Du concile général
et de la paix religieuse. It was immediately greeted by a storm of hostile
commentary and, in the same year by way of response, he published also
his Le Pape et les Évêques: Défense du livre sur le concile général et la paix
religieuse.11 It is on what Maret has to say in these two works that I propose
to dwell here. I should note, however, that in the wake of the total rout of
his Gallican views at the council, the final definition of papal infallibility,
and the triumph of the view that “Ultramontanism,” as Cardinal Manning
was to put it, is nothing other than “Catholic Christianity,” 12 he had to
accede in 1871 to the pope’s demand that he back down from his earlier
commitments. That is to say, he had publicly to retract anything in his Du
concile général that might be contrary to the conciliar constitution Pastor
aeternus with its twin definitions of the pope’s primacy and his infallible
teaching authority.
Though by that retraction Maret was able to avoid the fate of
Döllinger and of extrusion into the outer darkness of heterodoxy, he
was more or less consigned henceforth to the ecclesiastical shadows. His
admiring friend and long-time secretary, Gustave Bazin, sought in a threevolume biography published in 1891 to preserve his memory, including
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helpfully in its pages many a pertinent unprinted document. But the work
itself is basically hagiographical in tone, and it is one that, by dint of tactical omissions and a careful minimizing of Maret’s Gallican proclivities,
contrived to position the man as nothing other than what would be viewed
in the post-Vatican I era as a sound and devoted son of the church.13 And
while, in 1927, É. Amann’s profile of Maret in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique is more balanced in its interpretation, it is interesting that
Amann clearly seemed to feel it necessary to devote considerable space
to the five propositions which Deschamps, archbishop of Malines, had
extracted from the Du concile général and drawn attention to as perhaps
worthy of censure.14
It was only in the late twentieth century, stimulated largely by the
rediscovery in 1959 of the bulk of Maret’s papers and also by the convocation of Vatican II, that more sympathetic studies began to appear.15 One
should not miss the fact that if the shadow of Vatican I had fallen athwart
Bazin’s earlier biographical efforts, that of Vatican II falls across some of
the more recent studies.16 And not always helpfully so. Evident in some of
their pages is a misleading (if understandable) tendency to align Maret’s
stance with the teachings of that subsequent council. Speaking of Maret’s
“consistent objective of promoting conciliation between the Church and
contemporary society,” Aubin exclaims: “Shades of Vatican II!” 17 While,
more improbably, Bressolette goes so far as to attempt to assimilate to Paul
VI’s establishment in 1965 of the Synod of Bishops Maret’s affirmation of
the Constance decree Frequens mandating the regular assembly of general
councils and providing for their automatic assembly should the pope fail
to comply with that mandate.18 Strained parallels are also drawn between
Maret’s much more radical understanding of the pope–episcopate relationship and the teaching on episcopal collegiality embedded in Lumen
gentium, Vatican II’s Constitution on the Church. So far as ecclesiology
goes, indeed, there is a tendency to position Maret as, for his own day,
something of an avant garde figure, a man born before his time. 19 Thus
Aubin can speak of “strains” of “theological Gallicanism ... [being] heard
again only a century later and then preferably camouflaged in contemporary
terms of collegiality.”20 Elsewhere, it is true, she exhibits some caution about
the matter of any alignment of Maret’s views with those of Vatican II. Her
caution is warranted. After all, Lumen gentium itself explicitly reaffirmed
Vatican I’s twin definitions of papal primacy and infallibility. It also made
it clear that, as head of the episcopal college, the pope alone could “confirm certain acts which are in no way within the competence of the bishops,”
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could proceed, “taking into consideration the good of the church” and
“according to his own discretion” in the setting up, encouraging and approving of collegial activity, and, “as supreme pastor of the church [could] exercise his power at all times as he ... [thought] best.” 21 Such a point of view
would have been wholly unacceptable to Maret. That being so, if we are to
understand the true significance of Maret’s ecclesiological commitments,
it seems clear that we need to be very careful about permitting twentiethcentury concerns to supervene too directly on our interpretative endeavor.
In effect, and as we read Du concile général, we need above all to identify
what Maret’s purpose was in writing that work, what, specifically, were the
ecclesiological commitments that gave it its driving force, and what were
the basic presuppositions that sustained those commitments.
Though Maret in 1869 submitted his two-volume work to Pius
IX as a memorandum intended to help forward the deliberations of the
upcoming Vatican council, the Du concile général itself is far more than an
occasional piece whose composition had been evoked by the convocation
of that council. As far back as 1848 Maret had begun to make the case for
the assembly of such a general council, one that, like its fifteenth-century
predecessors, would be charged with reforming the church “in head and
members.” He had long since become convinced of the need to reconcile
“the faith and the Church with everything that is true and legitimate in
science and modern society.” To that goal, he tells us in an unprinted autobiographical manuscript found among his papers, he had “consecrated his
life.”22 Confronted in the 1850s with the intensification of Ultramontane
pressures and by increasing Roman centralization and the interference
by the papal nuncio in the affairs of individual French dioceses,23 he had
committed himself across the course of eight to ten years of study in the
pertinent sources to the effort that was to eventuate in writing of Du concile général. “Little by little,” he says, he had come to arrive at a doctrinal
position that occupied middle ground between “orthodox Gallicanism”
and “Ultramontanism,” a position that would encompass all that was true
in the two systems, one that envisaged, in fact, a “tempered” or “moderate”
papal monarchy. The government of the church, he felt, had become “too
exclusive, too absolute, too Italian.” To remedy such defects a reforming
council was called for that would reestablish not only “the full exercise of
episcopal rights,” but also “the periodicity of councils.” It was, he believed,
the achievement of that goal that should properly be the task of the
upcoming council. And, in order to promote that end, he had concluded
that it was now time to publish his treatise which, by 1868, when Pius IX
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finally convoked the council, he had already succeeded in putting into its
“definitive form.”24 In so doing, he had not had to depart in any dramatic
way from the pattern of thought that had long since begun to crystallize
in his mind. He had simply had to give it expression in a more simple,
more explicit, more rightly-focused, more fully-elaborated and betterdocumented form. The type of argumentation he deployed was one that
derived less from the older, scholastic, theological mode still dominant at
Rome. Instead, it was more akin to the type of historically grounded reasoning favored before him by such as Bossuet and Febronius. It was also a
mode of argument, however supple, that was not always informed by the
most recent findings of German “scientific” historical scholarship.25 And,
perhaps because of that, Döllinger was to characterize the treatise, not
without condescension, as “a companion piece to Bossuet’s Defensio.”26
Dependent on Bossuet (he refers to him as “that sublime genius”)
Maret of course was, and he had certainly absorbed much of the spirit of
that great bishop with whom the school of Paris, faithful to “the good
traditions of Constance,” had reached, he said, its state of “immortal brilliance.”27 During the decade prior to the publication of Du concile général,
indeed, he had made a systematic study of the Defensio, and he often relied
on it as a guide to the sources. But, as Thysman’s careful analysis of the texts
makes very clear, Maret often pursued his historical investigations beyond
the witness of Bossuet’s book, reaching back directly to the sources, and
sometimes deploying them more accurately and effectively than had
Bossuet himself. It is obvious that he was directly familiar with the conciliar writings of Pierre d’Ailly (1350–1420) and Jean Gerson (1363–1429),
as well as with those of such early-sixteenth-century conciliarists as Jacques
Almain. And it is clear that he had done his reading of those authors in
the first two volumes of Louis Ellies Dupius’s edition of the works of
Gerson, where the conciliarist works of Almain and his teacher John Mair
(the latter of whom Maret does not cite) are also printed. 28 Dale Van Kley
has properly pointed out that the French “constitutional patriots” of the
previous century, men like Claude Mey and Gabriel Nicholas Maultrot,
had relied less in their Gallican moments on the 1682 Declaration of the
Gallican Clergy than on the older Parisian conciliarists.29 And while one
cannot quite say the same of Maret, there is no doubt that he did reach
back to Francisco Zabarella (writing in the era of Constance) and to the
fifteenth-and sixteenth-century “divines of Paris”—i.e., d’Ailly, Gerson,
and Almain. He also reached further back to the conciliar writings of
William Durand of Mede at the time of the Council of Vienna (1311),
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as well as, after that, to the works of Nicholas of Cusa and Panormitanus
(Nicholas de Tudeschis), written in the era dominated by the Council of
Basel (1431–1449).30 In 1867, moreover, hoping to be appointed as official French ambassador to the upcoming council, he wrote to Lavigerie
that it was his wish to follow in the footsteps of Gerson, to be
Gerson’s successor to the School of Paris ..., like him, ambassador
to the general council, [in which capacity] my only aim would
be to maintain those doctrines that great and holy man upheld
successfully at Constance.31

Further than that, and notwithstanding Maret’s characteristically Gallican
reverence for “the great bishop” Bossuet, there are also clear differences
between the forms of Gallicanism the two men espoused.
In the first place, the regalism of the anciene régime and its expression
in the form of the political Gallicanism then regnant was obviously alien to
the liberal sympathies and (increasingly) democratic sensibilities that eventually led Maret to embrace a species of separation between church and
state. Bossuet himself, of course, had been a leading spokesman for divine
right kingship. Much of his Defensio, in fact, had been devoted to vindicating the first of the four Gallican articles that, while accepting the power of
the pope in spirituals, had denied to him any temporal power over kings.
It had devoted much attention, therefore, to the matter of the proper relationship between the two powers, spiritual and temporal. Of those sections
of Bossuet’s work Maret made little use. Although he had hoped to produce
a third volume of his own devoted to such matters, he never did so, and the
two volumes he actually produced focused exclusively on matters pertaining to the church’s internal constitution.32
In the second place, it is true that the Constance superiority decree
Haec sancta (1415) was at the center of Bossuet’s conciliar thinking. And
that decree had declared that the Council of Constance was a legitimate
general council, that it derived its authority immediately from Christ, and
that all Christians, including the pope himself, were bound on pain of punishment to obey it and all future general councils on matters pertaining to
the faith, the ending of the schism, and the reform of the church.33 But its
companion decree Frequens (1417), which sought to make general councils
a regular and reformative part of the universal church’s governance, does
not loom large in his thinking. For Bossuet, general councils were to be
no more in fact than extraordinary occurrences in the life of the Church.
While doubtless necessary, they were for him only relatively necessary.34
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For Maret, however, it was otherwise. The conciliarist thinking of the
Parisian theologians of the Constance era whom he cites, as also that of
Zabarella, reflected the momentary weaving together into a coherent,
meaningful, and historic pattern of three broad strands, distinct in their
origins and, in some measure, in their subsequent careers. One of those
strands, envisaging the church’s constitution in quasi-oligarchic terms, its
government ordinarily in the hands of the curia, claimed that the pope was
in some measure limited in the exercise of his power by the cardinalate,
with whose advice he had to rule.35 That strand in the conciliarist pattern
understandably found no resonance in Maret’s thinking. But the other two
strands did—not only the strict conciliar theory itself (with its assertion
that under certain specified conditions the general council possessed an
authority superior to that of the pope), but also the call for reform of the
church in head and members, along with the conviction that the frequent
and regular assembly of general councils was the constitutional instrumentality essential to the achievement of that goal. Hence his insistence on the
importance and continuing validity of Frequens.36 In this combination of
the strict conciliar theory with the (older) reforming strand in conciliarist
thinking, Maret stood somewhat closer in spirit to the great conciliarists
of the fifteenth century than he did to his immediate Gallican forebears,
Bossuet himself included.37
The same is, I think, true—and in the third place—of the marked
degree (as Bressolette claims) 38 to which his can properly be called a
“political ecclesiology.” In common with most ecclesiologists, it is true,
Maret clearly felt called upon to stress the danger of pushing too far (as
had Joseph de Maistre) analogies between the ecclesiastical and secular
polities. The church’s mode of governance, divinely instituted, is sui generis; it is not to be assimilated to the modalities of any merely human government rooted in the natural order.39 At the same time, making a move
very similar to that made in the early sixteenth century by his Parisian predecessor, Jacques Almain,40 he parts company again with Bossuet in his
willingness to deploy precisely such analogies, doing so in his Du concile
général, indeed, with a comparative lack of diffidence.
That work he organized into five books, moving from the ecclesiological generalities of the first, via his central analysis of the church’s monarchical constitution, to which books two and three are devoted, to the currently
pressing issue of papal infallibility in the fourth, and on to a final attempt
in the fifth to justify his own rejection of the impending move to endow the
pope with a “personal, absolute, and separate prerogative of infallibility.”
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For that, he was convinced, would amount to nothing less than a fundamental change in the church’s constitution. My concern here being with
Maret’s conciliar views, my principal (though not exclusive) focus will be
on what he has to say in Books two and three. And here the political nature
of his ecclesiology is certainly foregrounded.
Embedded in human society at large, the church, he argues,
does not endure through time in some sort of lonely isolation. Instead,
between the ecclesiastical and temporal polities a process of reciprocal
influence has to be acknowledged. “Public powers are the very bases of
civil and political societies in that they confer upon those societies order,
justice, and peace.” And, in that respect, “the spiritual society established
by Jesus Christ” is not to be seen as altogether an exception.41 Maret was
moved, it seems, by the serene assumption that the relationship of the
two spheres, temporal and spiritual, should properly be one of harmony
and analog y. Both spheres, he thought, should be infused by the sort
of “wise liberalism” that had led him long since to proclaim the need
for a general council to reform the internal life and government of the
church. While analogies between temporal and spiritual societies can, of
course, be “false and deceitful,” they can also be helpful and, believing
this, he opts for the view that, although “the constitution of the Church
is truly sui generis,” in its “mixed” and “tempered” nature it clearly comes
close to “the best forms of human government” and can readily be compared with “constitutional and representative monarchy.” And that can
undoubtedly help us better to understand how it is that “the bishop can
at the same time be submitted to the pope and [yet be with him] a member
of the sovereign.”42
Maret sought, then, to identify in the church’s constitution a liberal
element that could open the way to his longed-for “reconciliation of the
Church with the modern notion of freedom.” 43 Conceding the presence
in the ecclesiastical constitution of a “democratic” element, in that any
member of the faithful could be called to the episcopal state and that it
was the original practice of Christian communities to elect their bishops,
he insists, nonetheless, that “democracy cannot claim sovereignty in the
Church.” But neither does that sovereignty reside in any sort of absolute
monarchy. It belongs, instead, to monarchy tempered with aristocracy—in
one place he calls it “monarchy essentially aristocratic and deliberative.”
What is involved, in effect, is what is sometimes called a mixed government, one framed along the same lines as “constitutional and representative
monarchy” in the world of modern secular regimes.44
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Even without determining the precise relationship between pope
and bishop, this much, Maret concludes, can be said. But attempt that
determination and one comes up against the difficult challenge of having to decide between two long-standing and well-established schools
of thought, both competing for one’s allegiance. The first is the Italian
school, which he describes as “celebrated and worthy,” the great representative of which is Cardinal Robert Bellarmine. “In the system of this
school,” he says, “the pope possesses a monarchical power that is pure,
indivisible, absolute, and unlimited. To that power, rhetorical gestures
to the contrary notwithstanding, no counter weight is conceded—other
than that furnished by the Christian virtues” and “shared doctrine of the
faith.”45 The competing school, that of Paris, with Bossuet, “the incomparable doctor,” as its great representative, asserts to the contrary that while
the pope is indeed monarch of the church, that monarchy is “truly and
efficaciously tempered by [the] aristocracy of the bishops.” For the bishops
are not merely vicars-delegate or advisers to the pope but, by divine right,
co-judges and legislators with him, constituting in union with him “the
ecclesiastical sovereignty.”46
Between these two competing schools one has to decide. And
in order to do so, he suggests, one has to put them to the test of both
Scripture and tradition. So far as the Scriptures are concerned, the crucial cluster of texts (notably Matthew 16 and 18) that together constitute
what he calls the very “constitutional charter of the Catholic church,” certainly seem to suggest that sovereign power was given by Christ not to
Peter alone, but to the “collective unity of Peter and the other apostles,”
excluding from the government of the church, therefore, any sort of “pure,
absolute, and undivisible monarchy.”47 But, for the “authentic commentary” on and “legitimate interpretation” of that fundamental and scriptural “constitutional charter,” it is to the acts of the general councils down
through the centuries that one must turn. From them, he says, “it is easy to
grasp the vital play of the Church’s constitution.”48
To that “authentic commentary,” then, Maret wastes no time in
turning; devoting half as many pages to the forty-year period dominated
by the fifteenth-century councils from Pisa to Florence as he had devoted
to the entire thousand years stretching from the Council of Nicaea (325) to
that of Vienne (1311). And more space to Constance, and especially its
fourth and fifth sessions, than he does to any other general council, Trent
itself not excluded.49 That he does so is no accident. He himself tells us
that in the crucial and conflicted issue of the pope–bishop relationship
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the decrees emanating from the Councils of Constance (1514–1518) and
Ferrara-Florence (1438–1445) are “the most weighty and celebrated.”
And, in so doing, he makes it clear that the enactments he has in mind
are the Constance decrees Haec sancta and Frequens and the Florentine
decree Laetentur coeli, the first conciliar definition of the Roman pontiff ’s
primacy.50 Perhaps because of the intensity of his focus on these fifteenthcentury councils, Maret succeeds in constructing a more coherent, complete, and consistent account of unfolding events than do many of the
standard early-to-mid-twentieth-century accounts. For, post-dating
Vatican I, those accounts tend to bear the imprint of an unacknowledged
ultramontane orientation, assuming the legitimacy of the Roman line of
papal claimants, the legitimacy of Constance as a general council only,
therefore, after Gregory XII (the Roman claimant) was permitted, prior
to his resignation, to reconvoke it, thereby defanging the neuralgic provisions of the superiority decree Haec sancta, which had been voted on earlier in the fifth session.51 But the Council of Pisa (1409), often brushed
aside as having done little more than deepening the crisis by adding a third
line of doubtful papal claimants to the mix,52 Maret himself treats with the
utmost seriousness. “Legitimate in its convocation,” he says, “it was general
in its composition because it represented the universal Church.” Testimony
to that is the fact that Alexander V, the pope of unity whom it elected, “has
always been counted among the legitimate popes.” 53 That being so, Maret
was attempting to close the door to the claim that, even among historians
of distinction, proved to be alive and well on into the late twentieth century—and that despite the difficulties posed for it by the very text of Haec
sancta. Namely, the claim embedded in the “emergency measure” argument, which goes back, it seems, to one of Juan de Torquemada’s subsidiary
arguments,54 but was revived in the 1920s by Johannes Hollnsteiner and,
of more recent years, was deployed with force and ingenuity by Hubert
Jedin and Walter Brandmüller. That argument pivots on the assumption
that the fathers assembled at Constance did not recognize as a true pope
John XXIII, Alexander V’s successor, and believed themselves, therefore,
to be confronting an extraordinary emergency situation in which there
were three contenders for the papal office, all of them claimants of doubtful legitimacy. It was under such emergency conditions, or so the argument
goes, that Constance framed the provisions of Haec sancta, which is therefore (or so Jedin argued for a while) no “universal as it were free-floating
definition of belief,” but to be understood, rather, as an “emergency measure
[intended] to meet a quite exceptional case.”55
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With any such “emergency measure” argument, however, Maret
avant le propos would have nothing to do. Having affirmed the legitimacy
of the actions taken at Pisa to depose the Roman and Avignonese claimants alike, he had gone on to note that while at Constance the claims of
Gregory XII and Benedict XIII to the papal office were certainly viewed
as doubtful, that of John XXIII, the pope who had convoked the council,
was not. Instead, it was recognized as valid both by the Roman church
and by “an immense majority” of the faithful at large.56 Like Pisa before it,
Constance was, therefore, and right from the outset, a legitimately assembled council and Haec sancta the valid decree of such a council. Nor, he
went on to add, should any particular weight be given to the extension to
Gregory XII, prior to his resignation, of the privilege of reconvoking the
council. For Maret, that was no more than an “act of admirable indulgence
and Christian wisdom,” a pragmatic diplomatic move to help secure his
resignation. It was also, he was at pains to note (and it is something that
the twentieth-century accounts tend to pass over in silence), a privilege
extended also to the Avignonese claimant, Benedict XIII, in an effort to
secure his resignation too.57
What, then, does Maret conclude on the central matter of the
pope–bishop relationship? First, that notwithstanding the “legitimate
subordination of bishop to pope,” Scripture, tradition, and conciliar history alike preclude any attribution to the pontiff of a “pure, indivisible and
absolute monarchy.”58 Precluded also, however, is the opposite extreme,
namely, the attribution to the general council of any “absolute and unlimited superiority over the pope.” But, then, he correctly insisted, and contrary to Ultramontane claims, neither the council fathers at Constance
who framed Haec sancta nor the French clergy who approved the Gallican
Declaration of 1682 (and, among them, least of all Bossuet) had advanced
any such extreme position. 59 The conciliar superiority which all of them
had in mind was one limited to the ending of schism, matters of faith, and
reform in head and members. And what emerged from Constance (itself a
legitimate assembly from the moment of its first assembly)60 was the mediating position expressed quintessentially in Haec sancta itself. And while
Maret conceded that that decree did indeed “touch on matters of faith”
and pertained to “the domain of faith,” he did not take it to have proclaimed “a dogma of faith, rigorously defined.”61 Instead, it was properly to
be viewed as a “constitutional law” having for its objective the regulation
of the use of ecclesiastical power, and it was one deserving of the “most
profound respect.”62
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Subsequent history was to show, or so he went on to argue, that that
profound respect was indeed accorded to it. Recognized in practice by successive popes from John XXIII and Martin V onwards, reaffirmed more
than once by the Council of Basel (Eugenius IV himself approving), and
in no way qualified by the ecclesiological decrees of councils of Florence
and Lateran V (1512–1517),63 Haec sancta was a decree that simply stated
“more clearly and solemnly” than heretofore what had in fact been “the
constant and universal law of the Church,” grounded in Scripture itself,
affirmed by fifteen centuries of tradition, and of continuing validity all the
way down to the present. 64 In accordance with the position it affirmed,
the church’s constitution was to be understood as a mixed one, “a monarchy ... essentially aristocratic and deliberative,” one in which the pope,
while possessing by divine authority the plenitude of power, was no pure,
absolute, and unlimited monarch, but a ruler who, in the exercise of his
power, was limited by the aristocratic element which the bishops constituted. The latter were, he added, “true princes” possessing by divine right
a share in the church’s sovereign power.65 That power they were to wield in
general councils regularly assembled as Frequens had stipulated, working
to eliminate the abuses that centuries of over-centralization had spawned,
and forming a permanent part of the church’s constitutional machinery.
And, as Haec sancta had specified, in certain extraordinary cases—schism,
matters pertaining to the faith, and reform in head and members—those
bishops assembled in council, acting alone or in opposition to the pope,
could stand in judgment over him. In so doing, via a determinative judicial
process, an “act of jurisdiction over the pope” and not merely (as some
have supposed) via some sort of “declaratory” judgment, it can punish him
and, if need be, proceed even to depose him.66 In reaching that conclusion,
Maret (except possibly on one point)67 is nothing if not precise. Thus he
is careful to reject the claim of Alfonso Muzzarelli and other members of
the (high papalist) Italian school to the effect that the provisions of Haec
sancta represented emergency measures applicable only to the time of
schism and limited to popes of doubtful legitimacy. In driving that point
home, moreover, he was at pains to cite the authority of Jean Gerson’s Au
liceat in cansis fidei appellare, a tract written in 1418 just after the end of
the Council of Constance. There, having rejected the notion of papal selfdeposition or ipso facto loss of office, Gerson had insisted, speaking specifically of the judicial process leading up to the deposition of John XXIII,
that what Constance had effected was nothing less than the trial and deposition of a legitimate pope (verus papa).68
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All in all, then, what Maret gives us in the Du concile général is an
impressively robust and precise reaffirmation of the age-old tradition
of conciliarist constitutionalism in the Latin Church, one in which the
conciliarists of the classical era would certainly have recognized not only
the broad outlines of their own ecclesiology but also, in its very specifics,
something even more familiar than that. Maret has more than once been
described as the last of the Gallicans and his Du concile général as “the swan
song of Gallicanism.” But, given the faithfulness with which he evoked once
more the conciliarist position set forth in the early fifteenth century by
such Parisian predecessors as Pierre d’Ailly and Jean Gerson, he could also
(his own acceptance of the Gallican label notwithstanding) be dubbed, and
perhaps more accurately, as the last of the conciliarists. In his self-conscious
adherence to a fundamentally Gersonian formulation of the strict conciliar
theory, there is a sense in which he looked backwards, beyond the Gallican
orthodoxies of Tournély and Bossuet, to the “classical” fifteenth-century
age of conciliar theory. If his irenicism and his calm embrace of a dawning
modernity can well be seen as looking forward to views that came to qualified fruition in the documents of Vatican II,69 his unambiguously conciliarist commitments look back, rather, to a very distant past. And in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the seeds of those commitments were
destined to fall on unreceptively stony ecclesiological ground.
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Jean Gerson, An liceat in causis fidei a Papa appellare, in Oeuvres complètes,
6:283–90 at 286: “Unde et in toto processu usque post sententiam definitivam
suae depositionis reputatus est ab eodem concilio [Constantiensis] verus papa.”
69
Thus, his sensitivity to the elements of truth he saw embedded in the beliefs
of the separated Christian brethren, his quest to harmonize Christianity and science, his heartfelt desire to reconcile the church with the great achievements of
the modern world and to promote the recovery of a more liberal and participatory regime within that church—all of that can be seen to look forward to powerful trends that surfaced in the Catholic life of the late twentieth century.
68
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Part 5
Appendices

Thomas M. Izbicki
A Personal and Intellectual Appreciation
Gerald Christianson

T

HE CONTOURS OF THOMAS M. IZBICKI’S CAREER, the
subject of this tribute volume, are suggested in the title: Inventing
Modernity in Medieval European Thought. His work builds on, and
extends, the scholarship of the late medieval/early modern period in the
past seventy-five years and more. The history of ideas is his bedrock, but
closely connected are institutions as attempts at community-building and
centers of power. These general principles are then related to the history of
the era and to Western culture. Mix these principles and methods together
with a large helping of scholarly research and the result is a very large number of books and articles. I will not attempt to describe them all, but rather
look at what shaped Izbicki and how he has shaped what we know about
the “edge of modernity.”
An always-intriguing issue that continues to stimulate historians is whether the Late Middle Ages (including the Renaissance and
Reformation) is the source of modernity or a break with the past that has
little or nothing to contribute. Within this general framework, Izbicki is a
bit of a paradox. He holds both together at the same time. As he sees it, the
medieval/early modern period—broadly conceived—rests along a continuum roughly between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries. Within this
continuum, shifts and nuances point forward and backward at the same
time. This is especially true of the fifteenth century—a period not unlike
our own so-called “Post-Modern” times. Tom has made his mark here—
by examining how exemplary figures, events, movements and institutions
retain something of the old when adapting to the new.
We can illustrate this point with one prominent example. Tom was
schooled in the origins of conciliarism, which celebrated the links between
the Middle Ages and the early fifteenth century. At the same time, he
expanded his vision into the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries
where the conflict between consent and authority, representation and hierarchy, makes it even clearer that the picture was not all one-sided. In this

256   Gerald Christianson

pursuit, Tom benefited, as so many of us have, from a generation of scholars who came to prominence after the Second World War, the shock of
which brought renewed dedication to the origins and goals of Western values and institutions. The likes of Paul Oskar Kristeller, Heiko Oberman, F.
Edward Cranz, Charles Trinkaus, Francis Oakley, and Brian Tierney were
responsible for this “renaissance” and for setting an agenda to be addressed
by younger students.
For Tom, this was not just a general inheritance. He studied at
Cornell with Tierney, a scholar to whom many others, whether in support or opposition, are indebted. In Foundations of the Conciliar Theory,
Tierney argued that the conciliar movement, which taught that the pope
was a constitutional ruler susceptible to correction, was far from a radical affront to traditional institutions, but arose from a solid tradition of
Scripture and canon law.
With this “foundation,” Tom has focused on those controversial
years following the Great Schism of the West (1378–1417), during which
the papacy was divided among two and then three “obediences.” The
recurring issue that he addresses is how the challenges of Schism and conciliarism caused jurists, theologians, and humanists to rethink accepted
norms of church government, piety, and sacraments and to balance the
need for reform and representation with the need to preserve order in the
visible church.
From the beginning, however, Tom did not stop here. Even in recent
times some historians treated the Council of Basel (143l–1447) as a kind
of pariah. Those who acknowledged papal supremacy thought the assembly an aberration. Even those sympathetic to the idea of a conciliar church
tended to stop at its gates because conciliarism seemed to fall apart. Izbicki,
on the other hand, took this reticence as a challenge. He immersed himself
in the later Council of Basel and beyond, where lines shifted and parties
became polarized, and where leaders of conscience were sometimes compelled to make life-altering decisions. By adding his voice to the debate,
and without a polemical agenda, he brought greater balance to the conciliar element in the rough and tumble of late medieval church politics.
Typical of those who faced this dilemma and contributed to the reestablishment of papal hegemony were three figures who have benefited
from Tom’s research: Juan de Torquemada (Turrecremata), Nicholas of
Cusa and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius II). Because all attended,
then abandoned, the Council of Basel he saw opportunity for moving into
under-explored territory.
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While writing a review of Tom’s first book, Protector of the Faith:
Cardinal Johannes de Turrecremata, I met him for the first time in
Kalamazoo. This was some time ago, and the case he made for moderating
the traditional picture of this supposedly high papalist struck me as fresh
and persuasive. To put the pretensions of conciliarists to rest, Torquemada
had felt it necessary to teach himself canon law. Here he found that
councils had resisted popes who had fallen into heresy and consequently
showed himself more nuanced and guarded than other papal champions
of the time.
If Juan de Torquemada was a theologian who became immersed
in canon law, Nicholas of Cusa was a canon lawyer who turned to theology. Scholars usually divide their attention between the early, conciliar
Cusanus, author of The Catholic Concordance (De concordantia catholica)
with its doctrine of consent, and the later “Hercules of the Eugenians”
who abandoned Basel, supported the pope, and wrote a series of brilliant philosophical-theological treatises. Izbicki, however, bridges the two
sides by demonstrating, from both these tracts and lesser-known works,
that Cusanus had not abandoned the fundamental principles of the
Concordance, but in changing circumstances found it necessary to emphasize hierarchy over consensus.
Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II, may not have
been as theologically profound or canonically astute as Torquemada and
Cusanus, but he championed Basel longer than either, and then repudiated it even more emphatically. He did this by revising his earlier histories
of Basel which he now portrayed as a largely rowdy and radical assembly.
When Aeneas became Pius, he intended to deal the conciliar movement
a death-blow with the decree Execrabilis, which prohibited appeals to a
council. He soon realized, as Izbicki has shown, that the life and growth
of conciliarism still possessed a potent political punch. And while Aeneas,
the revisionary historian, was often taken at face value, Izbicki’s translations have given modern scholars a chance to compare the two Aeneases.
Each of these three leaders chose a different path than Basel. Each
one had to navigate uncertain territory that began in the shadow of Schism
and witnessed the restoration of papal authority. Thanks to Tom’s dedicated labor, we now have greater clarity about how these council fathers
had to contend with shifting alliances, conflicts of interest, and careerism,
and at the same time how each had to rethink concepts of church and
councils, collegiality and authority, hierarchy and consensus while still
preserving their dedication to reform.
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Beyond this all-too-brief summary of Tom’s scope, what also sets
Tom apart is the special set of skills he possesses and how he has marshalled
them in fresh and meaningful ways. His publications prove that he is well
grounded in history, theology, philosophy, and political theory. Most
scholars possess many or all such skills, but Tom’s range includes areas few
have mastered. He became immersed in the intricacies of canon law, as
well as manuscripts and their transmission, while studying with Tierney
at Cornell, but went the second mile when Stephan Kuttner enlisted him
in his research program at the School of Law in Berkeley. These studies
inform all Tom’s publications, especially those on specific jurists, but have
taken on new life with his investigation of canon law and the sacraments
which, I suspect, reflects Tom’s role as an Episcopal lay minister, and promises to draw revealing inferences about “ordinary” life in parish practice.
Moving on from these years of apprenticeship, and after a bit of
wandering in the world of lectureships and research fellowships, he settled on a career as a research librarian. This has made him a distinguished
and helpful bibliographer whose resources grace chapters on “Nicholas of
Cusa in English” in books published under the umbrella of the American
Cusanus Society and in the rich and rewarding lists in the Society’s
Newsletter.
Since those early days with Torquemada and canon law texts, Tom
has flourished as a Latinist. He translates rapidly and with a limpid style
that settles somewhere between literal and colloquial. This makes the
result readable but still sounding like the original. His writing is also
a matter of envy. Careful preparation is followed by an original draft
that flows smoothly and quickly. Usually it needs no more than a single
re-write.
On that day in 1983 when I first met Tom, the American Cusanus
Society was reborn with the election of Morimichi Watanabe, its president for many years. This was sheer coincidence but in no way detracts
from the fact that Izbicki has remained an anchor of this vibrant community of scholars ever since. He has also taken a leading role in a related
activity, the “working conferences” at Gettysburg Lutheran Seminary,
and has served as an intrepid editor of its publications more often than
anyone else.
Tom Izbicki’s legacy (happily, we can add “to date”) is extensive
and useful. He has published widely in his field. He has addressed topics
that engage us and are of lasting value. He has illumined the creative mix
between conciliarism and papalism. And he has enhanced the on-going
dialogue over the boundary between medieval and modern.
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This list can only hint at the range of Tom’s career, at the independence and originality of his research, and at an inner consistency that arises
out of his respect for the value of human creatures and their communities. When I read Thomas Izbicki, I get the feeling that we are important
to him. He doesn’t simply write; he writes something to us. Many walls
have tumbled; others arisen. But Tom builds bridges, and not just bridges
between people. Tom builds bridges from the past to the present and back
again; and certainly also, as he invites us to reflection, into the future.

Afterword
Thomas M. Izbicki

B

EGINNING WITH MY UNDERGRADUATE YEARS, the relationship of theory to practice has intrigued me. Whether the sources
employed are texts written by theologians, lawyers or men of letters, their
ideas of how things should be can be assessed against accounts of the things
which happened. In some cases, there is a wide gap. In others, ideas percolated down to the local level and entered practice. This can be traced in
canon law. Ideas born in the medieval universities reached the diocese and
the parish through received texts, whether decrees of general councils, local
enactments by provincial and diocesan synods, papal letters, or practical
advice given to pastors by learned men. The enforcement of these norms
can be tracked by reading the records of official visitations by bishops and
archdeacons. Lapses are revealed, of course, as are measures taken to impose
discipline on the many priests and lesser clergy. In other cases, the visitors
were satisfied with what they found. The consilia or legal opinions of the
university-trained jurists also were aimed at practical matters although
rooted in the received texts of the Corpus Juris Civilis. They might be part
of the documentation of a practical case or hypothetical considerations of
issues which could arise in the courts. The jurists might even be consulted
about political issues, including dynastic succession and the status of local
regimes, even those governed by tyrants.
This line of inquiry requires engagement with a wide variety of
sources. In turn, this involves use of both printed and manuscript texts. The
study of paleography and the use of the skills acquired allows finding and
employing sources not otherwise available, broadening the scholar’s reach.
It also becomes possible to read older printed texts and newer editions
critically, finding nuances even in the most familiar written works. These
inquiries also require serious engagement, especially empathy, applied to
persons whose ideas, beliefs and acts differ from those accepted at the present time. The historian’s task, after all, is to understand before attempting
any critical assessment of past ideas, persons, institutions, and developments.
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This effort is outlined in the Appreciation by Gerald Christianson, the
colleague who best knows my interests and their wellsprings.
Nearly fifty years have passed since I undertook these inquiries.
There is no greater tribute to the labors of a half century than to have colleagues engage with such issues. Bettina Koch and Cary Nederman have
brought together several colleagues to address relevant topics. The focus
of these essays is on the years 1100–1450, which has been identified as the
period which invented ideas of modernity. These ideas emerged in part
from conflicts over religious issues which contributed to increasing secularization, but they also granted humanity much greater dignity than had
Augustine’s disciples with their emphasis on curbing sinfulness. My own
research having focused most intensely on the early fifteenth century, a
time when the Italian Renaissance, often identified with the emergence of
the modern, was flourishing, these essays advance areas of research which I
value even when I have not pursued them myself.
Many of these studies show how the medieval Church gradually lost
unity even before it was fractured by the Reformation. The Dominican
theologians who defended papal privileges against secular apologists like
Jean de Pouilly caused confusion over the coherence of the Church’s history and validity of authoritative sources. This opened the way for dissidents like Marsilius of Padua to rewrite the ecclesiastical polity by using
the received texts in new ways. John Wyclif was able to find texts in the
Decretum of Gratian to use against the canonists on issues like clerical
property and papal dispensations. The Great Western Schism (1378–
1417) fractured unity, but it also made ecclesiastical statesmen like Pierre
d’Ailly aware of the need for personal, as well as institutional, reform.
However, it also generated heated debates over the Church’s divisions,
language which evoked ideas of tyranny and tyrannicide. This language
was echoed in the defense of the murder of Louis of Orléans by minions
of his rival, John duke of Burgundy, during France’s contemporaneous
civil strife. The effort of the Council of Constance (1414–1418) to reunite the Church was coupled with a defense of orthodoxy. The trial of the
Czech reformer Jan Hus turned not only on the canon law of heresy but
the belief that heresy arose from contumacy, intellectual stubbornness carried to the extreme. The conciliar arguments arising from the Schism were
used to reestablish unity, but they also were used to support royal control of churches. These conflicting uses endured to the time of the First
Vatican Council (1870) at which even the most temperate conciliarism
was rejected by the Ultramontanes. An irony is that the liberal and secular
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currents we identify with modernity were met at the Vatican Council with
an affirmation of papal primacy and infallibility.
Authoritative texts could be used in creative, not just destructive,
ways. Ptolemy of Lucca, using Classical writings, described ancient Rome
as inspired by providence in preparation for the coming of Christ while
also pursuing the common good through virtue. Marsilius of Padua, however, used Cicero and other ancient authorities to create a “naturalistic”
idea of social order far apart from the pretensions of the papacy. Marsilius
was received in the Reformation context but not as he would have
expected. An abridged translation of the Defensor pacis into German done
for a Protestant claimant to the Palatine Electorate omitted anything not
supportive of princely power, including lay power over ecclesiastical property, an early step toward secularization. The Platonist strain of the twelfth
century, found in writings of Thierry of Chartres and Peter Abelard, was
reflected in the works of Anselm of Havelberg and, much later, in the
unique thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464). Cusanus, a polymath,
is often seen as a transitional figure from medieval to modern. The De
venatione sapientiae, his intellectual autobiography, treats all the neologisms he coined in his intellectual development, engaging in dialog with
Plato, Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius as he broke out of the Aristotelian
framework of late medieval Scholasticism. Cusanus and Lorenzo Valla
both were dissatisfied with Scholastic precision, wanting to attain something more practical. The cardinal expected the monks of Tegernsee to
have a shared experience when gazing at the icon, while Valla wanted his
readers to expand responsible participation in life. Cusanus had a view of
the larger world. His vision encompassed non-Christians, but he expected
them to conform more closely to Christianity in a concord of peoples.
This vision of concord was replaced in the New World with a papal effort
to establish spheres of influence for European powers enabling protection
for missionaries dealing with peoples who never had heard of Christ while
princes persuaded their own interests. This time of discovery, contemporaneous with the Reformation, forced Western Europe to confront a wider
world not versed in either Classical or Christian texts, a modern world
facing issues of cultural clash and adaptation to entirely new contexts.

A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas
M. Izbicki

“Advisor Reports from the Field: Electronic Products: Questions to Ask Vendors—and Yourself.” The Charleston Advisor, vol. 6, no. 4 (April 2005)
[online:
http://charleston.publisher.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/
charleston/chadv/2005/00000006/00000004/art00018].
“An Ambivalent Papalism: Peter in the Sermons of Nicholas of Cusa.” In Perspectives on Early Modern and Modern Intellectual History: Essays in Honor of
Nancy S. Struever, edited by Joseph Marino and Melinda W. Schlitt, 49–65.
Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2001.
“Analyzing a Legal Miscellany: Schoenberg MS 450.” University of Pennsylvania,
September 23, 2014. [Open access: https://youtu.be/2RXPOntLQJ8.]
“An Argument from Authority in the Indies Debate.” The Americas 34 (1978):
400–6.
“Auszüge aus Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues im Rahmen der Geschichte
des Basler Konzils.” Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der CusanusGesellschaft 19 (1991): 117–35.
“Badgering for Books: Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini and Leonardo Bruni’s Translation of Aristotle’s Politics.” In Essays on Renaissance Thought and Letters:
Festschrift for John Monfasani, edited by Alison K. Frazier and Patrick
Nold, 12–22. Leiden: Brill, 2015.
“The Bleeding Host of Dijon: Its Place in the History of Eucharistic Devotion.”
In Saluting Aron Gurevich: Essays in History, Literature and Other Related
Subjects, edited by Yelena Mazour-Matusevich and Alexandra S. Korros,
227–46. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
“A Bolognese consilium on Portuguese Politics.” In Diritto e potere nella storia
europea: Atti in onore di Bruno Paradisi. Quarto Congresso Internazionale
della Società Italiana di Storia del Diritto, vol. 1, 313–19. Firenze: Leo S.
Olschki Editore, 1982.
“Cajetan’s Attack on Parallels Between Church and State.” Cristianesimo nella storia 29 (1999): 81–89.
“Cajetan on the Acquisition of Stolen Goods in the Old and New Worlds.”
Rivista di Storia del Cristianesimo 4 (2007): 499–509.
“The Canonists and the Treaty of Troyes.” In Proceedings of the Fifth International
Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Salamanca, 21–25 September 1976,
edited by Stephan Kuttner and Kenneth Pennington. Monumenta Iuris

266   A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki

Canonici, series C, vol. 6, 425 -34. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1980.
“The Church in the Light of Learned Ignorance.” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3 (1993): 196–214.
The Church, the Councils and Reform: The Legacy of the Fifteenth Century. Edited
by Gerald Christianson, Thomas M. Izbicki, and Christopher M. Bellitto. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2008.
“Circumcision in Dominican Sentence Commentaries.” In Dominikaner
und Juden: Personen, Konflikte und Perspektiven vom 13. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Elias H. Füllenbach and Gianfranco Miletto, 231–50.
Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015.
“Clericis laicos and the Canonists.” In Popes, Teachers and Canon Law in the
Middle Ages: Festschrift for Brian Tierney, edited by James R. Sweeney and
Stanley Chodorow, 179–90. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
“A Collection of Ecclesiological Manuscripts in the Vatican Library: Vat. lat. 4106
-4193.” Miscellanea Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae 4 (1990): 89–129.
Companion to the Council of Basel. Edited by Michiel Decaluwé, Thomas M.
Izbicki, and Gerald Christianson. Leiden: Brill, 2016. Including articles on
the records of the council and the revival of papalism.
A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417). Edited by Joëlle RolloKoster and Thomas M. Izbicki. Leiden: Brill, 2009. Including: “The
Authority of Peter and Paul: The Use of Biblical Authority during the
Great Schism,” 375–93; and “Conclusion: The Shadow of the Schism,”
443–46.
“Consilia of Baldus of Perugia in the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago.” With Julius Kirshner. Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 15 (1985):
95–115.
“The consilia of Bartolus de Saxoferrato in MS. Ottob. Lat. 1249.” In Honos alit
artes: Studi per il settantesimo compleano di Mario Ascheri: La formazione
del dirrito comune: Giuristi e diritti in Europa (secoli XII -XVIII), edited by
Paola Maffei and Gian Maria Varanini, 65–75. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2014.
Conciliarism and Papalism. Edited by J. H. Burns and Thomas M. Izbicki. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997. [Reprinted by the Chinese University Press, 2003.]
“Concilium Lateranense II 1139.” In Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque
Decreta, II/1, edited by Alberto Melloni and Daniele Dainese, 97–113.
Turnhout: Brepols, 2013.
Contributions in Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, edited by William W. Kibler
et al. New York: Garland Publishing, 1995.
“The Council of Ferrara-Florence and Dominican Papalism.” In Christian Unity:
The Council of Ferrara-Florence 1438/39 -1989, edited by Giuseppe
Alberigo, 429–43. Louvain: Peeters, 1991.

A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki   267

“Cusanus Preaches Reform: The Visitation of St. Simeon, Trier, 1443, and the
Legation Topos in His Sermons.” In Renovatio et unitas—Nikolaus von
Kues als Reformer: Theorie und Praxis der reformation im 15. Jahrhundert,
edited by Thomas Frank and Norbert Winkler, 105–16. Göttingen: V&R
Unipress, 2012.
“Dominican Papalism and the Arts in Fifteenth-Century Rome.” In Iberia and
the Mediterranean World: Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns, S. J., vol. 1,
Proceedings from Kalamazoo, 270–89. Leiden: Brill, 1995.
“Ecclesiological Texts of Jean Gerson and Pierre d’Ailly Among the Codices Vaticani Latini.” Manuscripta 32 (1988): 197–201.
“Ecclesiological Texts of Jean Gerson and Pierre d’Ailly in Vatican Manuscript
Collections Other Than the Codices Vaticani Latini.” Manuscripta 33
(1989): 205–9.
Encyclopedia of Medieval Pilgrimage. Edited by Larissa Taylor, Thomas M. Izbicki,
Kathy Gower, Leigh Ann Craig, John Friedman, and Rita Tekippe, vol. 1.
Leiden: Brill, 2009. [Associate editor for Religion and Law].
The Eucharist in Medieval Canon Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015.
“Faculty Liaison in the Electronic Environment.” Against the Grain 8 (November,
1996): 32.
“Failed Censures: Ecclesiastical Regulation of Women’s Clothing in Late Medieval Italy.” Medieval Clothing and Textiles 5 (2009): 37–53. Partly
reprinted in The Fashion Reader, edited by Linda Welters and Abby Lillethun, 2nd ed., 295–97. Oxford: Berg, 2011. [Open access: https://rucore.
libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/35871.]
F. Edward Cranz. An Essay on the Development of Luther’s Thought on Justice,
Law and Society. Edited by Gerald Christianson and Thomas M. Izbicki.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959; Mifflintown: Sigler
Press, 1998.
F. Edward Cranz. Nicholas of Cusa and the Renaissance. Edited by Thomas M.
Izbicki and Gerald Christianson. Aldershot: Variorum, 2000.
“The Fighting Figures of Barisano of Trani.” With Helen Roberts. Source: Notes in
the History of Art 9 (1991): 9–13.
“Forbidden Colors in the Regulation of Clerical Dress from the Fourth Lateran
Council (1215) to the Time of Nicholas of Cusa (d. 1464).” Medieval
Clothing and Textiles 1 (2005): 105–14. [Open access: https://rucore.
libraries.rutgers.edu/rutgers-lib/41068.]
Friars and Jurists: Selected Studies. Bibliotheca Eruditorum 20. Goldbach: Keip
Verlag, 1998.
“The Germans and the Papal Penitentiary: Repertorium poenitentiariae germanicum.” Catholic Historical Review 94 (2008): 108 -14. [Review article].
“Guido de Baysio’s Unedited Gloss on Clericis laicos.” Bulletin of Medieval Canon
Law 13 (1983): 62–67.

268   A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki

“`The Hand of Power for the Feeding of Christ’s Sheep’: The Pope and the Episcopate in Juan de Torquemada’s Early Polemics.” In Primato, pontificio ed
episcopato dal primo millenio al Concilio Ecumenico Vaticano II: Studi in
onore dell’Arcivescovo Agostino Marchetto, edited by Jean Ehret, 217–33.
Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2013.
Hildegard of Bingen. Explanation of the Athanasian Creed. Translated by Thomas
M. Izbicki. Toronto: Peregrina, 2001. [Found on Monastic Matrix: http://
monasticmatrix.usc.edu/cartularium/article.php?textId=2462.]
“How the Language of Transubstantiation Entered Medieval Canon Law.” In Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law,
Toronto, 5–11 August 2012, edited by Joseph Goering, Stephan Dusil, and
Andreas Their. Monumenta Iuris Canonici, series C, vol. 15, 1023–43.
Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2016.
Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of
Charles Trinkaus. Edited by John O’Malley, Thomas M. Izbicki, and
Gerald Christianson. Leiden: Brill, 1993. Including : “Lorenzo Valla:
The Scholarship in English through 1992,” 287–301; and “The Works
of Charles Trinkaus: A Bibliography,” with Pauline Moffitt Watts,
303–14.
“The Immaculate Conception and Ecclesiastical Politics from the Council of
Basel to the Council of Trent: The Dominicans and Their Foes.” Archiv für
Reformationsgeschichte 96 (2005): 145–70.
“Indulgences in Fifteenth-Century Polemics and Canon Law.” In Ablasskampagnen des Spätmittelalter: Luthers Thesen von 1517 im Context, edited by
Andreas Rehberg, 79–104. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017.
“Infallibility and the Erring Pope: Guido Terreni and Johannes de Turrecremata.”
In Law, Church and Society: Essays in Honor of Stephan Kuttner, edited by
Kenneth Pennington and Robert Somerville, 97–111. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.
Introducing Nicholas of Cusa: A Guide to a Renaissance Man. Edited by Christopher M. Bellitto, Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald Christianson. Mahwah:
Paulist Press, 2004. Including: “The Church,” 113–40; and “Nicholas of
Cusa in English,” with Kim Breighner, 409–57.
“Ista questio est antiqua: Two consilia on Widows’ Rights.” Bulletin of Medieval
Canon Law 8 (1978): 47–50.
“Johannes de Turrecremata, Two Questions on Law,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 43 (1975): 91–94.
Juan de Torquemada. A Disputation on the Authority of Pope and Council. Translated by Thomas M. Izbicki. Dominican Sources, New Editions in Translation 4. Oxford: Blackfriars Press, 1988.
“Juan de Torquemada’s Defense of the Conversos.” The Catholic Historical Review
85 (1999): 195–207.
“La Bible et les canonistes.” In Le Moyen Age et la Bible, edited by Pierre Riché
and Guy Lobrichon, translated by Charles Kannengiesser. Bible de Tous le
Temps 4, 371–84. Paris: Beauchesne, 1984.

A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki   269

“Legal and Polemical Manuscripts, 1100–1500, in Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milano.”
Quaderni Catanesi di Studi Classici e Medievali 5 (1983): 147–76, 291–320.
“Leonardo Dati’s Sermon on the Circumcision of Jesus (1417).” In Friars and Jews
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, edited by Steven J. McMichael and
Susan E. Myers, 191–98. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
“Leonardo Olschki (1885–1961): A Comprehensive Bibliography.” La Bibliofilia
88 (1986): 297–308.
“Lineamenta altaria: The Care of Altar Linens in the Medieval Church.” Medieval Clothing and Textiles 12 (2016): 41–60.
“Manuscripts and Books Exhibited from the Robbins Collection.” With Charles
McCurry and Katherine Christensen, in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Berkeley, 28 July–2 August 1980,
edited by Stephan Kuttner and Kenneth Pennington. Monumenta Iuris
Canonici, series C, Subsidia, vol. 7, xxiv–vi. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca
Apostolica Vaticana, 1985.
“Medieval Legal Texts in the Manuscripts of S. Scolastica, Subiaco.” Bulletin of
Medieval Canon Law 18 (1988): 58–64.
“Microfilm Collections of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United
States.” Collection Management 15 (1992): 449–73.
“The Missing Antipope: The Rejection of Felix V and the Council of Basel in the
Writings of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini and the Piccolomini Library.” Viator 41 (2010): 301–14.
Morimichi Watanabe. Concord and Reform: Nicholas of Cusa and Legal and Political Thought in the Fifteenth Century. Edited by Thomas M. Izbicki and
Gerald Christianson. Aldershot: Variorum, 2001.
“A New Copy of Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo’s Commentary on the Bull Ezechielis of Pope Pius II.” Revista Española de Teologia 41 (1981): 465–67.
“New Notes on Late Medieval Jurists.” Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 10
(1980): 62–65.
Nicholas of Cusa and His Age: Intellect and Spirituality: Essays Dedicated to the
Memory of F. Edward Cranz, Thomas P. McTighe and Charles Trinkaus.
Edited by Thomas M. Izbicki and Christopher M. Bellitto. Leiden: Brill,
2002. Including: “Nicholas of Cusa’s Early Sermons on the Incarnation:
An Early Renaissance Philosopher-Theologian as Preacher,” with Lawrence
Hundersmarck, 79–88; and “Nicholas of Cusa: the Literature in English,
1994–2001,” 268–74.
“Nicholas of Cusa and the Jews.” In Conflict and Resolution: Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa, edited by Inigo Bocken, 119–30. Leiden: Brill, 2004.
Nicholas of Cusa and Times of Transition: Essays in Honor of Gerald Christianson.
Edited by Thomas M. Izbicki, Jason Aleksander, and Donald F. Duclow.
Leiden: Brill, 2018.
Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom: Essays in Honor of Morimichi
Watanabe by the American Cusanus Society. Edited by Gerald Christianson
and Thomas M. Izbicki. Studies in the History of Christian Thought, vol.
45. Leiden: Brill, 1991. Including: “The Possibility of Dialogue with Islam

270   A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki

in the Fifteenth Century,” 175–83; and “Nicholas of Cusa: the Literature
in English through 1988,” 259–81.
Nicholas of Cusa on Christ and the Church: Essays in Memory of Chandler McCuskey Brooks for the American Cusanus Society. Edited by Gerald Christianson
and Thomas M. Izbicki. Leiden: Brill, 1996. Including: “Nicholas of Cusa:
A General Reform of the Church,” with Morimichi Watanabe, 175–202;
and “Nicholas of Cusa: the Literature in English, 1989–1994,” 341–53.
“Nicholas of Cusa: On Presidential Authority in a General Council.” With H.
Lawrence Bond and Gerald Christianson. Church History 59 (1990):
19–34.
Nicholas of Cusa, Writings on Church and Reform. Translated by Thomas M.
Izbicki. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.
“Notes on Late Medieval Jurists.” Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 4 (1974):
49–54.
“Notes on the Manuscript Library of Cardinal Johannes de Turrecremata.” Scriptorium 35 (1981): 306–11.
“The Origins of the De ornatu mulierum of Antoninus of Florence.” MLN Italian
Issues Supplement 119, no. 1 (2004): 142–61.
“Papalist Reaction to the Council of Constance: Juan de Torquemada to the Present.” Church History 55 (1986): 7–20.
“A Papalist Reading of Gratian: Juan de Torquemada on c. Quodcunque [C. 24 q. 1
c. 6].” In Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Medieval Canon
Law, Syracuse, 13–18 August 1996, edited by Kenneth Pennington, Stanley Chodorow, and Keith H. Kendall, 603 -34. Monumenta Iuris Canonici,
series C. vol. 11. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2001.
“Petrus de Monte and Cyril of Alexandria.” Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum
(1986): 293–300.
“The Politics of a Conclave: The Papal Election of 1447.” Cristianesimo nella storia 28 (2007): 277 -84.
“The Problem of Canonical Portion in the Later Middle Ages: The Application
of Super cathedram.” In Proceedings of the Seventh International Congress of
Medieval Canon Law. Cambridge, 23–27 July 1984, edited by Peter Linehan. Monumenta Iuris Canonici, series C, vol. 8, 459–73. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1988.
“Problems of Attribution in the Tractatus Universi Iuris (Venice 1584).” Studi
Senesi, ser. 3, 24 (1980): 479–93.
Protector of the Faith: Cardinal Johannes de Turrecremata and the Defense of the
Institutional Church. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981. [Open access: Libro: http://libro.uca.edu/pof/pof.htm.]
“The Punishment of Pride: Castilian Reactions to the Battle of Aljubarrota.” In
Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain,
edited by Donald J. Kagay and Joseph T. Snow, 217–28. New York: Peter
Lang, 1997.

A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki   271

“Pyres of Vanities: Mendicant Preaching on the Vanity of Women and Its Lay
Audience.” In De ore Domini: Preacher and Word in the Middle Ages,
edited by Thomas L. Amos, Eugene A. Green and Beverley M. Kienzle,
211–34. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1989.
Reform and Renewal in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Studies in Honor of
Louis Pascoe, S. J. Edited by Thomas M. Izbicki and Christopher M. Bellitto. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Including: “Reform and Obedience in Four
Conciliar Sermons by Leonardo Dati, O. P.,” 174–92.
Reform, Ecclesiology and the Christian Life in the Late Middle Ages. Aldershot:
Variorum, 2008. Including: “Their Cardinal Cusanus: Nicholas of Cusa in
Tudor and Stuart Polemics.”
Reject Aeneas, Accept Pius: Selected Letters of Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pope Pius
II). Edited and translated by Thomas M. Izbicki, Gerald Christianson,
and Philip Krey. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press,
2006.
“Reject Aeneas! Pius II on the Errors of His Youth.” In Pius II: “El più expeditivo pontefice”: Selected Studies on Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (1405–1464),
edited by Zweder von Martels and Arjo Vanderjagt, 187–203. Leiden:
Brill, 2003.
Religion, Power, and Resistance from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Centuries: Playing the Heresy Card. Edited by Karen Bollerman, Thomas M. Izbicki, and
Cary J. Nederman. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Including: “Tarring Conciliarism with the Brush of Heresy,” 139–51.
“Representation in Nicholas of Cusa.” In Repraesentatio: Mapping a Keyword for
Churches and Governance. Proceedings of the San Miniato International
Workshop, October 13–16, 2004, edited by Massimo Faggioli and Alberto
Melloni. Münster: Lit Verlag, 2006.
“Saint Anthony’s Self Knowledge in a Sermon of Jean Gerson.” In Auf den Spüren
des heiligen Antonius: Festschrift für Adalbert Mischlewski zum 75. Geburtstag, edited by Peer Friess, 215–21. Memmingen: Verlag Memminger Zeitung, 1994.
“Salamancan Relectiones in the Fernán Nuñez Collection.” Studia Gratiana 29
(1998): 489–500.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1989.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, and Craig Likness. Choice 29 (1991): 547–52.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1990.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, Fred Jenkins and Craig Likness. Choice 30 (1992): 579–82.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1991.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, Fred Jenkins, and Craig Likness. Choice 31 (1993): 565–69.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1992.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, Fred Jenkins, and Craig Likness Choice 32 (1994): 558–62.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1993–94.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen
Holten, Fred Jenkins, and Craig Likness. Choice 33 (1995): 567–75.

272   A Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas M. Izbicki

“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1995.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, Fred Jenkins, and Craig Likness. Choice 34 (1996): 565–70.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1996.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, Fred Jenkins, and Craig Likness. Choice 35 (1997): 601–6.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 1997.” With Peter Allison, Gretchen Holten, Fred Jenkins, and Craig Likness. Choice 36 (1998): 637–43.
“Significant European Scholarly Titles, 2007.” With Diana Chlebek. Choice 46,
no. 04 (December 2008).
Simon of Faversham. Quaestiones super libro elenchorum. Edited by Sten Ebbesen,
Thomas M. Izbicki, John Longeway, Eileen Serene and Eleanor Stump. Studies and Texts 60. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984.
“The Sins of the Clergy in Juan de Torquemada’s Defense of the Revelations of
Saint Birgitta.” Birgittiana 20 (2005): 249–62.
“The Summula de Summa Raymundi in Gordan MS 95,” Manuscript Studies 2
(2017): 524–39.
“Texts Attributed to Bartolus de Saxoferrato in North American Manuscript
Collections.” With Patrick Lally. Manuscripta 35 (1991): 146–155.
Reprinted in Miscellanea Domenico Maffei dicata: historia-ius-studium,
edited by Antonio García García and Peter Weimar, 479–88. Goldbach:
Keip Verlag, 1995.
Three Tracts on Empire: Engelbert of Admont, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini and Juan
de Torquemada. Translated by Thomas M. Izbicki and Cary J. Nederman.
Bristol: Thoemmes, 2000.
“A Tract on the Plague Falsely Attributed to Juan de Mella.” In Homenaje a Pedro
Sainz Rodriguez, vol. 3: Estudios Historicos, 367–72. Madrid: Fundacion
Universitaria Española, 1986.
“Training the New Selector.” Against the Grain 11 (April, 1999): 22, 24.
“What Are We to Do About Robert Bellarmine.” Early Modern Literary Studies 14.2, Special Issue 17 (September 2008): 7.1–10 [Online: http://extra.
shu.ac.uk/emls/14–2/Izbibell.html.]
Women and Gender in Medieval Europe: An Encyclopedia. Edited by Margaret C.
Schaus, Thomas M. Izbicki, and Susan Mosher Stuard. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Notes on Contributors

Christopher M. Bellitto is Professor of History at Kean University in New
Jersey. His books and articles treat a range of topics, primarily in church
history, reform, and councils. Among his books is Nicolas de Clamanges:
Spirituality, Personal Reform and Pastoral Renewal on the Eve of the Reformations (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001).
He has co-edited four volumes of collected essays with Thomas M. Izbicki,
including Reform and Renewal in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance
(Leiden: Brill, 1999).
Gerald Christianson is Professor Emeritus of Church History at the Gettysburg
Lutheran Theological Seminary.
Donald F. Duclow is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Gwynedd Mercy University. He serves as Vice President of the American Cusanus Society, and
has published widely on the Christian Neoplatonic tradition in the Middle Ages. His book Masters of Learned Ignorance: Eriugena, Eckhart, Cusanus (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2006) includes twenty of his articles.
Thomas A. Fudge is Professor of Medieval History at the University of New England in Australia. He is the author of thirteen books and is considered an
international authority on Jan Hus and Hussite history.
Bettina Koch is Associate Professor of Political Science/ASPECT at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University. She has published widely in
political theory and the history of Western and non-Western political
thought. Her most recent monograph is Patterns Legitimizing Political
Violence in Transcultural Perspectives: Islamic and Christian Traditions and
Legacies (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2015).
Ian Christopher Levy is Professor of Theology at Providence College in Rhode
Island. He has published books and articles on medieval biblical exegesis, ecclesiology, and sacramental theology. His most recent book is Holy
Scripture and the Quest for Authority at the End of the Middle Ages (Notre
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2012).
Constant J. Mews is Professor in the School of Philosophical, Historical &
International Studies, Monash University, where he is also Director of
the Centre for Religious Studies. He is author of The Lost Love Letters of
Heloise and Abelard: Perceptions of Dialogue in Twelfth-Century France
(New York: Palgrave, 1999) and Abelard and Heloise (New York: Oxford

274   Notes on Contributors

University Press, 2005), as well as author of numerous articles and book
chapters about medieval religious thought, with particular attention to the
twelfth century.
James Muldoon, Professor of History Emeritus at Rutgers University, is an
Invited Research Scholar at the John Carter Brown Library, and the author
of several books, including Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979) and Empire and Order: The Concept
of Empire, 800–1800 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), as well as
articles on canon law and European expansion.
Cary J. Nederman is Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. He
is the author or editor of approximately twenty books, including, most
recently, Religion, Power, and Resistance from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth
Centuries: Playing the Heresy Card (with Karen Bollermann and Thomas
Izbicki), (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). He has also published
over one hundred journal articles and book chapters, including contributions to leading journals in political science, history, philosophy, and
medieval studies.
Francis Oakley is the Edward Dorr Griffin Professor of the History of Ideas,
Emeritus, at Williams College. He is also President Emeritus of the College and of the American Council of Learned Societies.
Louis B. Pascoe, SJ (†2015) was Professor of History at Fordham University. He
published widely on theological and philosophical ideas of the later Middle Ages. His two books were Jean Gerson: Principles of Church Reform
(Leiden: Brill, 1973) and Church and Reform: Bishops, Theologians, and
Canon Lawyers in the Thought of Pierre d’Ailly (1351–1420) (Leiden: Brill,
2005).
Joëlle Rollo-Koster is Professor of Medieval History at the University of Rhode
Island. She is the author of numerous articles on the sociocultural and
institutional history of Avignon and its papacy. She is the author of The
People of Curial Avignon: A Critical Edition of the Liber Divisionis and
the Matriculae of Notre Dame la Majour (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press,
2009), Raiding Saint Peter: Empty Sees, Violence, and the Initiation of the
Great Schism (1378) (Leiden: Brill, 2008), and Avignon and its Papacy
(1309–1417): Popes, Institutions, and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2017). She
has supervised several volumes, including A Companion to the Great Western Schism (1378–1417) that she edited with Thomas Izbicki.
Nancy Struever is Professor Emerita at the Humanities Center at Johns Hopkins
University.
Thomas Turley is Associate Professor of History at Santa Clara University. His
recent research explores the pivotal shifts in European political thought
that emerged in the early fourteenth century. He is presently working on
a book-length project entitled Guido Terreni and the Crisis of Medieval
Papalism.

Index of Names and Places

Abelard, Peter, 9–10, 157–65
Abelard, Peter, works of:
Dialectica, 165
Sic et Non, 160
Theologia ‘Scholarium’, 9, 157–65
Acts of the Apostles, 25, 218
Adam, 18, 24
Alan of Lille, 158
Albert the Great, 160
Alexander III (pope), 215
Alexander V (anti-pope), 26, 241
Alexander VI (pope), 172, 179, 181,
183
Alighieri, Dante, 7, 33, 34, 38–41, 44,
45, 46
Alighieri, Dante, works of:
De monarchia, 39
Divine Comedy, Commedia, 39,
40–41, 45
Inferno, 39–40
Paradiso, 39–40
Purgatorio, 39–40
Almain, Jacques, 236, 238
Alps, 232
Amalfi, 35
Ambrose, St. (bishop of Milan), 81,
85, 174–76
Anagni, 193, 197
Anselm of Havelberg, 9–10, 155,
161–65

Anselm of Havelberg, works of:
Antikeimenon, 10, 161–62, 164
Anti-infallibilist Minority, 232, 233
Apostles, 25, 34, 54–55, 58, 62,
120, 123, 200, 218–22,
225–26, 240
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 55, 56, 61, 73,
85, 155, 158, 195–96
Aquinas, St. Thomas, works of:
Catena aurea, 85
Arendt, Hannah, 109
Aristotelian; Aristotelians, 9, 18, 45,
56, 58, 73–74, 80, 86, 88–89,
102, 107, 140, 143, 176
Aristotle, 8, 19, 56, 61, 74–75, 77,
80–81, 83–84, 86–87, 89–90
Aristotle, works of:
Metaphysics, 80
Nicomachean Ethics; 80
Physics, 140
Politics, 74, 80, 83
Rhetoric, 80
Armagnac, 201, 202
Arras, 202
Assisi (bishop of ), 199
Assyrians, 76
Aubin, Margaret J., 234
Augsburg, 116, 158
Augustinian, 18, 40, 55–56, 85–86,
86–87, 164

276   Index of Names and Places

Augustine of Hippo, St., 40, 44,
75–76, 78, 81, 85–88, 100, 155,
157, 158, 160, 164, 262
Augustine of Hippo, St., works of:
The City of God, 75, 85, 87–88, 160
The Confessions, 44, 160
De Genesi ad litteram, 100
On the Trinity, 85
Retractations, 85
Avignon, 25, 26, 58, 193, 242
Azores, 178, 181, 183
Balkans, 10, 184
Balbi, Pietro, 138, 144
Baluze, Étienne, 197
Barthes, Roland Gérard, 96
Basel, Council of, 115, 137, 172, 231,
237, 243, 256, 257
Bath, 40
Bavaria, 115, 200
Bazin, Gustave, 233, 234
Beauvais, 57
Beierwaltes, Werner, 145
Bellarmine, Robert (cardinal), 240
Belus, 76
Benedict XIII, (anti-pope), 25–26,
242
Benjamin, Walter, 96
Bernard of Armagnac (constable of
France), 201
Bernard of Chartres, 157, 165
Bernard of Clairvaux, 9, 161, 162, 164
Blumenberg, Hans, 1, 2, 4–6
Blythe, James, 74
Boethius, 156, 165
Boethius, works of:
Consolation of Philosophy, 156
Opuscula sacra, 165
Bohemia, Bohemian, 7, 34, 43
Bonaparte, Napoleon (first consul of
France), 232

Bonaventure, 156–58
Bonaventure, works of:
Collationes in Hexameron, 157–58
Boniface VIII (pope), 55, 63
Bonne of Armagnac, 201
Bourg, Thomas du (abbot of Cerisy), 201
Bousset, Jacques-Bénigne, 231,
236–38, 240, 242, 244
Bousset, Jacques-Bénigne, works of:
Defensio Declarationis Conventus
Cleri Gallicani, 236–37
Bracciolini, Poggio, 106
Brandmüller, Walter, 241
Bressolette, Claude, 234, 238
Brixen; Bressanone, 137, 161
Bubwith, Nicholas (bishop of Bath
and Wells), 40
Bussi, Giovanni Andrea de, 155
Caenati, Onorato (count of Fondi), 193
Cain, 76
Cambrai, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26
Camp, Haimeric de, 160
Camporeale, Salvatore, 102–7
Canary Islands, 173, 178, 180
Cape Verde, 178, 183
Capuano, Matteo (archbishop of
Amalfi), 35
Capuchin Friars, 157
Caribbean Islands, 182
Carmelite, 33, 63
Casanova, José, 2, 3
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